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MEASA Method for Employing Architecture in Systems Analysis 
MBSE Model-Based Systems Engineering 
MOE Measure of Effectiveness 
MOP Measure of Performance 
 
OMG Object Management Group 
 
PCD Percent Collateral Damage 
PTD Percent Targets Destroyed 
ROE Rules of Engagement 
 
SE Systems Engineering 
SoS  System of Systems 
SoS-AFAM System of Systems Architecture Feasibility Analysis Model 
SOSAT System of Systems Analysis Tool (Sandia National Laboratories) 
SoSE System of Systems Engineering 
SoS-TDM System of Systems Tradespace definition Methodology 
SoSTEM System of Systems Tradespace Exploration Methodology 
SysML Systems Modeling Language 
 
TSE Tradespace Exploration 
 
UML Unified Modeling Language 
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LIST OF MATHEMATICAL NOTATION 
Note: The majority of this notation is rigorously defined in Section II.B.2. 
Notation not defined in that section is defined as it is used in the body of the text. 
 
Dj The domain of the jth parameter 
Djmin The lower allowable bound for the jth parameter 
Djmax The upper allowable bound for the jth parameter 
 
D Design Space, the set of all possible design points 
DA The set of acceptable design points 
DAP The set of Pareto optimal points from DA 
DF The set of feasible design points 
DPhys The set of points described by the physical parameters 
DPhys-F The set of DPhys that are feasible 
DOrg The set of points described by the organizational parameters 
DOrg-F The set of DOrg that are feasible 
DProc The set of points described by the process parameters 
DProc-F The set of DProc that are feasible 
 
di  The ith design point 
dij The jth parameter of the ith design point 
 
δai The ath attribute of the ith design point, i.e., fa(di) 
δi The set of all attributes of the ith design point 
δa*min The lower allowable bound for the ath attribute 
δa*max The upper allowable bound for the ath attribute 
 
E The set of all possible environmental points 
em The mth environment 
emj The jth parameter of the mth environment 
 
fa:DàRa The ath attribute function 
f The set of all attribute functions 
 
Ra The range of the ath attribute 
 
ua:Raà[0, 1] The utility function for the ath attribute. 
u The set of all utility functions 
 
µa The minimum allowable utility for the ath attribute 
 
wa The weight of the ath attribute  
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A. BACKGROUND AND CHALLENGE 
This dissertation introduces a methodology and a means by which to define a 
system of systems (SoS) tradespace. A SoS tradespace, to be defined completely, must 
address the physical, process, and organizational aspects of the SoS architecture. 
Including these perspectives extends the state-of-the-art for system tradespace 
development. This extension is accomplished through the contributions of this 
dissertation, the SoS Tradespace Definition Methodology (SoS-TDM) and SoS 
Architecture Feasibility Assessment Model (SoS-AFAM). 
SoS are a unique class of systems defined as systems composed of operationally 
and managerially independent constituent systems whose interactions produce a desired 
emergent behavior (Maier 1998). SoS have been found to meet many organizational 
needs, particularly those of the Department of Defense (DOD) (DOD 2008); however, the 
design and development of SoS has proven difficult (Pernin et al. 2012). 
The challenge of designing an SoS has several distinctions from that of designing 
a monolithic system. A significant one is how an SoS ’s architecture must be defined. 
Desired SoS behaviors and capabilities are emergent properties that arise through the 
interactions of the constituent systems; accordingly, these interactions form the 
architecture of the SoS (Maier 1998). These interactions are founded upon the physical—
the composition of included systems and their information interfaces; however, as the 
constituent systems are decision making entities, their interactions are governed by the 
ways in which these processes relate. Two of these relations may be defined by processes 
and organizations. 
An, or perhaps the, important aspect of design is how to choose among potential 
designs. There are three methods of design decision-making: heuristics, normative, and 
exploratory. Heuristics are natural language guidelines based upon experience. While 
useful for quickly reducing ambiguity and contending with complexity, they are limited 
in that they make no utility of analytic means for a specific problem. Normative decision-
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making is the typical analysis seen in most systems engineering or decision science texts. 
It relies heavily upon pre-established metrics and values. This allows for dispassionate 
analysis, but presupposes that the metrics and values are inherent and correct (Giachetti 
and Whitcomb 2016). This, too, has proven lacking in many scenarios. Exploratory 
design decision-making augments these methods by combining aspects of both. 
Exploratory design decision-making is closely coupled iteration of synthesis and 
analysis—problem framing, solution development, and value analysis done nearly 
simultaneously. In some cases, this may be done physically through prototypes and 
similar means as popularized by “design thinking” (IDEO 2016). More analytically, it 
may be done in a virtual environment in which one couples system designs 
(architectures) with their attributes (analysis); this is called tradespace exploration (TSE). 
The methods to do this rigorously in the context of model-based systems engineering 
(MBSE) are areas of current research (Beery 2016). 
A tradespace is the set of all possible designs that can be developed, the attributes 
of these designs (e.g., cost or performance), and the set of bounds that define what is and 
is not allowable. This may be described mathematically. Each design point may be 
defined as a vector where each entry is a parameter that describes it. Associated with each 
design point are a number of attributes; these attributes are matched to design points via 
attribute functions. Each parameter and attribute are defined on some domain; the set of 
acceptable bounds vary these domains. The problem in defining a tradespace, therefore, 
is in defining the design space and the attribute functions.  
To define the design space for an SoS , one must include parameters that describe 
the SoS from a physical, process, and organizational perspective. This is necessary, as 
these three vantages are required for a complete SoS architecture. Not only does this 
correctly define an SoS architecture, but also this is useful for SoS design analysis. These 
parameters inform SoS models and simulations, such as agent based models (ABM), 
which require input to define how systems (agents) interact in the model’s context. In 
itself, defining an SoS in this manner is not difficult, though it has not been done for SoS 
in a TSE environment. 
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The real challenge of any tradespace definition problem is in defining the attribute 
functions. This is because design spaces are large (i.e., there are a significant number of 
design points in them) and the time to assess all of these points is not. Even with very fast 
computers, the size of the design space may quickly become too large for exhaustive 
analysis. In many cases, it is possible to approximate these attribute functions; however, 
due to the complex nature of the interactions in an SoS , this is not generally possible. It 
is possible, however, to exhaustively analyze a carefully selected subset of the design 
space. 
Contemporary research in system design has addressed defining the tradespace of 
a system by 1) focusing on monolithic systems, which can be described primarily by 
physical parameters (Ross and Hastings 2005; MacCalman 2013; Beery 2016), 2) 
focusing on SoS, but only considering the physical composition of the SoS (Biltgen et al. 
2006; Chattopadhyay 2009), or 3) defining SoS attributes in such an overly simplistic 
manner that the results do not yield an accurate tradespace (Chattopadhyay 2009). This 
research aimed to provide a different option by answering the following questions: 
• How may the required SoS architectural perspectives of physical, process, 
and organizational be used to define an SoS design space? 
• How may one assess the feasibility of an SoS architecture? 
• May the above be used to define an SoS tradespace in an efficient manner 
so that it can be incorporated into existing MBSE TSE methodologies? 
B. RESEARCH AND CONTRIBUTION 
1. The SoS Tradespace Definition Methodology 
The SoS-TDM is a method to define the tradespace of an SoS according to its 
physical, process, and organizational parameters. It takes a valid SoS need, relevant 
performance measures, and potential systems, processes, and organizations as an input 
and outputs the set of feasible SoS and their performance attributes. It has four steps as 
seen in Figure 1: “Design Space Definition,” “Design Space Feasibility Analysis and 
Screening,” “Feasible Design Space Analysis,” and “Design Point Assessment and 
Tradespace Analysis.” 
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This methodology is predicated upon the idea that, for any design space, the set of 
feasible design points is significantly smaller than the entire design space. This is not 
generally provable, but experience shows it is true in many cases. In particular, as a 
system increases in complexity, it is generally more difficult to achieve a feasible design, 
as there are more interactions among the sub-systems, making it more difficult for a 
system to meet all requirements. 
The first step of the SoS-TDM is to define the design space according to physical, 
process, and organizational parameters. For the physical, this involves defining what 
systems may be included, what refactorizations1 they may take, and what 
communications sub-systems each one has. For the process, this involves defining the 
potential operational activity flows, defining what functions each system may perform, 
and defining potential rules of employment. For the organization, this involves defining 
organizational relationships and the set of organizations that may be formed from these. 
The second step of the SoS-TDM is to assess each design point for feasibility. 
This is done through the SoS-AFAM. In this, each point is assessed as feasible or not 
according to multiple criteria. The SoS-AFAM is discussed in detail in the next section. 
The third step is to assess if the set of feasible design points is “sufficiently 
small.” This is defined as being less than or equal to the number of points that may be 
assessed in the allowable time. If the set of feasible points is “sufficiently small,” then 
one proceeds to the next step. If the set is not, then one iterates the previous steps at a 
greater level of detail to further winnow the space. 
 
                                                
1 A refactorization is a slight modification to an existing system. For example, adding a new radio to a 
vehicle to allow that vehicle to communicate with other systems would be a refactorization. 
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Figure 1. The SoS Tradespace Definition Methodology 
 
The fourth and final step of the SoS-TDM is to assess the design points for their 
attributes. To do this, one inputs every design point into the relevant model or simulation and 
records the outcomes using standard techniques. For operational attributes of an SoS , the 
most common method is through the use of ABM as they best represent the salient aspects of 
SoS (Rainey and Tolk 2015), although other methods may be used as appropriate. Once one 
has defined the attributes for each feasible design point, one can build a dynamic visual 
representation of the tradespace; Figure 2 is an example SoS tradespace visualization. 
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Figure 2. Example SoS Tradespace 
 
A tradespace visualization, as depicted in Figure 2, plots design points according 
to their attributes, as seen in the top half of the figure (the colors represent the number of 
design points at each attribute location). One can vary the bounds of the tradespace by 
imposing requirements for systems, refactorizations, organizations, operational activity 
flows, or rules of employment to be included or not included in the domain of possible 
design points. Similarly, one may vary the bounds of acceptable attributes, in this case, 
cost and performance. In doing this, one varies the set of acceptable design points and 
“explores” the tradespace. Ultimately, a decision-maker may use this to define a subset of 
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the feasible design points that are acceptable and then conduct detailed architecting and 
analysis on these design points and continue the systems engineering process. 
2. The SoS Architecture Feasibility Assessment Model 
The SoS-AFAM is the second step of the SoS-TDM and depicted in Figure 3. It 
takes design points as inputs and outputs their feasibility. This is done in four steps where 
different aspects of the design space are assessed independently. This is advantageous 
because, by partitioning the design space, one must only assess a small subset of the 
space, but still be able to comprehensively assess the entire space 
 
 
Figure 3. The SoS Architecture Feasibility Assessment Model 
 
The first step of the SoS-AFAM is to assess the physical aspect of all design 
points. In this step, one assesses each design point’s physical parameters against their 
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ability to form a connected network2 that is capable of transmitting the required 
information for that SoS. At a base level, the minimum requirement is that one can form a 
connected network with the included systems in which a connection between two systems 
is binary—they are connected if they share a common communications subsystem and 
not otherwise. At higher levels, one tests for connectivity based upon communications 
subsystems ranges, availability, minimum bandwidth, maximum latency, and maximum 
error rate.  
The second step of the SoS-AFAM is to assess the process design space. This step 
assesses every design point composed of a physically feasible set of parameters crossed 
with all process parameters. The first test assesses if a set of systems has sufficient 
functionality to complete all functions in the operational activity flow for that point. The 
second tests assesses if the rules of employment are acceptable to all included systems. 
The third test assesses if there are any unresolvable conflicts among the constituent 
systems conducting listed simultaneous activities. 
The third step of the SoS-AFAM is to assess the organization design space. This 
step assesses every design point composed of a physically feasible set of parameters 
crossed with all organizational parameters. The first feasibility test assesses if the 
proposed organization is acceptable to all included constituent systems. The second test is 
if the network formed by the organization (where two systems are connected if they have 
an organizational relationship) is connected. More detailed tests include acceptance of the 
number and type of organizational relationships any one system has (e.g., one system 
may not command more than five other systems), and physical connectivity support for 
each organizational relationship (e.g., if two systems have a command-subordinate 
relationship, they must be able to communicate directly). 
Finally, one synthesizes the first three analyses to assess which design points are 
completely feasible. A design point must be feasible from all perspectives—physical, 
process, and organization. Further, one may assess how well the organization supports 
the process; in this, one assesses how many organizational steps there are between any 
                                                
2 A connected network is one in which every node is connected to every other node either directly or 
indirectly.  
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sequential points in an operational activity flow. For example, if one is conducting 
indirect fire and the activity flow is: observe the target, request fire, and shoot, but the 
organization between the observer and shooter involves multiple layers of a chain of 
command, this may not be a feasible solution as the time to traverse the organization may 
be greater than the allowable time between the two operational activities. 
The SoS-AFAM can quickly assess a large design space as it partitions the design 
space. Specifically, for a given design space, if the number of physical compositions is C, 
the number of processes is P, and the number of organizations is O, the total number of 
design points is CPO. However, one must only assess a certain percentage of these 
points; this percentage is 
Equation 1. 𝛱   = !!" + !! + !! + 𝑤𝑥 
where x is the percentage of points that are physically feasible, and w is the lesser of the 
percentage of points that are process or organizationally feasible. Note that as the design 
space increases in size as a function of organizations and processes, this number 
decreases. Moreover, the algorithms used to assess each partition of the design space are 
relatively quick, using common, well-developed network analysis algorithms (e.g. Ahuja 
et al. 1993). 
3. Indirect Fire SoS Example 
This dissertation provided an example employment of the SoS-TDM and SoS-
AFAM in the development of an indirect fire (IDF) SoS. The IDF SoS is potentially 
composed of nine systems from four different commands (U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, 
U.S. Special Operations, and Afghan Army), one possible refactorization, two possible 
operational activity flows, two sets of rules of employment, and eleven organizations. 
This leads to a design space that contains 90,112 design points. Through the use of the 
SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM, we identified that we needed a design space with fewer than 
10,080 design points to be “sufficiently small.” Through the SoS-AFAM, we identified a 
feasible design space that contained 7,980 points in less than 10 minutes of computation. 
From there, we developed the SoS tradespace as presented in Figure 2.  
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C. CONCLUSION 
The challenge of designing SoS is a desired but difficult undertaking. SoS are a 
unique class of systems whose characteristics demand that they be described not only 
with physical parameters but also with process and organizational parameters that 
describe how constituent systems interact. One method to facilitate SoS design is TSE; 
however, contemporary methods of defining tradespaces only consider physical design 
parameters. SoS designers must address the full complexity of an SoS by including 
considerations of their relationships—process and organizational parameters. This 
requirement allows for an extension to the state-of-the-art. 
The SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM extend the state-of-the-art by defining a 
methodology that winnows a well-defined (physical, process, organization) SoS design 
space through the use of feasibility tests. This allows one to only assess the feasible 
design points and use the results to define an SoS tradespace. This tradespace can then be 
explored and used to define a set of acceptable design points that may then be used for 
detailed architecting and analysis. The winnowing process, the SoS-AFAM, is a 
computationally efficient methodology for assessing feasibility for a general SoS. 
Subsequent research to advance this methodology and model include further development 
of the models for detailed architecting and analysis; definition and analysis of 
organizations and processes; the extension of them to collaborative SoS; the extension of 
the methodology to consider strategic SoS decision making over multiple iterations of the 
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This dissertation contributes to the state-of-the-art in two sub-fields of systems 
engineering, System of Systems Engineering (SoSE) and Model-Based Systems 
Engineering (MBSE). Current methods of designing SoS are either 1) heuristic or 2) 
analytic and focus on the physical considerations of an SoS while neglecting the process 
and organizational ones; however, these considerations are necessary as they represent 
how an SoS provides its capabilities. Furthermore, MBSE design methodologies are 
challenged to address the problem of accounting for process and organizational 
considerations, as they have been developed explicitly for monolithic systems. This 
dissertation contributes the SoS Tradespace definition Methodology (SoS-TDM) and SoS 
Architecture Feasibility Assessment Model (SoS-AFAM) as a means to add 
considerations of process and organization to the design of an SoS. 
The SoS-TDM is predicated upon several basic concepts. First, tradespace 
exploration significantly facilitates system design and augments heuristic and normative 
decision-making methods. Second, for accurate analysis, an SoS design space must be 
defined by physical, process, and organizational parameters; this inherently expands the 
size of the design space. Third, all SoS design points may be assessed quickly, in a 
general manner, for feasibility through the use of the SoS-AFAM. Finally, the subset of 
the SoS design space that is feasible is significantly smaller than the entire design space. 
With sufficient feasibility analysis, an engineer may winnow the design space to a 
sufficiently small set of feasible solutions that may be analyzed exhaustively. The result 
of these concepts is that an engineer can define an SoS design space that includes 
parameters necessary to define an SoS architecture, winnow this design space by only 
considering the feasible design points, and then assess these points for performance 
attributes and build a tradespace for subsequent exploration and analysis.  
A. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND 
A SoS is composed of multiple operationally and managerially independent 
systems that interact to produce a desired capability not provided by any individual 
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system. Moreover, the design and operation of an SoS is not wholly controlled by any 
one entity. Organizations—governmental, private, and combinations thereof—
increasingly rely upon SoS to meet their needs. This is due, in part, to the networked 
nature of modern society and to a recognition that SoS are capable of meeting needs that 
monolithic systems either cannot meet or are inefficient in meeting. 
In particular, the Department of Defense (DOD) is interested in SoS design and 
development as it owns and operates multiple SoS and foresees developing future SoS. 
Examples of former and current SoS the DOD owns or is a part of include the Army’s 
Future Combat System, the Navy’s Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air, the Air 
Force’s Air Operations Center, and the Joint Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(Department of Defense [DOD] 2008, 2–3). The Navy’s concept of “Distributed 
Lethality” that proposes forces composed of multiple distinct interoperating systems to 
provide a new, greater capability (Rowden et al. 2015) is a future Navy SoS. The Army’s 
Operating Concept, “Win in a Complex World” establishes a need to provide “effective 
integration of military, interorganizational, and multinational efforts” (U.S. Army 2014, 
iv). In short, the Army’s concept is to be able to quickly develop SoS including U.S. 
Army, joint, and other forces to contend with emergent situations. To address how the 
DOD designs, acquires, and manages SoS, it has published the “Systems Engineering 
Guide for Systems of Systems” (DOD 2008). The DOD clearly has an interest in 
designing SoS that meet its stakeholders’ needs. 
Designing SoS that successfully meet stakeholders’ needs has proven to be a 
difficult undertaking. The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS) is an example of an SoS 
design failure. It suffered for lack of clear SoS level architecting and analysis (Pernin et 
al. 2012, xx-xxiii) and a “narrow level of focus at the program level rather than at the 
level of the enterprise” (Archer 2014, 23). Furthermore, there were, “conflicts of interest 
among the different stakeholders of the project and an inability to observe these conflicts 
easily” (Srivastava, Piper, Arias 2012, 1964). More specifically, Pernin et al., (2012) in a 
RAND Corporation analysis of the FCS program identified the following best SoSE 
practices the FCS program failed to employ: 
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• Analytic capabilities are important to the success of large, complex 
acquisition programs. The development of concepts and the analysis of 
cost, technical feasibility, risk, and uncertainty all require detailed and 
sophisticated study.  
• An organization and operation (O&O) plan that takes an integrated unit 
perspective can aid requirements formulation.  
• A successful program requires a sound technical feasibility analysis.  
• The development of operational requirements requires an integrated, unit-
level (not system-level) approach 
• Up-front system engineering and architecting are critical 
• A shared modeling and simulation repository can improve the fidelity of 
mission-level analysis. (Pernin et al. 2012, xviii–xxix) 
Pernin et al. (2012) specifically note that the analysis of SoS technical feasibility, 
organization, and operations are key to SoSE. The FCS program either did not do these or 
did them poorly, and, consequently, the FCS failed to materialize. This failure was costly 
at $14 billion (2012 U.S. dollars) and 10 years of effort (Pernin et al. 2012, 50). A SoS 
design methodology that addresses these issues—the need to assess for feasibility, 
include organization and operations in the architecture, and conduct up-front SoSE—
would improve the ability of organizations to design and realize successful SoS. 
Coincident with the challenge of and necessity for SoS design have been 
advancements in the field of MBSE, particularly as it relates to design decision-making, 
namely tradespace exploration (TSE). Many researchers have examined tradespace 
exploration in the context of MBSE, e.g., (Brantley et al. 2002; Stump et al. 2005; Ross 
2006; Carlsen 2008; Chattopadhyay 2009; Sitterle et al. 2015; Beery 2016; Paulo, Beery, 
and MacCalman forthcoming). In particular, Beery (2016) developed the MBSE 
Methodology for Employing Architecture in System Analysis (MEASA) that formalizes 
a linkage with MBSE architecture description models and analysis models (Beery 2016). 
This methodology has proven useful for facilitating design decision-making for singular 
systems. An expansion to the MEASA or other similar system design methodologies for 
SoS will facilitate improved SoS design decision-making. 
 4 
Many organizations desire to engineer SoS to meet their needs, particularly the 
DOD. Designing and realizing an SoS has proven difficult and resulted in costly failures. 
This is, at least in part, because the design of an SoS must account for unique SoS 
considerations. Consequently, there is significant utility in developing methodologies and 
tools that facilitate and improve SoS design. 
B. SYSTEM DESIGN AND DECISION-MAKING 
This dissertation considers design as the process of determining a system 
architecture. It is necessarily an iterative process between the creative act of imagining 
possibilities and the analytic act of assessing those possibilities for feasibility and other 
performance measures (Cross 2011, 16–29; Buede 2000, 37–41). This inherently 
involves decision-making—what the system must do, how it may do it, and how well it 
must do it. There are at least three general methods of decision-making: heuristic, 
normative, and exploratory. 
Heuristic decision-making is founded in principles based upon experience and 
best practices. Maier and Rechtin (2009) outline an extensive number of systems 
architecting heuristics. Within the field of SoS, Maier (1998), Cole (2008), and Dagli and 
Kilicay-Ergin (2009) outline various heuristics. Heuristics are useful, but are limited as 
they are often conflicting (as they apply in varying contexts) and only provide general 
guidance. Moreover, heuristics must be applied by a knowledgeable designer. 
Normative decision-making is founded upon making decisions for a well-defined, 
well-understood problem. Clear performance measures and their associated values are 
defined and engineers make decisions based upon optimizing these measures. This is 
commonly practiced in traditional systems engineering (Keeney 1992; Buede 2000; 
Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011; Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson 2011). Normative design 
has also been called “technical rational design;” Giachetti and Whitcomb (2016) clearly 
articulate its baseline assumptions and its benefits and limitations. This is useful in many 
cases, but less so when the understanding of the problem and potential solutions is poorly 
understood. In fact, the premise of normative decision-making is that stakeholders’ 
values exist independently from the problem and must only be “elicited,” whereas 
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psychologists have identified that preferences are often “constructed” (Lichtenstein and 
Slovic 2006). Accordingly, it is often useful to use exploratory analysis to better 
understand and define decision-maker requirements and values. 
The final decision-making methodology is exploratory. This is, in essence, trial 
and error—closely coupled iteration between solution definition and analysis. This takes 
many forms, it is sometimes called, generically, “design thinking” (Cross 2011; Giachetti 
and Whitcomb 2016), but more rigorous implementations of it come in the form of 
tradespace exploration (TSE).  
While there is no definitive definition of a tradespace, the term is used extensively 
in the literature (Brantley et al. 2002; Stump et al. 2005; Ross 2006; Carlsen 2008; 
Chattopadhyay 2009; Sitterle et al. 2015; Beery 2016; Paulo, Beery, and MacCalman 
forthcoming). The general concept of a tradespace is based upon the idea that, for any 
system design problem, there is a design space. The design space is the set of all possible 
system design points, described by system parameters. Each design point has system 
attributes that describe how the system performs (e.g., operational performance, cost). 
The tradespace is the combination of the design space and the space defined by the 
system attributes; these spaces vary in size and composition depending upon constraints 
decision-makers place upon what system parameters and system attributes are acceptable 
and desirable. As these spaces vary depending upon decision-maker requirements, one 
may identify and understand the trade-offs involved in any threshold requirement, 
attribute value, or weighting of attributes, hence the name tradespace.  
Until recently, the concept of a tradespace was, by and large, theoretical; it was 
difficult to define and explore the tradespace in any meaningful manner. However, 
advances in computational power, statistical methods, and MBSE tools and 
methodologies have made tradespace definition and exploration a third possibility for 
system design. 
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C. MODEL-BASED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND TRADESPACE 
EXPLORATION 
The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) defines MBSE as 
“the formalized application of modeling to support system requirements, design, analysis, 
verification and validation, beginning in the conceptual design phase and continuing 
throughout development and later life cycle phases” (Friedenthal et al. 2007, 5). 
Although it has broad applications, MBSE has particular impact upon the design of 
systems. This is because skillful employment of MBSE broadens the ability of an 
engineer to develop, understand, and assess significantly more alternative options in a 
system design problem, this “illuminates the tradespace” (Paulo, Beery, MacCalman 
forthcoming).  
There has been much research regarding tradespace exploration in a MBSE 
environment (Stump et al. 2004; Ross and Hastings 2005; Sitterle et al. 2015; 
MacCalman et al. 2015; Beery 2016; Paulo, Beery, and MacCalman forthcoming). In 
particular, recent research (Beery 2016) has defined a useful methodology that uses 
MBSE tools to define the tradespace for a system using systems architecture models. 
Beery’s (2016) MBSE MEASA advanced the state-of-the-art in MBSE by explicitly 
integrating systems architecture models with analysis models to allow for subsequent 
exploratory design. This was intended for systems with the assumption of top-down, 
monolithic design. This assumption is invalid for SoS as they are developed “bottom-up,” 
meaning that the constituent systems execute a level of independence. Moreover, the 
MBSE MEASA does not consider non-physical factors such as process or organization 
(Beery 2016). These perspectives are, however, important in the design of an SoS. 
D. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING AND DESIGN 
SoS are a unique subset of systems that require special consideration and 
architectures that direct and describe how the constituent systems interact in order to 
provide useful capabilities (Maier 1998; Dagli and Kilicay-Ergin 2009). In particular, one 
may vary the process and organizational architecture aspects of an SoS while holding the 
physical architecture constant and produce different capabilities, both in degree and kind. 
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The architecture of an SoS , therefore, must include these perspectives. To fully explore 
the wide variety of potential SoS, one must define a design space that incorporates the 
parameters that describe these architectural requirements. 
1. System of Systems 
A SoS is commonly defined as a system composed of multiple systems that are 
operationally and managerially independent, geographically dispersed, present emergent 
behavior, and develop in an evolutionary manner (Maier 1998). Other authors have varied 
the criteria, e.g., autonomy, belonging, connectivity, diversity, and emergence (Boardman 
and Sauser 2006) or Maier’s five characteristics plus self-organization and adaptation (Sage 
and Biemer 2007). Regardless of the precise definition, a general consensus is that an SoS 
is a system, composed of multiple independent systems, that provide some capability and 
the total design of the system is not wholly controlled by any one entity. 
The DoD has adopted a classification of virtual, collaborative, acknowledged, or 
directed SoS (DOD 2008). The classification distinguishes SoS based on the amount of 
managerial control the SoS level has, with virtual and collaborative SoS having none to 
minimal, acknowledged having limited, and directed having significant control. They 
further distinguish SoS based upon the agreement of the SoS’s purpose, with virtual SoS 
having no agreement and the others having an agreed upon purpose for the SoS.  
SoS provide a capability that is not wholly encapsulated by any one system. This 
capability is a product of the interactions that occur among the various constituent 
systems, typically called an emergent behavior. Emergence may be very simple and 
predictable, such as gears rotating in a watch to keep time or highly complex, such as neurons 
in a brain yielding consciousness (Maier 2015). All systems, SoS or otherwise, exhibit 
emergent properties; however, SoS are distinct in that the designer of an SoS does not 
completely control how the constituent systems (i.e., its sub-systems) are designed, how 
those systems function, or how those systems operate. The challenge for an SoS engineer is 
to design an SoS that will cause the constituent systems to interact in a productive manner. 
These interactions are founded upon the physical systems included in the SoS and the rules 
that guide their behavior, the process and organizational architectures. 
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2. System of Systems Architecture 
An architecture prescribes a system’s structure in terms of elements and 
relationships from multiple perspectives. A standard trichotomy of systems architecture is 
functional, physical, and allocated architectures (Buede 2000). A functional architecture 
describes what a system must do. The physical architecture represents how the system is 
physically partitioned, colloquially, the who of the system. The allocated architecture 
maps the who to the what. Finally, architectures may be standardized using architecture 
frameworks such as the Zachman Framework or DOD Architecture Framework 
(DODAF). For this dissertation, DODAF is used as a frame of reference, although the 
approach is generally applicable. 
Within an SoS , the physical-functional-allocated trichotomy is valid, but there 
are some key distinctions. At its highest level, the functional architecture of an SoS 
represents, in part, the emergent properties of the SoS, what the system must do to 
provide its useful capabilities. The physical architecture of an SoS describes included 
constituent systems that are, generally, pre-existing to the SoS. The allocated architecture 
of an SoS is very distinct from general monolithic systems. Standard engineering practice 
is to allocate functions to physical sub-systems in a one-to-one manner (Buede 2000). For 
monolithic systems, this works as engineers have control over the development of their 
sub-systems and development is “top-down.” In an SoS , this is generally not true. The 
SoS designer does not have control over the development of the constituent systems and 
the development process is “bottom-up.” Moreover, different constituent systems may 
have the capacity to provide the same functions. SoS must describe how constituent 
systems interact and are “assigned” to functions. This is commonly expressed as process 
and organizational architectures. 
For this dissertation, an SoS physical architecture describes the composition of the 
included constituent systems and the communications network formed by these systems. 
At its highest level, it is a graph (network) where the nodes represent the constituent 
systems and the arcs represent communications links. At lower architectural levels, the 
details of the constituent system capabilities, communications standards, communications 
systems performance, and other similar detail are included in this architecture. Though 
this architecture may be expressed in multiple ways, the DODAF describes this primarily 
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in through the Operational Viewpoint 1 (OV-1), high-level operational concept, Systems 
View-1 (SV-1), system interface matrix, and the Data and Information Viewpoints (DIV) 
(Department of Defense Chief Information Officer [DOD CIO] 2010). 
The process architecture describes both the operational activity flow (expressed as 
a kill chain, functional flow block diagram, IDEF0 diagram, or similar flow model) and 
the rules of employment that govern this flow. Though these may be expressed in 
different ways, the DODAF describes this in its various Operational Viewpoints (OV) 
and certain System Viewpoints (DOD CIO 2010). 
Finally, the organization architecture describes the relationships between the 
constituent systems. This includes both a definition of the relationships with regard to 
how they affect system decision-making (e.g., one system prioritizes a response to 
another system due to a hierarchical relationship between the two) and what information 
is required, permitted, or prohibited between two relationships. This is seen in DODAF in 
the OV-4: Organizational Relationships Chart and may be seen in variations of the 
aspects of the Services or Systems Viewpoints (DOD CIO 2010). 
SoS architecture descriptions may be done using many of the same tools and 
methods for describing monolithic systems. Pan, Yin and Hu (2011) demonstrate the 
utility of modeling and simulation of SoS using DODAF. DODAF 2.02 makes provisions 
for SoS. Similarly, MBSE tools such as SysML are useful to represent SoS (Lane and 
Bohn 2013; Wang 2007; Rao et al. 2008; Kenley et al. 2014). It is important to note, 
however, that within these frameworks, methodologies, and tools, engineers must take 
care to specifically identify the important SoS aspects of the physical, process, and 
organizational views as, together, these views describe and prescribe how the constituent 
systems interact to provide desired SoS capabilities. 
3. System of Systems Analysis 
Once an SoS architecture has been described, it must be analyzed for its 
performance attributes (e.g., feasibility, cost, operational performance). SoS analysis differs 
from typical systems analysis (Buede 2000; Blanchard and Fabrycky 2009; Gibson et al. 
2007) primarily in the details. Notably, it differs in what is being analyzed and the tools 
used to assess SoS. The purpose of SoS analysis is to assess how an SoS performs 
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according to any number of measures of effectiveness (MOE) or measures of performance 
(MOP). These measures should focus on the desired emergent capabilities provided by the 
SoS (Thompson et al. 2015). To assess these emergent properties, engineers are best served 
using models that demonstrate them. This is most commonly expressed through the use of 
Agent Based Models (ABM) (Rainey and Tolk 2015), through Petri Nets (Wang 2007; Rao 
et al. 2008; Kenley et al. 2014), Markov Chains (Giachetti 2015), and other simpler 
aggregation models (Chattopadhyay 2009).  
Within any systems analysis, particularly in the context of tradespace 
development, one must assess large numbers of design points. Due to the nature of SoS, 
to accurately assess them for performance, one must represent their complex interactions, 
at least across the physical, process, and organization perspectives. Given that time and 
computational power are finite resources, it makes sense to only assess carefully selected 
design points. Logically, it only makes sense to assess the design points that have the 
potential to be realized, the set of feasible points. An efficient feasibility test that assesses 
an SoS design point against feasibility requirements from multiple perspectives allows 
one to winnow the design space and exhaustively examine the significantly reduced sub-
set of feasible design points. 
Finally, note that in modeling a system (of any sort), one must identify the relevant 
interactions. The identified interactions must be known a priori to do this. It is possible that 
there are interactions that are not foreseeable, no matter how carefully one considers and 
understands the problem; this is an inherent limitation of modeling and simulation. On the 
other hand, many, if not most, interactions are foreseeable, even if they were not actually 
foreseen. The art of modeling and simulation involves scoping a modeling problem so that 
one sufficiently identifies the most relevant interactions to correctly approximate the behavior 
of the system. For SoS, in addition to baseline physical concerns, considerations of 
organization and process are relevant and significantly contribute to the interactions that lead 
to emergent behavior. It is impossible to say that all interactions will occur from only a 
physical, process, or organization perspective; however, many, if not the majority of SoS 
interactions may fall into these categories. 
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4. System of Systems Design 
SoS design methodologies, tools, and guidance come in the form of heuristics, 
normative decision-making, and exploratory decision-making methodologies. The most 
significant reference is Maier’s (1998) SoS architecting principles (heuristics). Other 
methods have been proposed and Figure 1 outlines them. These various methodologies 
are generally limited, however, in that considerations of SoS-specific architecture 
requirements of organization and process are either not, or poorly accounted for. In 
particular, the two SoS TSE specific methodologies, Chattopadhyay (2009) and Biltgen 
et al. (2006) are similarly insufficient. Chattopadhyay (2009) only considers SoS 
composition. Biltgen et al. (2006) is focused on physical interactions of sub-systems 
within a system or directed SoS. 
The other SoS research does not account for tradespace exploration. In particular, 
Rao et al. (2008) focused on integrating SysML with Petri Nets; Mokhtarpour and 
Stracener (2014) is limited and does not consider the requirements for organizational and 
process architecture; Davendralingam and DeLaurentis (2015) provides methods for 
considering the different combinations of systems, but they are focused on optimizing 
pre-established metrics and not tradespace exploration. Kenley et al. (2014) is the most 
closely related research; it includes allocation of systems to functions, but in a very 
limited manner and it does not assess for SoS feasibility (Kenley et al. 2014).  
5. System of Systems Conclusion 
SoS are a distinct subset of systems with unique architecture, analysis, and design 
requirements. In particular, for accuracy and completeness, SoS architectures require a 
description of their physical, process, and organizational perspectives. This significantly 
impacts subsequent SoS analysis and operational performance. Accordingly, to explore 
an SoS tradespace, the design space must include these parameters. This has not been 
done in the field of tradespace exploration and poses a potential extension to the state-of-
the-art. The ability to define and analyze an SoS design space efficiently allows the 
development of an SoS tradespace, which provides engineers and analysts a third tool for 
SoS design decision-making. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
There is a significant need to design SoS; however, this is a difficult challenge. 
SoS must be designed in a manner that includes their physical, process, and 
organizational considerations. These have been expressed in SoS architectures and 
included in SoS heuristic design decision-making. They have not been included in more 
analytic SoS design techniques, particularly TSE, as seen in Figure 1. Furthermore, by 
including expanded SoS design parameters, we challenge existing methods to account for 
the complex interactions among these various parameters. We must, therefore, introduce 
a different methodology for defining and exploring the tradespace. 
 
 



































































































This leads to a potential extension to the state-of-the-art in both MBSE and SoSE. 
The extension is in adding the perspectives of process and organization to existing TSE 
methodologies. By adding these new considerations, we must, however, be able to define 
SoS feasibility from these multiple perspectives, as any chosen design point must be 
feasible. Assessing for feasibility allows us to define a small sub-set of the entire design 
space for exhaustive analysis. 
This research addresses these potential extensions by answering the following 
problems: 
• How may the required SoS architectural perspectives of physical, process, 
and organizational be used to define an SoS design space? 
• How may one assess the feasibility of an SoS architecture? 
• May the above be used to define an SoS tradespace in an efficient manner 
so that it can be incorporated into existing MBSE TSE methodologies? 
The scope of this research is limited to studying acknowledged and directed SoS. 
It is focused on SoS design, in particular, high-level, early life-cycle design and 
architecture. Furthermore, it is limited to the bottom-up design of SoS composed of 
existing systems.  
The end state of this research is two-fold. First, it is a general methodology, the 
SoS-TDM, to describe a means of defining and examining the tradespace of SoS in a 
manner that includes parameters that describe the SoS physical, process, and 
organizational architectures. Second, it is a specific modeling technique, the SoS-AFAM, 
to assess SoS feasibility using the same parameters. The results may be used in 
conjunction with a greater MBSE TSE approach and/or SoS engineering methodology. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter introduces the relevant background material, defines key terms and 
concepts, and discusses recent, related research. This provides readers with a common 
language and the context in which the research provides an original contribution. For 
clarity and brevity, the author assumes the reader has familiarity with the foundations of 
systems engineering.  
In particular, this chapter outlines system design and decision-making, tradespace 
exploration, MBSE, and SoS engineering and design. Together, these areas show a 
potential extension to the state-of-the-art in both MBSE and SoSE as applied to designing 
SoS. This is because current SoS exploratory design methodologies do not allow for the 
architecture requirements of process and organizational views. 
A. SYSTEM DESIGN AND DECISION-MAKING 
Design is the essence of engineering. Broadly defined, design is the 
creative process by which our understanding of logic and science is joined 
with our understanding of human needs and wants to conceive and refine 
artifacts that serve specific human purposes. (White 1998, 285) 
The focus of this dissertation is SoS design. White (1998) provides a useful 
definition of design that exemplifies what others (e.g., Buede 2000; Blanchard and 
Fabrycky 2009; Maier and Rechtin 2009) have stated about design (or architecting): it is 
an iterative process that necessarily combines creativity, analysis, and judgment and a 
balancing act of satisfying multiple, possibly competing, requirements and constraints. 
As one chooses among the range of possible problem definitions and system solutions, an 
engineer must have a “rational, explicit process” (Buede 2000, 13) that facilitates this 
decision-making. 
Broadly speaking, there are three major methods of design decision-making: 
heuristic, normative, and exploratory. The first two are broadly explored in the literature; 
the latter is less well documented, and may be termed “design thinking” or “tradespace 
exploration” depending upon the context. There is no specific ordering to these 
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methodologies, each has its strengths and weaknesses; the three methodologies are 
generally complementary. 
1. Heuristic Decision-Making 
A heuristic is “A guideline for architecting, engineering, or design. Lessons 
learned expressed as a guideline. A natural language abstraction of experiences that 
passes the tests of Chapter 2”3 (Maier and Rechtin 2009, 424). Simply put, a heuristic is 
an expression of common sense experience. These are highly useful in systems design. 
They provide guidelines to reduce ambiguity, contend with complexity, and facilitate 
decision-making when means that are more analytic are not feasible. Moreover, they are 
very quickly employed and can be used to find a “good” solution in reasonable time 
(Giachetti 2010). 
Maier and Rechtin (2009) compiled a significant number of systems architecting 
heuristics. Within SoSE, Maier (1998) and Cole (2008) have proposed several heuristics. 
These are 
• Maier (1998): “Stable Intermediate Forms,” “Policy Triage,” “Leverage at 
the Interfaces,” and “Ensuring Cooperation,”  
• Cole (2008): “Needs often compete,” “Needs change over time,” 
“Resource availability constrains the solution space,” and “Design 
compromise is necessary.” 
Heuristics do have their limitations: they sometimes conflict; they may be victims 
of experience; and they have difficulty in providing guidance for choices that vary in 
degree. First, heuristics may provide contradictory guidance. Maier and Rechtin (2009) 
provide an example that “Look Before You Leap” and “He Who Hesitates is Lost” are, 1) 
obviously contradictory and 2) situation dependent. They get around this by defining 
heuristics as narrowly focused on a single field, although this may not prevent all 
contradictions. Second, heuristics, to be effective, must ring true with the decision-maker; 
                                                
3 The “tests of Chapter 2” are “There is an interesting human test for a good heuristic. An experienced 
listener, on first hearing one, will know within seconds that it fits that individual’s model of the world. 
Without having said a word to the speaker, the listener almost invariably affirms its validity by an 
unconscious nod of the head, and then proceeds to recount a personal experience that strengthens it. Such is 
the power of the human mind” (Maier and Rechtin 2009, 31). 
 17 
accordingly, this is subject to that decision-maker’s personal bias and experiences. 
Adams (2001, 70), writing on creativity, states, “The problem arises when individuals 
become so universally in favor of tradition that they cannot see the need for and 
desirability of change in specific areas.” The choice and employment of a heuristic is 
subject to this challenge. Finally, when making decisions among options that vary in 
degree (as opposed to kind), heuristics are limited, as distinguishing between the degrees 
of options requires analysis. Together, these limitations lead to the fact that an 
experienced and skillful designer must employ heuristics. In cases where these limitations 
are apparent, other decision-making methodologies are useful. 
2. Normative Decision-Making 
Normative decision-making is the typical analysis expressed in most systems 
engineering and analysis texts. It is also sometimes termed “technical-rational design” 
(Giachetti and Whitcomb 2016). It involves defining a problem through significant 
interaction with stakeholders, establishing metrics by which to assess solutions, defining 
value curves that normalize the metrics and clarify the importance stakeholders place 
upon various solutions, and defining relative weights among the metrics (Buede 2000; 
Parnell, Driscoll, and Henderson 2011; Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). With this 
framework in place, a problem is well defined and potential solutions may be analyzed 
against these metrics. Once a set of potential solutions are defined and analyzed, one may 
establish a set of Pareto optimal solutions, among which the decision-makers must 
choose. 
This type of decision-making is very powerful. It allows engineers and analysts to 
quantify various options and weigh them against each other. It provides a means of 
limiting subjectivity in decision-making and helps inform decision-makers of how 
various options perform. Due to the success of normative decision-making, particularly 
for problems that are well defined and easily quantified, this sort of decision-making is 
pervasive in many industries. 
This type of decision-making is also limited. It is subject to the bias of initial 
problem definition—requirements (e.g., thresholds and goals on various measures) and 
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values may be defined incorrectly. It presupposes that decision-makers have intrinsic 
values that may be “elicited;” we must only interrogate the stakeholders sufficiently to 
understand these preferences. However, psychologists have recognized that preferences 
are often “constructed,” i.e., preferences are often developed in the context of a situation 
(Lichtenstein and Slovic 2006). In the field of systems engineering, this manifests itself 
when a system is designed such that it meets all of its stated requirements, yet 
stakeholders are, ultimately, unsatisfied. Norman and Kuras (2006, 207) articulate this 
clearly: 
We continue to view Systems Engineering as fundamentally about 
allocating desired, known functionality among specific elements of a 
design; all known a priori and stable over time. The users of the 
functionality built often accuse us, the developers and acquirers, of being 
“late to need,” “unresponsive,” and “too expensive.” 
We respond with a lexicon carefully crafted to put the onus back on the 
users. We say that the users’ requirements are unknown or poorly stated; 
that, if the requirements are known, there is a requirements drift (i.e., 
modifying the requirements), or requirements creep (i.e., adding additional 
requirements). We suggest that the user can’t (or won’t) say what they 
really want, or how they will use that which is to be built and delivered. 
(Norman and Kuras 2006, 207) 
This problem leads to one of a few possible solutions. Decision-makers increase 
the number of requirements in an attempt to better define what they desire (leading to a 
reduced possible design space) or decision-makers return to heuristics or, worse, personal 
bias. An alternative to these options is exploratory decision-making. 
3. Exploratory Decision-Making 
The final general methodology for decision-making is exploratory. This is a non-
standard term, but encompasses related ideas seen throughout the literature. For this 
dissertation, exploratory decision-making is defined as closely coupled iteration of 
synthesis and analysis. This broadly encompasses seemingly distinct methodologies as 
“design thinking” and “tradespace exploration.”  
Companies such as IDEO popularized “Design Thinking.” Tim Brown, the 
president of IDEO, defined it: “Design thinking is a human-centered approach to 
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innovation that draws from the designer’s toolkit to integrate the needs of people, the 
possibilities of technology, and the requirements for business success” (IDEO 2016). 
Important to this is the idea that there are overlapping requirements for system design that 
consider desirability and feasibility and that solution formulation is not an orderly 
process, rather a sequence of “inspiration, ideation, and implementation” (IDEO 2016). 
One does this through the development and trial of prototypes or similar models of the 
solution. Other authors have expanded upon the concepts of design (Cross 2011; Nelson 
and Stolterman 2003; Whitcomb and Giachetti 2016). These are by and large theoretical 
(and, in some cases philosophical) constructs of design thought. Design is useful as it 
explores both problem definition and solution simultaneously. 
A related concept to exploratory decision-making is “set-based design” or “set-
based concurrent engineering.” This methodology was most prominently employed by 
Toyota and discussed by Sobek, Ward, and Liker (1999). The general concept is that 
throughout the design process various domain engineers (e.g., mechanical, 
manufacturing) and other perspectives (e.g., marketing) consider the set of all 
possibilities, gradually eliminating infeasible solutions (Sobek, Ward, and Liker 1999). 
This is in contrast with traditional engineering, in which engineers attempt to converge on 
a (optimal) point. In the case of Toyota, this method is particularly useful as it is tied to 
their product development process (Sobek, Ward, and Liker 1999). From a defense 
perspective, there has been some application to naval engineering (Singer, Doerry, and 
Buckley 2009; Doerry et al. 2014). In particular, this has been applied to early stage 
capability development conceptualization for an amphibious combat vehicle (Doerry et 
al. 2014). To date, these applications have been for monolithic systems. 
More analytically, various researchers developed the concept of tradespace 
exploration (TSE) to address similar problems seen in normative decision-making. The 
essence of TSE is that a tradespace is a design space composed of potential design points 
and their associated performance measures (this is more rigorously defined in the next 
section). Through this, designers and decision-makers can explore their options both in 
terms of system design and system performance. This concept has been explored and 
developed by a wide variety of researchers (Stump et al. 2004; Ross and Hastings 2005; 
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Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory [PSU-ARL] 2015; Sitterle et 
al. 2015; MacCalman et al. 2015; Beery 2016; Paulo, Beery, and MacCalman 
forthcoming). In particular, the Pennsylvania State University Applied Research 
Laboratory Trade Space Exploration Group (2015) defines it as a “shopping process,” 
“negotiated process,” and “iterative process.” TSE allows engineers to use analytic tools 
to develop virtual design spaces that may be used in a “design thinking” manner as 
outlined by IDEO (2016). By virtue of being composed of computer models, researchers 
may consider increasingly complex or cost-prohibitive (for proto-type development) 
solutions that would normally be done in a non-analytic design-thinking environment. 
Exploratory decision-making is a third option to augment heuristic and normative 
methodologies. It provides flexibility in problem definition (a problem in normative 
methods) while allowing for analytic comparisons (a problem in heuristic methods). This 
augments the other methods and facilitates high-level design decision-making and allows 
users to better formulate problems (using their experience and heuristics) and 
requirements for subsequent optimization. 
4. Conclusion 
The design of a system involves decision-making. In general, there are three 
general decision-making methodologies: heuristic, normative, and exploratory. Each has 
its own benefits and limitations; the three augment each other and should be used in 
combination for any full system design problem. The third method, exploratory, is the 
most recent as advances in computer modeling and simulation have made large-scale 
tradespace exploration feasible. 
B. TRADESPACE, TRADESPACE EXPLORATION, AND DESIGN 
DECISION-MAKING 
Exploratory decision-making may be conducted analytically using computer 
models to define a tradespace. The development of a tradespace and its exploration is 
predicated on the idea that a design problem can be expressed, at least in part, 
mathematically. This may be used, in combination with MBSE, to link architectural 
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products with external models and simulations (Beery 2016) to “illuminate the 
tradespace” (Paulo, Beery, and MacCalman forthcoming). 
1. Tradespace Usage in the Literature and Definition 
The term “tradespace” is widely used in the literature, but rarely rigorously 
defined. Brantley, McFadden, and Davis (2002), Ross and Hastings (2005), Sitterle et al. 
(2015), the Pennsylvania State University Applied Research Laboratory (2015) and 
Buede (2000) provide varying definitions: 
The “trade space” can be defined as the set of program and system 
parameters, attributes, and characteristics required to satisfy performance 
standards. Decision makers define and refine the developing system by 
making tradeoffs with regard to cost, schedule, risk, and performance; all 
of which fall within the systems trade space. (Brantley, McFadden, and 
Davis 2002, 2) 
Tradespace. Is the space spanned by the completely enumerated design 
variables, which means given a set of design variables, the tradespace is 
the space of possible design options. … Using models and simulation, the 
full set of design options—the tradespace—can be evaluated in terms of 
benefits and costs to decision makers. Often the Utility-Cost plot will be 
referred to as the tradespace as well since it is a useful representation for 
making “best” system value trade decisions. … The Pareto Front is the 
tradeoff curve between metrics. (Ross and Hastings 2005, 2) 
A tradespace is defined as a collection of design variables and system 
attributes, different levels of which characterize each design alternative for 
a given system. A model or collection of models acts as a mathematical 
representation of the system, often with external variables to map the input 
variables to output variables. Commonly, input variables are chosen to be 
system design variables while output variables are defined to be system 
attributes. This relationship may be reversed depending on the mapping, 
and the delineation between which design variables are used as inputs and 
which are derived via model transfer functions is not always clear. 
Variables may be intrinsic to the system or dependent on conditions 
external to the system (e.g., cargo space versus miles per gallon). Some 
form of cost is also typically derived from the characteristics that describe 
each system design alternative. (Sitterle et al. 2015, 651) 
1) It is a shopping process. The decision maker discovers what it is they 
want while they are looking for it. 
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2) It is a negotiated process. Decisions of real complexity involve multiple 
decision makers, each with their own motives and levels of expertise. 
3) It is an iterative process. The trade space is first explored, and then the 
knowledge gained is exploited by focusing future searches to regions of 
decreasing breadth but of increasing depth and detail.  
(PSU-ARL 2015) 
Buede (2000) does not explicitly use the term tradespace, but he provides a visual 
depiction of the tradespace as seen in Figure 2. Notably, he indicates that there is a back-
and-forth (indicated by two-way arrows) of different requirements and objectives along 
with cost and performance trade-offs that all, together, inform the tradespace.  
 
 
Figure 2.  Buede Tradespace and Design Problem Definition through 
Requirements. Source: Buede (2000) 
Collectively, these definitions share a few key aspects. The first is that there must 
be a manner to assess all feasible design points. Feasible must be defined in a practical as 
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opposed to theoretical sense and account for the various constraints that affect what may 
make a design point possible (e.g., the time to develop the system affects what 
technology may feasibly be considered. A system to be implemented within a year can 
only consider computing power on order of contemporary computing power. A system to 
be implemented in 10 years may account for Moore’s Law). The second shared aspect of 
a tradespace is that, for each design point, there must be an associated set of system 
attributes—cost, performance, and other key factors. This may be done as an enumerated 
list, or, more generally, a function that takes design parameters as an input and outputs 
system attributes. Finally, there is an associated set of requirements and constraints that 
define what is and is not desirable with regard to system attributes. Combining these 
three leads to a set of potential design points that may be considered the tradespace. 
These concepts may be expressed more rigorously mathematically. 
2. Mathematical System Design and Tradespace Definition 
A system design problem may be defined in a general, abstract manner. Wymore 
(1993) developed his tricotyledon theory to characterize what he called the functionality, 
buildability, and implementability cotyledons. These are sets of theoretic system design 
points that, respectively, meet system operational requirements, feasibility requirements, 
and their intersection, as depicted in Figure 3. Wymore’s language and description are, 
unfortunately, outdated and esoteric. Analogously, Statnikov and Matusov (2002) present 
their “Parameter Space Investigation” that uses more common set theoretic and 
mathematical optimization language to describe design problems. A sample depiction of 
their work in two-dimension is seen in Figure 4. In general, one can describe a system 
design problem mathematically by defining design parameters, design points, attribute 
functions, and utility functions. System design points are defined according to a set of 
parameters. System attributes are defined by the attribute functions that take design 
parameters as an input and output an attribute value. Utility functions prescribe a 
normalized value for each attribute. This, combined with a relative weighting of attributes 




This caricature depicts the three theoretical spaces a systems engineer must contend with 
in engineering a system: The functional, buildable, and implementable cotyledons.  
Figure 3.  Tricotyledon Theory. Source: Wymore (1993) 
 
Figure 4.  Parameter Space Investigation Example. Source: Statnikov and 
Matusov (2002) 
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For this dissertation, the general mathematical formalization of a design problem 
is defined in the following sections.  
a. Design Point and Design Space 
A system design point may be described according to its various parameters. 
Call the ith design point:  𝒅𝒊 =  < 𝑑!!,𝑑!!,…𝑑!" ,…   𝑑!" > 
The design point has k parameters, 𝑑!" , 1 ≤ 𝑗 ≤ 𝑘. Each parameter is defined on its 
domain, a closed set 𝑫𝒋. Example parameters include:  
• Engine Type, which may be defined on the set < 𝑑𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑙,𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒, 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐t𝑟𝑖𝑐 > 
• Car Color, which may be defined on a set such as < 𝑟𝑒𝑑, 𝑏𝑙𝑢𝑒,𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑦,𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛 > or a set < 𝑟,𝑔, 𝑏 |  𝑟,𝑔, 𝑏 ∈ ℤ; 0 ≤ 𝑟 ≤255, 0 ≤ 𝑔 ≤ 255, 0 ≤ 𝑏 ≤ 255 > (the RGB color model 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RGB_color_model).  
• Car length, which may be on 0, 5 ⊂ ℝ , the number of meters the car 
may be long. 
The design space is the set of all possible design points. It is the Cartesian 
product of all of the parameter domains. Call the design space:  𝑫 = 𝑫𝟏×𝑫𝟐×…×𝑫𝒋×…×𝑫𝒌. 
If 𝑫𝒋 ≤ 𝑚 ∈ ℝ for some positive 𝑚, then |𝑫| is finite (if large), otherwise, the 
design space is infinite, but still closed. Note that if D is infinite and not countable (say 
some 𝑫𝒋 is a subset of ℝ ), then one cannot enumerate the 𝒅𝒊. For this dissertation, we 
assume a discrete, finite definition of each Dj, thus the design space is finite, if large.4 In 
cases where parameters are defined on a continuous domain, we may approximate them 
by choosing a number of discrete levels representative of the domain. For example, the 
length of a vehicle may have a domain of 1 to 10 meters; this may be approximated as the 
domain: <1m, 2m, 3m, 4m, 5m, 6m, 7m, 8m, 9m, 10m>. 
                                                
4 We may assume this as each potential constituent system is a discrete element. Each operational 




As every system exists in a larger context, there are environmental parameters 
that may affect how a design point performs in that situation. This environment may be 
physical (e.g., terrain or weather), regulatory (e.g., interface standards or government 
rules and regulations), or the behaviors of external actors (e.g., enemy activity). The 
important distinction of an environmental parameter from a design parameter is that the 
designer has no control over environmental parameters and does have some level of 
control over design parameters. An environmental point may be described as a vector of 
environmental parameters: 𝒆𝒎 =  < 𝑒!!, 𝑒!!,… , 𝑒!" > 
Where each em* describes the relevant parameter. The set of all possible environmental 
parameters is E.  
c. System Attributes 
Each design point has some set of system attributes that are defined by a 
function. If there are x attributes, these functions may be termed: 𝑓!:𝑫 → 𝑹𝒂, 1 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 
with  𝛿!" = 𝑓!(𝒅𝒊) 
where 𝑹𝒂 is a closed set, commonly a subset of ℝ!. The set of all attributes for design 
point 𝒅𝒊 is 𝜹𝒊. The set of all functions is f. 
Common examples of systems attributes include: 
• The cost of a design point. 
• The mean time between failures of a design point. 
• The operational performance of a design point. 
• The availability of a design point. 
• The feasibility of a design point. 
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Note that each 𝑓! must be well defined. This definition may be analytic (e.g., the 
COSYSMO model for cost) or through the results of a simulation or a meta-model 
developed based upon the results of selected design points and subsequent statistical 
inference. 
Thus far, we have assumed that the environment is static; however, this is not 
always true. In this case, the attribute function fa may be modified to include 
environmental parameters. That is, one may say: 𝛿!"# = 𝑓!(𝒅𝒊, 𝒆𝒎) 
Is the ath attribute of the ith design point in the mth environment. In a more detailed 
analysis, this may be a further useful consideration as a decision maker must vary what 
potential environments in which a system must operate. All subsequent discussion 
assumes that the environment is static. 
d. Acceptable Design Points 
With this framework in place, a designer may place acceptable boundaries on the 
design space and the system attributes based upon criteria (these may be engineering, 
political, or of another nature) of the designer’s choosing. For each 𝑫𝒋 there is some 𝐷!!"#  and  𝐷!!"#. Similarly, for each 𝛿!∗there is an associated 𝛿!∗!"# and 𝛿!∗!"#. Together 
these serve to constrain the set of allowable design points, call this subspace, the set of 
acceptable design points, 𝑫𝑨 ⊂ 𝑫,   𝑫𝑨 =< 𝒅𝒊 ∈ 𝑫|∀𝑑!" ∈ 𝐝𝐢,𝐷!!"# ≤ 𝑑!" ≤ 𝐷!!"#   𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛿!∗!"# ≤ 𝛿!" = 𝑓! 𝒅𝒊 ≤ 𝛿!∗!"# ,∀𝑓! ∈ 𝒇 > 
Once a designer has defined 𝑫𝑨, if it is non-empty, the question, of course, is 
what is the best choice of design point?  
e. Choosing a Design Point 
The term “best” depends significantly upon the values a decision-maker assigns to 
each system attribute and the relative weighting among those functions. For each 
attribute, assign a utility function, 𝑢!:𝑹𝒂 → 0, 1 , 1 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥 that describes the value the 
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decision-maker assesses for that attribute. These utility functions may take many forms, 
examples include: 
• An S curve, indicating initially low returns, followed by rapidly increasing 
returns, and then decreasing returns. 
• An inverse logarithmic curve, indicating decreasing returns. 
• An inverse parabola, indicating the desire for a value in the middle of 𝑹𝒂. 
For each 𝑢!(𝛿!∗) the decision-maker may further assign a minimum utility, 𝜇! ∈ 0, 1 . In most cases, it makes sense to assign 𝜇! = 0 and assess a minimum for the 
attribute according to 𝑫𝑨. 
The decision-maker further assigns a relative weight to each attribute, 𝑤! , 1 ≤𝑎 ≤ 𝑥,𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ   𝑤!!! = 1. This leads to an optimization problem: 
Maximize: 𝑤! ∙ 𝑢! 𝑓! 𝒅𝒊 + 𝑤! ∙ 𝑢! 𝑓! 𝒅𝒊 +⋯+ 𝑤! ∙ 𝑢! 𝑓! 𝒅𝒊  
subject to 𝒅𝒊 ∈ 𝑫𝑨 𝑢! 𝑓! 𝒅𝒊 ≥ 𝜇! 
If all of the above functions are well defined and 𝑫𝑨 ≠ ∅, this problem may be 
solved, or closely approximated, using mathematical programming. Call the results, the 
set of optimal points, 𝑫𝑨∗ 
An alternative to optimization is satisfaction. In this manner, a decision-maker 
merely defines 𝑫𝑨 and states that any point in 𝑫𝑨 is satisfactory.5 This may be useful in 
cases where optimization is difficult, such as when 𝑢! is unknown or poorly known. One 
may further consider the set of Pareto optimal points, 𝑫𝑨𝑷 ⊂ 𝑫𝑨. These are defined as: 𝑫𝑨𝑷 =< 𝒅𝒊 ∈ 𝑫𝑨  |  ∄𝒅 ∈ 𝑫𝑨  𝑓! 𝒅𝒊 ≥ 𝑓! 𝒅 , 1 ≤ 𝑎 ≤ 𝑥  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑓! 𝒅𝒊 > 𝑓 𝒅 >. 
Stated simply, a point is Pareto optimal if one cannot improve one attribute without 
worsening another. Note that 𝑫𝑨∗ ⊆ 𝑫𝑨𝑷 ⊆ 𝑫𝑨. 
                                                
5 In reality, the most common application is that a designer defines and evaluates several options and 
then chooses the best among them, where best is defined based upon the decision-maker’s values. 
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f. Implications of This Formalization 
The most obvious implication stems from the fact that, 𝑫𝑨∗ ⊆ 𝑫𝑨. If one further 
restricts any or all of the 𝑫𝑨 by making 𝐷!!"# > 𝐷!!"#  𝑜𝑟  𝐷!!"# < 𝐷!!"#  , or similarly by 
making a 𝛿!∗!"# > 𝛿!∗!"#  𝑜𝑟  𝛿!∗!"# < 𝛿!∗!"#, there is a new 𝑫𝑨 ⊆ 𝑫𝑨. The set of optimal 
solutions on 𝑫𝑨, 𝑖𝑠  𝑫𝑨∗ ⊆ 𝑫𝑨∗. Accordingly, as one restricts 𝑫𝑨, the possible set of 
optimal solutions is further restricted. Similarly, if one defines two disjoint sets of 
acceptable solutions, 𝑫𝑨  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑫𝑨, then 𝑫𝑨∗  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑫𝑨∗ are disjoint. Furthermore, if one 
varies 𝑓! ,𝑢! , or  𝑤!, the solution to the optimization problem is similarly changed. The 
choice of the best design point, then, heavily depends upon the limitations placed upon 
the design parameters and the system attributes and the utility assigned to each parameter 
and its relative weight. 
In an ideal world, 𝑓! ,𝑢! , and  𝑤! are defined a priori, the limits that define 𝑫𝑨 are 
also pre-defined and the most significant challenge is in defining 𝑫𝑨, its associated 
attributes, and then interrogating the space. This is not an insignificant challenge. In some 
cases, the spaces are huge, and one must carefully select design points for analysis (by 
which to define the attributes) and, potentially to define an approximation to any 𝑓!. 
More problematic than defining the attribute functions, however, is that the limitations 
placed upon the design space and the utility functions may be somewhat arbitrary—
subject to personal whims, pre-conceptions, or other factors. So, while one may conduct 
an optimization, and, if the set of allowable design points is not empty, one will get at 
least one optimal point, the reality is, that this may not truly satisfy the stakeholders. For 
this reason, the concept of the tradespace was born. 
g. Mathematical Definition of Tradespace 
For this dissertation, a tradespace is defined based upon the aforementioned 
aspects. A tradespace is the set of potential design points (𝑫), their associated attributes 
(𝜹𝒊), and the bounding requirements (𝐷!!"#,𝐷!!"# , 𝛿!∗!"#,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝛿!∗!"#)  that together define 
the sub-set of acceptable design points (𝑫𝑨) from which an engineer, analyst, or 
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decision-maker may choose a system design by any number of means—optimization of 
utility, heuristic selection among Pareto optimal points, or some other method. 
h. Conclusion 
It is a non-trivial problem to define the tradespace for a system of even moderate 
complexity. Further, to be useful, a tradespace must be linked to standard architectural 
products. Accordingly, researchers have defined various methodologies for using MBSE 
in conjunction with tradespace exploration. 
C. MODEL-BASED SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
INCOSE defines MBSE as: “the formalized application of modeling to support 
system requirements, design, analysis, verification and validation, beginning in the 
conceptual design phase and continuing throughout development and later life cycle 
phases” (Friedenthal et al. 2007, 5). More concretely, the central tenant of MBSE is that 
systems engineers move from a “document centric” to a “model centric” approach 
(Friedenthal et al. 2007, 4). The purpose of this is to, “enhance[s] the ability to capture, 
analyze, share, and manage the information” (Friedenthal et al. 2007, 7). This realizes 
five principal benefits 
1.  “Improved communications.” 
2.  “Increased ability to manage system complexity.” 
3.  “Improved product quality.” 
4.  “Enhanced knowledge capture.” 
5 “Improved ability to teach and learn systems engineering fundamentals.” 
(Friedenthal et al. 2007, 7) 
The INCOSE definition of MBSE modifies the phrase “application of modeling”6 
with the word “formalized.” This is the essence of MBSE, methodologies and tools that 
link the different aspects of systems engineering. So, while systems engineer have always 
used models, these disparate models have not been formally linked in such a manner that 
                                                
6 The author assumes the reader is familiar with modeling and simulation. For a greater treatment, see 
Law (2008) or Sokolowski and Banks (2011) among others. 
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a change in one propagates changes in the others. This is the utility of MBSE—such 
linkages facilitate the above-mentioned benefits.  
MBSE is conducted through the use of modeling languages, methods and tools. 
Estefan (2007) provides a useful overview of various MBSE methodologies, tools, and 
languages. It has been used to solve a wide variety of problems across various disciplines. 
For the DOD, examples of MBSE application include engineering for Space Systems 
(Jepperson 2013), Supply Chain Management (Bonagrazia-Healy et al. 2014), Energy 
Efficiency in a Marine Operational Setting (Bennett et al. 2014), Naval Ship Design and 
Mine Warfare (Pisani, 2013; Frank et al., 2014; Kaymal 2013). 
While MBSE is generally applicable to systems engineering at large, most MBSE 
research has focused on various aspects of systems architecting (Beery 2016). 
Increasingly, recent research has advanced the state-of-the-art (e.g., Beery 2016) to 
include greater aspects of systems engineering (i.e., analysis) in conjunction with 
architecting. This is commonly expressed, at its end state, through a tradespace. While 
this end state is useful, the methodologies and tools to define this tradespace are of 
greater importance. 
1. Model-Based Systems Engineering for Design
Until recently, there was a significant gap in the MBSE state-of-the-art. The 
majority of MBSE research occurs in the area of systems architecting (Beery 2015). This 
has created an artificial separation between systems architecting and systems analysis 
(Beery 2015) as seen in Figure 5.  This is problematic, as, “that research has focused 
primarily on development of system architecture models and has largely ignored the need 
to clearly link systems architecture models to detailed external models and 
simulations” (Beery 2016, 3). To address this limitation, Beery (2015) developed the 
MBSE Methodology for Employing Architecture in Systems Analysis (MEASA). 
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Figure 5.  Beery Depiction of Current MBSE Research Focus. 
Source: Beery (2015) 
a. Model-Based Systems Engineering Analysis Methodology Description
Beery’s (2015) MBSE MEASA methodology links two systems engineering 
domains, architecture and analysis, as depicted in Figure 6. This facilitates exploratory 
design as one can use this methodology to define a tradespace. 
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This figure depicts how Beery’s MBSE Analysis Methodology can be used to link 
Systems Architecting with Systems Analysis to improve early life cycle system design.  
Figure 6.  Beery’s MBSE Analysis Methodology Utility. 
Source: Beery (2015) 
The intent of the MBSE MEASA is “to be utilized for definition, design, and 
analysis of large scale, complex systems early in the system design cycle” (Beery 2016, 
56). It is not applicable to systems integration or implementation. Furthermore, MEASA 
assumes that a valid systems engineering problem and need have been identified in 
accordance with typical systems engineering methods (Beery 2016). Finally, Beery 
intends MEASA to be nested within the greater context of MBSE, e.g., the use of SysML 
(Beery 2016). 
The MEASA is intended to support the development of systems engineering 
artifacts typically associated with problem definition, system design, and system analysis 
as identified by systems engineering textbooks such as (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2010; 
Buede 2000) and articulated by Beery (2016). As MEASA supports the development of 
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these artifacts, it can be used in conjunction with any specific systems engineering 
methodology (e.g., the waterfall, vee, or spiral) (Beery 2016). 
The MEASA is depicted in Figure 7. In it, one sees how the methodology links 
the two domains of systems architecting and analysis. The left hand side of the figure 
depicts systems analysis, which involves modeling how the system performs in an 
operational environment. The right hand side of the figure depicts (high -level) systems 
architecture through a system synthesis model. The center shows how the two are linked 
in MEASA. In total, this figure captures Beery’s MEASA, and provides an overview for 
how a researcher or engineer may employ MBSE to link systems architecting with 
systems analysis during early life cycle system design. 
 
 
Figure 7.  Beery’s MBSE MEASA. Source: Beery (2016) 
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The MEASA begins with the development of operational simulation models 
(Beery 2016) and is depicted by approximately the left half of Figure 7. In this, the 
system is modeled functionally and operationally against a range of operational and 
environmental variables. It is then assessed against the refined need(s) defined during the 
problem definition phase (Beery 2016). Importantly, during this phase, statistically 
relevant variables are identified using standard statistical analyses such as analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) or other appropriate methods (Beery 2016). These are called design 
parameters in Figure 7.  Once relevant parameters are identified, an engineer can conduct 
a DOE, assess the design points and develop a surrogate model of operational 
performance that takes environmental and design parameters as inputs and outputs 
operational MOE (Beery 2016). 
The second major step of MEASA is the development and analysis of the system 
synthesis model(s) (Beery 2016). A system synthesis model is one which takes system 
design parameters as inputs and outputs both the feasibility of a design with such 
parameters (i.e., an assessment that says a system with such parameters may be built 
given the set of constraints) and the projected system characteristics (e.g., cost or weight). 
The creation of such a synthesis model is, tacitly, a high-level systems architecture. In 
Beery’s example, the system synthesis model, the architecture is that of a ship, and there 
is a model used by naval architects that relates the number of engines, ship length, crew, 
and so forth to determine if the ship is feasible, and what its cost, stability, and other 
characteristics are (Beery 2016).  
The final major step of MEASA is linking the previous two steps (Beery 2016). 
This is the particularly innovative step, in which Beery developed the MEASA to 
formally develop a method to link systems analysis (step one) with systems architecting 
(step two). In Figure 7, the two boxes labeled design parameters show the input 
parameters to both the operational and synthesis models. Beery develops an explicit 
linkage between these variables. In some cases, there is a very obvious one-to-one 
correlation, such as the number of helicopters as a synthesis parameter and an operational 
parameter. In other cases, there is a more complex relationship, for example, the 
simulation input of ship range may be dependent upon both the number of engines and 
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the fuel capacity according to some formula (Beery 2016). This linkage and the previous 
modeling efforts are displayed through the use of a dynamic “dashboard” as indicated by 
the tradespace in Figure 7. This tradespace is an example of an exploratory design 
decision-making methodology, as previously described.  
b. MBSE MEASA Limitations  
The MEASA, as developed, is applicable to developing material system solutions 
and monolithic systems (as opposed to SoS) (Beery 2016). The reason for this is because 
the MEASA assumes that 1) There is a feasibility (synthesis) model for the system in 
question, 2) One may define a set of operational parameters for the use in operational 
simulations. These operational parameters may be defined through functions that take 
design parameters as input and output these operational parameters, and 3) Attribute 
functions—synthesis or operational—may generally be defined through the use of DOE 
and meta-models. These assumptions are not generally true in the case of SoS; 
particularly if one wishes to represent an SoS completely by including process and 
organizational parameters. 
The first limitation of the MEASA to SoS is that one must have a system 
feasibility model to assess if a given design point is feasible. For example, in the 
application of the MEASA, Beery (2016) demonstrates how the design parameters for a 
ship are related; e.g., the length of the ship directly affects the number of helicopters that 
may be employed due to space requirements. This assumption is reasonable for systems 
whose feasibility is a function of physical parameters—there are well known physical 
models for a large variety of domains. When one begins to consider organizational and 
process parameters, however, this situation is less well defined. 
The second limitation of the MEASA to SoS is that it defines a system design 
problem in a somewhat unique manner from the description in the Section II.B.2. In this 
dissertation, there are only design points, d, and attribute functions, fa. These attributes 
may be of any type e.g., operational performance, cost, feasibility. Beery (2016) defines 
two distinct sets of parameters—design and operational. Call the design parameters 𝒅 ∈ 𝑫 as usual, and call the operational parameters: 
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 𝒐 ∈ 𝑶 =< {𝑜!, 𝑜!,… 𝑜!}|𝑜!   𝑖𝑠  𝑎𝑛  𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟 > 
Furthermore, there are a distinct set of system attribute functions that take operational 
attribute points as input and output operational measures of performance, call these 𝑔!:𝑶 → 𝑹𝒃. These are the operational corollaries of 𝑓!:𝑫 → 𝑹𝒂. Figure 8 clarifies this to 
demonstrate the MEASA in this dissertation’s mathematical notation. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Overlay of Current Work’s Notation on the MEASA. 
Adapted from Beery (2016). 
The reason for partitioning design and operational variables is practical; 
operational models typically require input variables that are operational in nature (e.g., an 
agent based model considers vehicle speed as a variable, not number of engines, vehicle 
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weight). This is acceptable, but to do this, one must have a well-defined method of 
defining the function that links these two sets of parameters, a transfer function:  𝑡:𝑫 → 𝑶 
In a physical model, this is often well understood. For example, one may define a transfer 
function that takes the system weight, shape, and engine size as inputs and outputs speed. 
In doing this, one may consider the problem 𝑔 𝑡 𝑓(𝒅)   to define the operational system 
attributes of a system design point. Alternatively, one may consider the problem 𝑓 𝑡!! 𝒐 7 to define the synthesis system attributes of an operational set of parameters. 
If the design space is limited to physical parameters, it is reasonable to assume that one 
may define such a transfer function—there are well-understood relationships among 
physical design parameters and performance in many cases as demonstrated by Beery 
(2016). In cases in which this transfer function is poorly understood, the alternative is to 
only define system attributes via design parameters. 
The final challenge of Beery’s (2016) MEASA is that it makes extensive use 
experimental design and meta-models to define attribute functions. DOE for problems 
with qualitative variables are best when those variables are limited to 10 or fewer levels 
(Sanchez and Wan 2012). For SoS, this is problematic as one may quickly exceed this 
threshold as, for the set of SoS that may be formed from n potential systems forms a 
qualitative variable with approximately 2n levels. Furthermore, while there are a number 
of DOE that address 2nd order interactions (Vieira et al. 2011; MacCalman 2013), an SoS 
with necessarily involves higher order interactions that are statistically significant, 
especially among its categorical variables (i.e., ones defined against physical, 
organizational, and process parameters), these options are impractical. DOE for 3rd order 
interactions are an area of active research; 4th and higher are beyond the state-of-the-art 
(Kleijnen et al., 2005).  
                                                
7 Note: t:DàO is well defined. That is, for a given system design, one will only get a single 
operational parameter (e.g., a design won’t give two different maximum speeds), although two designs may 
yield the same operational parameters. On the other hand, t-1:OàD may not be well defined. That is, an 
operational parameter may be achievable by multiple system designs. 
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Combined, these limitations make the MBSE MEASA ineffective for 
application to SoS, particularly SoS described by their full physical, process, and 
organizational perspectives. Beery specifically notes this in his areas of future 
research section (Beery 2016). 
2. Conclusion 
MBSE is the desired future state of the practice per INCOSE’s strategic vision 
(INCOSE 2015). The transformation from document-based systems engineering to 
MBSE is an ongoing process and has been made possible by the large variety of research 
in MBSE tools, methods, and applications. Beery’s MEASA is an important advancement 
in the state-of-the-art, particularly as it rigorously links two key areas of systems 
engineering, architecting and analysis. This facilitates subsequent tradespace 
development and TSE and improves design decision-making. 
As with any new methodology, a test of its utility is to apply it broadly. Beery 
(2016) demonstrated the MEASA in the context of a relatively well-defined problem for 
a monolithic system. SoS are a somewhat more complex and distinct subset of systems 
engineering with unique challenges and approaches for solving these challenges. There 
is, therefore, a significant utility in addressing the shortfalls of the MEASA as applied to 
SoS. The subsequent section discusses SoS, SoS engineering, and their relationship with 
MBSE and the MEASA. 
D. SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
SoS are a significant subfield of systems engineering. SoS, while being systems in 
their own right, have unique characteristics that warrant unique engineering approaches 
across the spectrum of systems engineering, including problem definition, architecting, 
analysis, integration, implementation, and management. Multiple researchers and 
practitioners have developed various methods and tools to contend with these distinct 
challenges (Maier 1998; DOD 2008; Jamshidi 2008; Jamshidi 2009; Rainey and Tolk 
2015). This section defines SoS, the implications of SoS for systems engineering, and 
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outlines the current methods of SoSE. It further places this research in the greater context 
of SoSE. 
1. Systems of Systems 
a. SoS Definition 
Maier (1998) laid some of the foundational work for SoS. In it, he defined an SoS 
as a group of distinct systems characterized by operational and managerial independence, 
exhibiting emergent behavior, geographically dispersed, and evolutionary in their 
development (Maier 1998). This definition and classification has been widely adopted 
and expanded upon with additional characteristics such as autonomy, belonging, 
connectivity, diversity, self-organization, and adaptation (Boardman and Sauser 2006; 
Sage and Biemer 2007). The DOD (2008, 4) defines SoS similarly: “A SoS is defined as 
a set or arrangement of systems that results when independent and useful systems are 
integrated into a larger system that delivers unique capabilities.” Regardless of the 
precise definition, the general concept is that an SoS is a system, composed of multiple 
independent systems, that provide some capability, and that the total design or operation 
of the system is not wholly controlled by any one entity. As Maier’s (1998) definition is 
so common in the literature, his characteristics are outlined as follows: 
(1) Operational Independence 
Each constituent system is a purposeful, useful system in its own right. It can 
operate in its intended environment and accomplish a mission (Maier 1998). For 
example, a patriot missile battery is an independent air defense system that can conduct 
air defense operations on its own; it is also a member of a more general missile defense 
SoS. A counter-example is the engine of an aircraft; it is, in many senses, a system in and 
of itself, but it is not operational or useful without the rest of the aircraft, therefore it is a 
sub-system vice a constituent system. 
  
 41 
(2) Managerial Independence 
The constituent systems are managed by independent entities. This implies that 
each constituent has its own life cycle, maintenance and upgrade criteria, and is generally 
run by its own program (Maier 1998). An example of this is two distinct defense 
programs of record. Though they may both support a common goal, each system is 
managed independently and run by its own program executive officer (PEO). A counter-
example is two sub-systems within a single program of record. Though independent 
design teams may be working on each sub-system, final decisions about their design rest 
with the program manager. 
(3) Geographic Dispersion 
The constituent systems of an SoS are generally geographically dispersed. The 
actual distances involved are relative; an SoS may be dispersed by meters, kilometers, or 
hundreds of kilometers. Importantly, as a result, the constituent systems do not generally 
exchange material or energy; rather, the primary interface among the various constituent 
systems is information (Maier 1998). An example of this is a kill chain in which various 
constituent systems conduct different steps of the kill chain and pass on the information 
of what has been conducted and the target’s location and status. 
(4) Evolutionary Development 
SoS are evolutionary in nature. This is a direct result of the managerial and 
operational independence of the constituent systems. As the constituent systems are thinking, 
adapting, and reacting independent actors capable of making decisions, the SoS will 
necessarily evolve with their changing behavior (Maier 1998). Moreover, as each constituent 
system exists on its own life-cycle, constituent systems will retire from and be introduced 
into the SoS at different times. The SoS must evolve to adapt to these changes. 
(5) Emergent Behavior 
SoS exhibit emergent behavior. This is defined as a behavior that is not entirely 
contained by any constituent system (Maier 1998). Emergence occurs at various levels: 
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simple, weak, strong, and spooky (Maier 2015). These levels are differentiated by our 
ability to understand, predict, and model the behavior. Emergence in an SoS is both a 
desirable behavior (for the desired SoS capabilities) and an undesired behavior 
(unpredicted, negative behavior). Ultimately, the goal of SoSE is to design an SoS that 
produces desired emergent behaviors and minimizes non-desired ones; Maier (2015) 
states, “To be an SoS, the collective must possess properties or behaviors that are not 
possessed by any of the components. This is an ‘emergent property.’” The four categories 
of emergence are defined as follows: 
• Simple: Emergence that is readily predicted through an understanding of 
the constituent systems and readily modeled (Maier 2015) 
• Weak: Emergence that is replicable with a simulation and may be 
understood after it is recognized. An example of this would be traffic 
patterns on a communications network (Maier 2015). 
• Strong: Emergence that is either not replicable or highly difficult to 
replicate in a model or simulation, but is consistent with the known 
properties of the constituent systems. An example of strong emergence 
would be the human brain. We cannot replicate its function in a model, but 
it is entirely consistent with current understanding of neurons (Maier 
2015). 
• Spooky: Emergent properties that are not replicable in a model and are 
inconsistent with the known properties of the constituent systems. There 
are no known examples of this sort of emergence (Maier 2015). 
With these definitions in mind, one can see that is only truly possible to design an 
SoS that exhibits simple or weak emergence as these may be modeled and behaviors may 
be replicated and predicted. Strong emergence may be a factor in an SoS, but only in an 
evolutionary and reactionary manner. Spooky emergence has no obvious examples and 
cannot be designed by definition. This research is focused solely on SoS design; 
accordingly, only simple or weak emergent properties are considered. 
b. Delineation between Systems and Systems of Systems 
There is no strict delineation between systems and SoS. Rather, the identification 
of a system as a singular system versus an SoS allows engineers to tailor their approach 
in the manner that is most useful for the problem at hand. In general, to classify 
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something as an SoS, it must have the preponderance of the characteristics described. 
There are certainly examples at the extremes—a system is most clearly either a singular 
system or most clearly an SoS, but there are equally certainly systems that exist in the 
grey area in between. The point of classifying systems is to help identify what techniques 
and perspectives may or may not be useful for a given problem. 
An example of the distinction between a system of sub-systems and an SoS 
clarifies the issue. A system of sub-systems is a jet fighter. It contains many sub-systems 
such as the weapons system, avionics, engine, and so forth, each of which are their own 
system; however, these systems are more properly seen as sub-systems since they do not 
perform a useful activity if isolated from the other sub-systems. In general, the collection 
of sub-systems does not generally exhibit the characteristics of an SoS. On the other 
hand, one could consider an aircraft carrier, complete with its full complement of aircraft 
and other supporting activities. While this, in one sense, is a singular unit that operates 
autonomously, and may be considered a singular system with many sub-systems, it can 
equally be considered an SoS, as each sub-system or constituent system can perform an 
independent, useful action (e.g., the aircraft, the ship). In this sense, an aircraft carrier 
may be both an SoS and a singular system of sub-systems. The choice of classification 
depends upon the purpose of the analysis. 
c. SoS Classification 
SoS are classified by the amount of central control and agreed upon purpose of 
the SoS. Maier (1998, 278) categorizes SoS as: “virtual,” “collaborative,” or “directed.” 
The DOD (2008, 4–5) classifies SoS similarly with the addition of an “acknowledged” 
category. Most DOD SoS programs are acknowledged SoS (DOD 2008). This 
dissertation only addresses acknowledged or directed SoS; the other categories are 
included for completeness. 
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(1) Virtual Systems of Systems 
A virtual SoS lacks central control and an agreed upon purpose. An example of a 
virtual SoS would be a free-market economy (DOD 2008). 
(2) Collaborative Systems of Systems 
A collaborative SoS maintains a central purpose but lacks centralized control. An 
example would be the World Wide Web (DOD 2008). 
(3) Acknowledged Systems of Systems 
An acknowledged SoS has a central purpose and partial central control, in the 
sense that there is an entity charged with ensuring the SoS’s success, but that entity may 
not have coercive or budgetary power over its constituent systems. An example would be 
the U.S.’s ballistic missile defense system (DOD 2008). 
(4) Directed Systems of Systems 
A directed SoS is both centrally controlled and has a centralized purpose. It 
remains an SoS because its constituent systems may still be able to make independent 
managerial choices, so long as they do not negatively impact the SoS and are 
operationally viable independent entities, though they have been designed to operate in 
the context of the SoS. Furthermore, a directed SoS meets the other three criteria of 
evolutionary development, emergent behavior, and geographic dispersion. An example is 
the ill-fated Army FCS (DOD 2008). 
2. Systems Engineering versus Systems of Systems Engineering 
The characteristics of SoS and implications for SoSE reach across all aspects of 
systems engineering, including management, design, integration, and operations. Giachetti 
(2014) concisely captures the essence of the distinction between the two domains in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9.  Comparison of Systems and SoS Engineering. 
Source: Giachetti (2014) 
In particular, the engineering and design of an SoS must balance the needs of 
constituent systems and the SoS as a whole in a “win-win” manner. This is particularly 
distinct from the traditional systems engineering top-down methodology in which top-
level functions are identified and subsequent analysis follows a traceable train of logic 
from need to function to form. SoS, on the other hand, necessarily must start with 
existing systems and be developed both top-down (i.e., function to form) and bottom-up 
(i.e., form to function) to achieve the balance between SoS and constituent level system 
requirements. As a result of these differences, practitioners have developed SoSE models 
to capture these differences. These include the “trapeze model,” the “wave model,” the 
“iterated vee,” and Sage and Biemer’s SoS Engineering Process.  
The “trapeze model” is called the “Core SoS SE Elements and Their 
Relationships” by (DOD 2008) and seen in Figure 10. It demonstrates the many 
interrelationships that must be understood to assess and engineer an SoS. The seven Core 
A Comparison  
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 46 
Elements: “Translating Capability Objectives,” “Understanding Systems and 
Relationships,” “Assessing Performance to Capability Objectives,” “Developing and 
Evolving an SoS Architecture,” “Monitoring and Assessing Changes,” “Addressing 
Requirements and Solution Options,” and “Orchestrating Upgrades to SoS” describe the 
various necessary activities for SoSE per the DOD (2008). These provide a useful 
conceptual framework for SoSE, but are generally unwieldy as a repeatable process that 
produces predictable results. 
 
 
Figure 10.  “Trapeze Model.” Source: Department of Defense (2008) 
To address some of the limitations of the “Trapeze Model,” Dahmann et al. 
(2011) developed the “Wave Model” seen in Figure 11.  This model takes the DOD’s 
seven “Core Elements” and places them in an iterative, repeatable model. This model 
combines the elements of “Translating Capability Objectives,” “Understanding Systems,” 
“Assessing Performance Against Objectives,” and “Monitoring Change” into a single 
concept, “Conduct / Continue SoS Analysis.” This effectively is the step in SoSE in 
which desired emergent properties are defined and assessed according to SoS 
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performance. This must be repeated continuously as strong or spooky emergence, or non-
predicted simple or weak emergence may arise with changes to the SoS. The subsequent 
steps are fairly self-explanatory and map directly to their corresponding “Core Elements” 
as seen in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11.  The Wave Model. Source: Dahmann et al. (2011)  
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SoSE practitioners have developed a somewhat more detailed “Iterated Vee” that 
is analogous to the typical systems engineering vee model. The DOD (2008) version of 
this iterated vee is seen in Figure 12.  This model emphasizes the necessity to conduct 
upfront SoSE before conducting system level engineering. In this case, much of the 
engineering process is similar to typical systems engineering—identify the SoS problem 
and requirements, identify the necessary functions that must interact to provide useful 
emergent properties, identify potential physical systems that can meet these functions 
(i.e., constituent systems), and develop solutions that will cause these interactions to 
occur and be favorable to the constituent systems. 
 
 
Figure 12.  Iterated Vee Model. Source: Department of Defense (2008) 
The final SoS engineering process was developed by Sage and Biemer (2007) and 
is seen in Figure 13.  This figure is somewhat more complex than the preceding figures, 
but it encompasses much of the same information. Importantly, it identifies the various 
levels of SoSE identified as “Enterprise Activities,” “Development Activities,” 
“Operational Activities,” and “Technical Activities” (Sage and Biemer 2007) and the 
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links among these different types of activities. This shows how SoSE operates at a key 
intersection of high level, strategic enterprise engineering, the technical aspect of system 
development and integration, along with management and operation of the systems and 
SoS. Sage and Biemer note that there is necessarily significant iteration and simultaneous 
activity in this process and that there are many more links among the various activities 
than displayed, but to display all of them would obscure the figure.  
 
 
Figure 13.  Sage and Biemer SoS Engineering Process.  
Source: Sage and Biemer (2007) 
In the preceding four SoSE models, it is clear that there is a continuous, iterative 
nature to SoSE. Within this, there occurs a periodic design phase in which SoS engineers 
design or modify interactions that can elicit desired emergent properties and, possibly, react 
to unpredicted emergent properties. This design phase consists of SoS analysis and SoS 
architecting. Figure 14 highlights where this design phase occurs within SoSE. SoS design, in 
a MBSE environment is the focus of this research and the topic of the following section. 
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Figure 14.  Where SoS Design Occurs in SoSE. Adapted from Dahmann et al. 
(2011) and Department of Defense (2008) 
3. Conclusion 
SoS are unique in that they are composed of operationally and managerially 
independent systems that interact to produce a desired emergent behavior. That the 
constituent systems are independent—they make decisions, respond to inputs according 
to their needs, and are not controlled by the SoS—has implications upon how they must 
be architected. Consideration must be accorded to not merely the technical, but 
relationships and methods by which these systems interact. This is expressed in the SoS 
architecture. Furthermore, the potential complexity of SoS operation mandates unique 
requirements for their analysis. Combined, these affect how one must design SoS. 
E. SYSTEM OF SYSTEMS DESIGN 
SoS design is the process by which an SoS architecture is realized. A SoS 
architecture must represent the unique SoS features—physical composition, processes, 
and organization. These features affect how SoS are analyzed. Together, these unique 
qualities make SoS design, particularly when framed in the context of tradespace 
exploration, a unique, and open, question. 
1. System of Systems Architecture and Architecting 
Maier and Rechtin define a (systems) architecture as, “The structure—in terms of 
components, connections, and constraints—of a product, process, or element” (Maier and 
Rechtin 2009, 423). They further elaborate this as: a matter of synthesis and analysis, 
SoS Design:  SoS Analysis & SoS Architecture!
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engineering and art, which ties human needs to system possibilities (Maier and Rechtin 
2009). Architectures may be described in many ways; there are a variety of architecture 
frameworks that prescribe necessary elements of a system architecture. More generally, 
an architecture is only complete if it describes all of the various views necessary to 
understand a system (Maier and Rechtin 2009). 
a. Systems Architecture and Architecting 
Much has been written regarding systems architecture and architecting (Maier and 
Rechtin 2009; Buede 2000; Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011). For the purpose of this 
dissertation, we shall consider systems architecting in the common trichotomy of 
functional, physical, and allocated architectures. 
A functional architecture describes what a system is supposed to do (Buede 
2000). This is typically expressed as a functional hierarchy and augmented by functional 
flow block diagrams or IDEF0 diagrams (Buede 2000). More importantly, the functions 
of a system necessarily support the system objectives and are traceable to those 
objectives.  
A physical architecture describes the components of a system that will complete 
the functions (Buede 2000). These may be systems (in the case of an SoS), sub-systems, 
components, or configuration items, depending upon the level of detail of the 
architecture. This may be represented as a hierarchy and be generic or instantiated 
representations (e.g., a plane versus an F-22) of physical components (Buede 2000). 
The allocated architecture (formerly called operational architecture) ties the 
functional (what) to the physical (who) to describe how the system completes its 
objectives (the how) (Buede 2000). Importantly, one must allocate functions to physical 
components as seen in Figure 15.  Buede (2000) argues that the most effective and 




Figure 15.  Allocation of Functions to Components. Source: Buede (2000) 
Finally, note that within the field of systems architecting, there are a number of 
architecture frameworks that describe and standardize how system architectures are to be 
developed, described, and their content (Maier and Rechtin 2011). Two of the most 
common architecture frameworks are the DOD Architecture Framework (DODAF) and 
Zachman Framework. These have been described in detail in by many researchers, e.g., 
(Dam 2006; DOD 2011; Giachetti 2010). This research references DODAF; however, 
this is as it is useful for the practical demonstration, any relevant framework may be used 
for a particular application. For a discussion of DODAF and its various views, see 
Appendix A.  
processing tasks. Similar issues arise when considering the decision of allocat-
ing a function to people within the system or a combination of hardware and
software. This allocation decision is discussed in more detail later.
Figure 9.3 expands upon Figure 9.4 for the allocation of the system’s
functions to subsystems and components. Clearly allowing the allocation
decision to be represented as a mathematical relation, and not a function, as
shown in the top left of Figure 9.3 is inadequate; there will be some functions
that are not allocated to any component and some functions that are being
processed by two or more components. Forcing the allocation of functions to
components to be represented as a mathematical function, as shown in the top
right of Figure 9.3, solves these problems. However, there may be some
components with no functions to perform; these components should either be
dropped from the system or the engineers should revisit their functional
architecture to ensure that the functional architecture is complete. There is
also the possibility that some functions will be performed by the same
component; there is nothing wrong with this because the functions can be
aggregated into a single function. If as expected all of the components are
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FIGURE 9.3 Mathematical relations and functions for the allocation of engineering
functions to components.
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Systems architecting is a key, if not the key, aspect of systems design. It ties 
human needs and desires to engineering reality. It is both prescriptive and descriptive in 
demonstrating what the system should and can do. The process of architecting is an 
inherently iterative one that cycles through creativity and analysis, desirability and 
feasibility. Architecting, particularly of complex systems, is enhanced by MBSE tools 
and methodologies along with architecture frameworks to facilitate communication and 
highlight consistency and traceability across an architecture. 
b. System of Systems Architecture and Architecting 
In some regard, architecting an SoS is no different than architecting a system. 
Fundamentally, the goal is the same, to link human needs with engineering potential, to 
describe the design of the system within the bounds of the “-ilities,” and to define a 
manageable engineering problem. SoS architectures do have unique needs, however; in 
particular, they must consider the physical architecture as related to the constituent 
systems, the processes that regulate how systems may interact, and the organization that 
defines constituent system relationships. 
(1) “Architecting Principles for Systems-of-Systems” 
Maier’s (1998) seminal article,8 “Architecting Principles for Systems-of-Systems” 
details the definition and categories of SoS and outlines key heuristics for architecting 
them. His definition and categorization of SoS was referred to in Section II.D.1. Maier 
(1998) argues that SoS are architecture centric, specifically, information interface 
architecture centric. This is a direct result of the geographic dispersion and independence 
of the constituent systems. He states his analysis as follows:  
Since the components are often developed independently of the aggregate, 
the aggregate emerges as a system in its own right only through the 
interaction of the components. Because elements will be independently 
developed and operated, the system-of systems architect must express an 
overall structure largely (or even wholly) through the specification of 
communication standards. (Maier 1998, 268).  
                                                
8 As of this writing, Maier’s article is cited by over 1,000 others on Google Scholar. 
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Combining this observation with the fact that SoS develop evolutionary according 
to the changes of constituent systems, Maier presents four SoS architecting principles: 
“Stable Intermediate Forms,” “Policy Triage,” “Leverage at the Interfaces,” and 
“Ensuring Cooperation” (Maier 1998). These principles are meant to demonstrate best 
practices or heuristics for engineering an SoS. 
“Stable Intermediate Forms” is a heuristic that recommends intermediate systems 
be capable of achieving useful purposes before the entire system is brought into being 
(Maier 1998). Applied to SoS, this means that the SoS may continue to exist if an 
individual system leaves, moreover, the loss of a single constituent will not be so 
catastrophic as to cause other constituents to leave the SoS (Maier 1998). This is 
necessary as constituent systems have operational and managerial independence, and, as 
such, may leave the SoS for any variety of reasons. 
“Policy Triage” is a heuristic that invokes the concept of medical triage: only help 
those who can be helped and cannot recover without help, ignore the others (Maier 1998). 
For SoS, the implication is that one must attend to what one can control, namely the 
interfaces among the constituent systems, and not the internal workings of the systems 
themselves. Maier puts this aptly as, “The design guidance is to choose very carefully 
what to try and control. Attempting to over control will fail for lack of authority. Under 
control will eliminate the system nature of the integrated system” (Maier 1998, 273). In 
an SoS, an engineer must clearly identify what he can and what he cannot engineer. 
“Leverage at the Interfaces” is a heuristic that directly applies the previous one. 
As Maier argues, an SoS engineer can only control the interfaces; he must focus his 
architecture at that level. In fact, Maier makes a somewhat bold claim: 
When the components of a system-of-systems are highly independent, 
operationally and managerially, the architecture of the system-of-systems 
is the interfaces. There is nothing else to architect. (Maier 1998, 273) 
This claim is certainly true for collaborative or virtual SoS; it arguably has 
applicability to acknowledged and even directed SoS. Certainly no SoS architecture can 
be complete without a thorough description of the interfaces among the constituent 
systems; however, in the case of acknowledged and directed SoS, the SoS program has 
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some greater operational and managerial control which requires architecting, i.e., non-
material aspects such as processes and organizations. 
The final heuristic, “Ensuring Cooperation,” speaks to the independence of the 
constituent systems. In all SoS, the constituent systems choose to participate or not, at 
least to a degree, depending upon the type of SoS (Maier 1998). As such, the motivation 
to participate must be factored into the design of the SoS (Maier 1998). There are a 
variety of means of doing this, and will vary with the distinct nature of the SoS, but this 
principle must be accounted for in architecting an SoS. 
(2) Subsequent SoS Architecting Research 
Maier’s research along with a growing need for SoS engineering and architecture, 
prompted further research. Cole (2008) provides a comprehensive review of SoS 
architecture. He presents four SoS architecture design principles: “Needs Often 
Compete,” “Needs Change Over Time,” “Resource Availability Constrains the Solution 
Space,” and “Design Compromise is Necessary” (Cole 2008, 45-47). In this context, the 
needs are those of the constituent systems and the SoS. The titles are self-explanatory; the 
point, similar to Maier’s heuristics, is that one must focus on how the constituent systems 
interact physically. In Cole’s work, these interactions are framed as needs. Cole further 
articulates SoS architecting with his six “SoS Architecture Considerations:” Autonomy, 
Complexity, Diversity, Integration Strategy, Data Architecture, and System Protection 
(Cole 2008, 47–55). Importantly, Cole outlines two strategies for system integration, 
bridging and refactoring. Bridging involves developing a new system that can interface 
with existing systems with only minor modification to existing systems. Refactoring is 
conducting potentially significant modifications to existing systems so that they can 




Figure 16.  Cole’s SoS Architecting Strategies. Source: Cole (2008) 
Cole further describes three types of data architecture strategies for SoS. First, 
note that a data architecture is a representation how data is stored, transmitted, and 
understood across a system. This is not unique to SoS engineering; for example, it is used 
in enterprise engineering (Giachetti 2010). While data and information architecture is 
important in engineering many systems, it is particularly important to SoS as, per Maier’s 
description, SoS information interface architecture is the SoS. Cole describes three data 
architecture strategies: uncoordinated, coordinated, and federated as seen in Figure 17.  It 
is important to note that sharing information among different systems is particularly 
difficult as not only must one physically transmit the information, the information must 
be “usable” among the different systems. There must be semantic interoperability, such 
that System 1 may understand and use System 2’s information. How an engineer 
architects this is highly important to developing an SoS. 
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Figure 17.  Cole’s Data Architecture Models. Source: Cole (2008) 
Dagli and Kilicay-Ergin (2009) outline their perspective on SoS architecting. 
Importantly, they compare system and SoS architecting, as seen in Table 1.   One can 
note that this table outlines that much of the focus of SoS architecting is at the “meta-
level” and is focused on how interactions among software, people, and systems occur and 
the interfaces that encourage these interactions. 
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Table 1.   SoS Architecting versus Systems Architecting. 
Source: Dagli and Kilicay-Ergin (2009) 
System of Systems Architecting Systems Architecting 
Architecting 
properties 
§ Abstract, meta-level 
§ Fuzzy uncertain requirements 
§ Network-centric 
§ Software intensive 
§ People intensive 
§ Intensive communication 
infrastructure 
§ Network of various stakeholders 
§ Collaborative emergent 
development 
§ Dynamic architecture 
§ Domain specific 
systems level 
§ Several stakeholders 
§ Controlled development 
§ Static architecture 
Architecting 
constraints 
§ The same classical systems 
architecting processes, but at the 
meta-level 
§ Emphasis is on interface 
architecting to foster collaborative 
functions among independent 
systems 
§ Concentration is on choosing the 





§ Hidden cascading failures 
§ Confusing life cycle context 
§ Architecting processes 
at component and 
systems level 
§ Monolithic systems 
architecting (optimize 
individual systems) 
§ Concentration is on 
building the right 
physical technical 
architecture 
§ Clear life cycle context 
Legacy 
systems 
§ Abstraction level determines the 
integration of legacy systems to 
other systems 
§ Large amount of variety of legacy 
systems 
§ Integration of legacy 
system to system 
components are more 
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Maier and Cole both devote significant effort to detailing the necessity of an SoS 
architecture to satisfactorily integrate different constituent systems via an information 
architecture. This is, of course, highly important. In some sense, this is the physical 
architecture of the SoS. Similarly, Dagli and Kilicay-Ergin focus on designing interfaces 
to encourage specific physical systems to interact. However, this focus is somewhat 
exclusive of functional and allocated SoS architecting. 
(3) Distinctions Between Systems Architecting and SoS Architecting 
SoS architectures must describe both the composition of the SoS, the constituent 
system interfaces, and the means by which their interactions are governed to produce the 
desired emergent behaviors. This requires both systems (technical) and enterprise (non-
technical) perspectives. This is because SoS are composed of independent constituent 
systems that make decisions regarding SoS participation and their operational activity. 
The physical architecture of an SoS is the composition of the included constituent 
systems and the technical description of their interfaces. These are described in DODAF 
by both the SV-3 and DIV-1, DIV-2, and DIV-3 views (DOD CIO 2010). Much of SoS 
engineering is devoted to choosing the composition of systems (Chattopadhyay 2009; 
Mokhtarpour and Stracener 2014) and the technical interface architecting (Maier 1998; 
Cole 2008; Biltgen, Ender, and Mavris 2006). This is warranted, as it is both a difficult 
problem and a necessary first step in the architecting process. A collection of systems 
with an inability to interface cannot be an SoS. 
A SoS has a functional architecture; it describes what the SoS does. These 
functions, at the highest level, are the result of a desired emergent property of the SoS. 
That is, if one desires an SoS to perform a given function, one must induce systems to 
interact in a manner so as to provide that functionality. If a single system can provide that 
functionality, the problem is complete and a matter of systems engineering (this is not 
trivial, but outside the scope of this research). This is modeled in Figure 18.  Note that a 
single system may have multiple types of interactions with different systems. 
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Figure 18.  SoS Interactions Provide SoS Functionality 
These interactions are not simply a matter of physical interfacing, rather, they are 
a function of multiple systems sequencing their activity and modifying their activity 
according to the actions of the others. This requires an enterprise perspective—
organization and process views (Giachetti 2010). 
Each constituent system provides some level of functionality, capability, or 
operational activities. Within DODAF, a system’s capabilities are described by the 
various Capability Viewpoints (DOD CIO 2010); see Appendix A for further details. 
Moreover, the SV-4, SV-5a and SV-5b provide greater detailed descriptions of these 
capabilities (DOD CIO 2010). Using DODAF standardizes the language of capabilities 
and functions so that one may establish parity among the different system-level 
architecture descriptions. More to the point, any emergent behavior is a product of these 





















constituent systems contain all of the necessary functionality. For each desired emergent 
behavior, one must be able to describe, either through a functional flow or a set of rules 
(in DODAF, the OV-5 and OV-6 models), how an emergent behavior occurs. In the cases 
of simple emergence (readily understood and modeled), this is most easily described by a 
functional flow; in the cases of weak emergence (understood and possible to be modeled 
after observing it), this is more likely to be modeled using rules governing interactions. 
Regardless, an SoS requires a description of the processes that govern the interactions. 
Constituent systems are independent, decision-making entities. Moreover, with 
the exception of fully autonomous systems, people operate the constituent systems. 
Accordingly, an SoS is not simply a technical system, but also an organization. There is a 
diverse range of literature regarding the study of organizations (e.g., March and Simon 
1958; Galbraith 1977; Daft 1998; Burton, DeSanctis, and Obel 2006). Organizations are 
defined similarly to systems, except that they are social entities as opposed to technical 
ones; this is articulated as, “organizations are made up of people and their relationships 
with one another. An organization exists when people interact with one another to 
perform essential functions that help attain goals” [Emphasis added] (Daft 1998, 11). 
Importantly, it is these relationships that must be well defined in an organization to 
influence the behavior of the constituent members (March and Simon 1958).  
Typically, organizational design, particularly with regard to a business, is 
concerned with the totality of an organization—its goals, measures of performance, 
processes, people, and coordination (Daft 1998; Burton, DeSanctis, Obel 2006). This 
significantly overlaps with much of systems engineering; accordingly, for this 
dissertation, organizational design only refers to the structure and definition of the 
relationships among the constituent systems of the SoS.  
Traditionally, organizational structures are defined according to the information 
and decision-making affects relationships have between the various entities of the 
enterprise (Burton, DeSanctis, Obel 2006). There are a variety of organization structure 
types: simple hierarchy, functional, divisional, matrix that vary groupings of people 
within the enterprise according to their rank, their function, their market (type or 
location), or some combination thereof (Burton, DeSanctis, Obel 2006; Giachetti 2010). 
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The structure may be expressed as a set of relationships (or a matrix) between the entities 
in the organization and the corresponding definition of those relationships; this view of 
an organization generally coincides with the OV-4: Organizational Relationships view in 
DODAF (DOD CIO 2010). A well-defined organizational relationship articulates 
requirements for communication and decision-making; e.g., in the Army, there are 
Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) that detail information a 
subordinate must pass to the commander (U.S. Army 2006). 
A SoS is both technical and non-technical; accordingly, its architecture must 
represent both of these perspectives. At a minimum, an SoS architecture should include a 
physical description of the constituent system composition and their interfaces, the 
process(es) by which the SoS achieves its emergent behavior, and the organization that 
defines the relationships among the systems. Together, these both describe and prescribe 
SoS activity in a complete manner that may be both used for SoS assessment (in a model 
or simulation) and SoS realization. 
2. System of Systems Analysis 
The analysis of an SoS is similar to the analysis of any system and differs 
primarily in the details of how it is done. Gibson, Scherer, and Gibson (2007, 29) list six 
major phases of systems analysis: “1. Determine goals of the system.” “2. Establish 
criteria for ranking alternative candidates.” “3. Develop alternative solutions.” “4. Rank 
alternative candidates.” “5. Iterate.” and “6. Action.” This is generally in line with other 
texts on systems analysis such as (Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011; Buede, 2000). These 
steps may be somewhat simplified as problem definition (including steps one and two), 
analyze systems (including steps three and four), and implementation (steps five and six). 
a. System of Systems Analysis Problem Definition 
Defining a systems analysis problem involves determining the goals of the system 
and the means by which to compare alternative solutions. This is typically expressed in 
terms of functions and functionality and through MOEs and MOPs. Note that an MOE is 
a measure of how successful the system operation is relative to the need and an MOP is a 
measure of how well a system operates according to its design (Parnell et al. 2011). Much 
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work has been written regarding problem definition and MOE and MOP selection, e.g., 
(Parnell et al. 2011; Blanchard and Fabrycky 2011).  
The goals of an SoS are necessarily realized through emergent properties. 
Accordingly, SoS analysis problem definition should be focused on how the SoS 
performs these emergent functions. The MOEs and MOPs selected should support these 
fundamental SoS objectives in a clear and logical manner. Importantly, they should be 
focused on the aspects of the SoS that the engineer has control over. Examples of MOEs 
might include various measures of overall (SoS) mission accomplishment such as time to 
mission accomplishment, force exchange ratio, or similar total SoS measures. Examples 
of MOPs might include measures of connectivity of a designed interface, percent of 
available systems willing to participate using a given interface, or reliability of an 
interface. It is inappropriate for an SoS MOE or MOP to be focused on a constituent 
system level property or function; system-level engineers more appropriately answer such 
questions. Finally, the thresholds (minima or maxima) and goals of a given performance 
measure and their associated values vary according to decision-maker preferences. In the 
context of exploratory analysis, the question of defining these specifically a priori is less 
important than defining the relevant measures as it is assumed that these thresholds and 
goals may change during TSE. 
b. How to Analyze a System of Systems 
For a non-extant SoS, as is the case in SoS design, the typical method of analysis 
is to model the SoS and assess its performance of its various MOEs and MOPs in that 
model. This is no different than modeling for system assessment. Importantly in an SoS, 
one must capture the relevant perspectives of its design—its physical, process, and 
organizational view—as inputs and output its emergent behavior or other desired 
attributes. 
The choice of model depends upon the system being modeled and the purpose for 
modeling that system. In the case of SoS, the typical purpose for modeling is to analyze 
and understand an emergent property. In this case, agent based models (ABM) are the 
most common choice, though Petri Nets, and Markov Chains, and Network Models have 
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also been used. Of note, Rainey and Tolk (2015) provide a comprehensive overview of 
modeling and simulation for SoS; Baldwin et al. (2015) provide an analysis of event 
based versus agent based simulation approaches for SoS. 
Macal and North (2005) describe ABM as a model composed of agents with 
defined behaviors that interact with other agents and their environment; this gives rise to 
emergent behavior. This clearly is a useful way to approximate an SoS. Rainey and Tolk 
(2015) and Mour et al. (2013) provide multiple examples of using ABM for SoS. 
Giachetti et al. (2013) is another example of using ABM to assess SoS performance. 
Petri Nets and Markov Chains are other common methods for modeling SoS. In 
both cases, there is a process flow, possibly stochastic, that mimics how SoS perform a 
fundamental objective. These are useful in cases where the interactions among systems 
are generally well understood, such as in the case of simple emergence. Wang (2007), 
Rao et al. (2008), and Kenley et al. (2014) provide examples of SoS analysis using Petri 
Nets; Giachetti (2015) is an example of using a Markov Chain for the same purpose. The 
advantage of such techniques is that they are less computationally intensive than ABM. 
Networks that represent constituent systems as nodes and interactions as edges in 
a network are also useful for modeling an SoS. Garrett et al. (2011) use a network model 
to represent the Ballistic Missile Defense System [of Systems]. This work is useful in 
demonstrating how a network may represent an SoS, though it is flawed in that the 
subsequent analysis makes limited utility of their model. DeLaurentis et al. (2008) use 
traditional network measures (see, e.g., Newman 2010) to assess and enhance the Air 
Traffic Organization air route forecast. In general, network models using various network 
flow algorithms, such as presented by Ahuja et al. (1993), can be used to assess the 
performance of many metrics of an SoS represented as a network. 
Perhaps more important than the specific choice of type of model, is that SoS 
cannot be well assessed through an aggregation of system level analysis. This, as with 
most aspects of SoS, stems from the fact that SoS present emergent properties and the 
interactions eliciting these properties must be included in the model. Anderson et al. 
(2013) demonstrate this with regard to SoS operational availability using the Sandia 
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National Laboratory SoS Analysis Tool (SOSAT). In this case, averaging the operational 
availability of the constituent systems is not a useful aggregation, as an SoS may be 
operationally available 100% of the time even if some of its constituent systems are not 
(due to the redundancy contained in the SoS).  
Chattopadhyay (2009) present a method for combining attributes of systems for 
SoS. This is at odds with the preceding paragraph. Her method has three levels of 
“attribute combination complexity,” low, medium, and high. Low-level combination is 
taking a best in class MOE or MOP for each constituent system and assigning it as the 
attribute of the SoS (Chattopadhyay 2009). Medium-level involves weighted averaging of 
system level attributes (Chattopadhyay 2009). High-level attribute combination is done 
through “data fusion” (Chattopadhyay 2009). While it is possible that the low and 
medium level attribute combinations can be useful in select cases, they generally fail for 
the reasons described in the preceding paragraph and are not generally useful for 
assessing emergent behavior. High-level combination through data fusion is useful, and 
though not done in the same way as ABM, it is a method of predicting emergent behavior 
through more complex combinations of system level attributes that mimic the system 
interactions. Despite these challenges, there may be instances where low or medium level 
attribute combination is useful, if a rough, first order level of analysis. 
The actual analysis of an SoS is best-conducted using models that clearly 
represent the interactions among the constituent systems of an SoS and demonstrate 
emergent SoS behavior. These types of models include ABM, Petri Nets, Markov Chains, 
and Network Models. Lower level aggregation of constituent system level properties 
while computationally inexpensive, run the risk of presenting inaccurate SoS level 
properties and should be used with caution. The results of these models can inform 
decision-makers on the performance of SoS with regard to MOEs and MOPs and 
facilitate the choice of SoS design. 
c. Challenges of SoS Modeling and Simulation 
A side, but important, topic in SoS analysis is some of the outstanding challenges 
of SoS modeling and simulation. These challenges include model validation, model 
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integration, and the development of metal-models of SoS performance. These challenges 
impact SoS analysis and, accordingly, SoS design; in particular the development of meta-
models. 
(1) SoS Model Validation 
SoS model validation is a challenge because it is often difficult, if not impossible, 
to conduct sufficient numbers of SoS experiments to assess the validity of a model. 
Particularly as SoS have the potential to constantly evolve, thus changing the 
assumptions of any model. Operational test and evaluation of an SoS is a challenge as it 
is often difficult to coordinate the activity of the operationally and managerially 
independent systems in a non-operational environment (i.e., a test scenario). Moreover, 
these tests are often difficult to reproduce to build sufficient data for a statistical analysis 
by which to validate the model. Accordingly, SoS models are rarely validated at the level 
of statistical analysis of repeated tests, rather they are validated with toy problems, face 
validity, or similar, lower level methods of model validation. 
(2) Model Integration 
Most systems within an SoS, being managerially independent, have pre-built, 
possibly validated models, of their performance. In the interest of economy and accuracy, 
it makes sense for an SoS model to incorporate these system level models. The challenge 
is that every model is built for a specific purpose and makes specific assumptions. These 
purposes and assumptions may not align well for the purpose of the SoS and across the 
various system models. Wang, Tolk, and Wang (2009) present the Levels of Conceptual 
Interoperability Model (LCIM) that outlines this problem with model interoperability 
rated across seven levels as seen in Table 2.  Despite this problem, it is not impossible to 
overcome; Kewley and Wood (2012) present a case of a federated combat model to 
assess SoS performance of different combat systems demonstrating both the difficulty 
and possibility of federating different models to develop an SoS one. 
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Table 2.   Levels of Conceptual Interoperability Model (LCIM). 
Adapted from Wang, Tolk, and Wang (2009). 
Level Layer Name Information Defined Capability 
6 Conceptual Assumptions, 
constrains etc. 
High 
5 Dynamic Effect of data  
4 Pragmatic Use of data Medium 
3 Semantic Meaning of data  
2 Syntactic Structured data  
1 Technical Bits and bytes  
0 No NA Low 
 
(3) SoS Meta-Models  
The final major challenge in SoS modeling and simulation is in developing meta-
models of the SoS. A meta-model, or response surface, is a model that is developed using 
various statistical techniques to return a response of interest from multiple variables 
(Montgomery 2005). It is developed through selective samples that are best chosen 
through a DOE. Montgomery (2005) provides an overview of basic experimental design; 
Kleijnen et al. (2005) provide a more detailed overview on advanced DOE techniques. 
In this dissertation’s notation, a meta-model is an approximation of a system 
attribute function, 𝑓!:𝑫 → 𝑹𝒂. A meta-model is an efficient way to define fa as direct 
analysis of large numbers of design points is computationally intensive, if not impossible. 
Meta-models provide a reasonable approximation in much less time. 
The challenge of meta-modeling and experimental design for SoS is that the 
experiments for SoS are highly complex, with many degrees of freedom, and, often, 
highly non-linear or even non-polynomial response surfaces (Kernstine 2013). 
Traditional methods of meta-modeling and DOE are currently inadequate for handling 
such response surfaces with significant higher order interactions between the variables 
(design parameters) (Sanchez and Wan 2012). In the case of an SoS, however, we 
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explicitly assume there are many higher order interactions among the parameters. 
Kernstine (2012) provides a solution to explore such spaces using adaptive sequential 
experiments. This is done through an algorithm that identifies significant areas of 
variance and explores them in greater depth (Kernstine 2012).  
Kernstine’s (2012) method is still insufficient for an SoS that is fully described by 
physical, process, and organizational parameters. For example, the network 
configurations formed by including or not including two or more of n potential systems 
may be considered one categorical variable with approximately 2n levels. Furthermore, 
the number of different organizations and processes are also categorical in nature. So, 
while it is possible to define an experimental design for such variables (e.g. Vieira, et al. 
2011), in this situation, the number of levels each parameter can take makes such designs 
unwieldy. Sanchez and Wan (2012) note that experimental designs to account for 
categorical variables are best when the number of levels each variable can take is 10 or 
fewer. In the case of an SoS defined across physical, organizational, and process 
parameters, this threshold is quickly surpassed. As an alternative, we develop a method to 
selectively choose a small sample of design points for analysis and only define an 
attribute function on that domain. 
d. Conclusion 
SoS analysis assesses an SoS design point for its system attributes. These 
attributes are, typically, the emergent behaviors of the SoS. To do this, one uses a variety 
of models and simulations, commonly ABM, but also Petri Nets, Markov Chains, and 
Network Models. The common means of approximating an attribute function, through 
DOE and meta-modeling, is problematic in the case of an SoS that introduces qualitative 
parameters (variables) with many levels (significantly greater than ten) and higher order 
interactions that are significant among them. This condition exceeds the threshold for 
contemporary MBSE methods, thereby creating a limitation in the state-of-the-art for SoS 
analysis. 
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3. System of Systems Design 
SoS design is the process by which an SoS architecture is realized. This is done 
through identifying a set of possibilities and choosing among them. Methods of design 
decision-making include heuristics, normative, and exploratory. Researchers have 
provided SoS heuristics, normative methods, and limited exploratory methods as outlined 
in Figure 19.  The challenges of SoS design—system complexity and competing 
perspectives challenge heuristics and normative methods and make SoS exploratory 
decision-making methods a useful alternative. 
 
 
Figure 19.  System Design Decision-Making Methodologies 
a. SoS Heuristic Design 
SoS heuristic design considerations (Maier 1998; Cole 2008; Dagli and Kilicay-

































































































or exploratory augmentation, particularly when decision-makers are considering 
distinguishing between degrees of variation in system architectures. 
b. SoS Normative Design 
SoS normative design methods (Davendralingam and DeLaurentis 2015; 
Mokhtarpour and Stracener 2014; Kenley et al. 2014; Rao et al. 2008) have been the 
major thrust of SoS design research. These are useful in well-defined problems with 
clearly defined system attribute goals and thresholds. In general, however, these are all 
limited in that they only consider select aspects of an SoS architecture. 
(1) Davendralingam and DeLaurentis, 2015 
Davendralingam and DeLaurentis (2015) propose and demonstrate a method for 
analyzing SoS architectures by employing tools from operations research and financial 
engineering. They formulate the problem by imagining possible constituent systems as 
nodes in a network. Each system has input requirements and output capabilities; possible 
connectivity is established through connections in the network. Furthermore, a generalized 
method of SoS accomplishment is established as a (directed) network of capabilities. For 
example, the Ballistic Missile Defense System is represented as a network that links the 
capabilities of detect, track, intercept (Davendralingam and DeLaurentis 2015). With the 
problem established as such, the researchers applied methods of operations research and 
financial engineering such as mathematical programming to quantify the effects of adding a 
given system to the SoS so as to provide a set of Pareto optimal solutions balancing the risk 
associated with each system and capability added by each option. The authors applied this 
to a Naval Warfare scenario using various ships, communications packages, weapons 
packages, and aircraft to complete various missions. The subsequent analysis yielded a 
usable performance versus development time (risk) tradespace and data to facilitate 
engineering decision-making. The authors conclude their research with a call to examine 




Figure 20.  Davendralingam and DeLaurentis Archetypal SoS for Portfolio 
Optimization. Source: Davendralingam and DeLaurentis (2015) 
This research is novel in that it presents a combinatorial approach to SoS 
development with regard to process architecting. The development and demonstration of 
analytic techniques for assessing the many possible combinations that can occur when 
developing an SoS from many constituent systems with overlapping capabilities is a 
useful aid to SoS designers. It is limited in that it only allows for a singular process 
architecture to achieve the desired emergent property. It is also limited as the objective 
functions to be optimized are set a priori and do not allow for trades in requirements to 
be made. This constrains the possible design space an engineer can consider as he 
architects the SoS. Finally, it does not explicitly identify that it is conducting an allocated 
architecture and consider how the different combinations of systems within the SoS may 
be affected by organizational allocations. Nor does it consider how the allocated 
architecture affects systems participation risk. Overall, this is a useful analytic technique 
that could be combined into a greater methodology and applied to specific problems. 
(2) Mokhtarpour and Stracener, 2014 
Mokhtarpour and Stracener, (2014) present a conceptual methodology for 
selecting systems to form an SoS. They included several key factors for assessing a 
general SoS: “Time to achieve SoS capability,” “SoS mission reliability,” “SoS basic 
reliability,” “SoS operational availability,” “SoS priority,” and “SoS capability cost” 
(Mokhtarpour and Stracener 2014, 2). They subsequently formulated a general 
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methodology, seen in Figure 21.  Each step is expanded upon, with an algorithmic 
process for steps one, two, and three; a combinatorial assessment for step 4; assessing the 
possibilities according to the metrics initially listed for step 5; and making a decision 
according to situation specific (i.e., the formulation of values and number of decision-
makers) criteria for step 6. This methodology is quite systematic and serves as a useful 
guide for SoS decision-makers and planners. 
 
 
Figure 21.  Conceptual Methodology for Selecting the Preferred SoS. Source: 
Mokhtarpour and Stracener (2014) 
This methodology is one of the few such methodologies in the literature that take 
an analytic perspective on designing an SoS. It is clear, repeatable, and, though it not 
explicitly defined, it could conceivably be iterated. It is limited with regard to specific 
architecting; the article references what could be considered an SoS functional 
architecture through the use of a mission essential function list and mission essential 
systems in steps 1 and 2 (Mokhtarpour and Stracener 2014), though it does not 
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specifically identify this as a functional architecture for the SoS. The physical 
architecture is clearly the candidate systems chosen, though the methodology does not 
clearly allow for the development of new or modified interfaces, which greatly affect the 
feasibility of what systems are possible. The allocated architecture is not specifically 
mentioned, although the combinatorial aspect of Step 4 is a potential start of allocated 
architecting. It is limited in that it only considers a process view and does not consider 
organizational rules or policies that are the important architecture models that an SoS 
designer controls to realize these processes. The analysis methodology is useful in that it 
is fully described, but it inexplicably does not include operational performance as a 
measure (e.g., how well does the SoS complete the mission by any MOE); it includes the 
various “-ilities” and cost as the only drivers for assessment. These may or may not be 
the preferred measures for any given decision-maker. Overall, this methodology is useful 
in demonstrating the limitation of SoS design methodologies and a possible methodology 
for SoS design in very specific cases, namely directed SoS exhibiting simple emergence. 
It does not yield clear architecture models, it does not allow for tradespace exploration, 
nor is it integrated with contemporary MBSE methods. 
(3) Kenley, Dannenhoffer, Wood, and DeLaurentis, 2014 
Kenley et al. (2014) present a method that links common system architecting, 
with SoS specific characteristics, and MBSE techniques to specify SoS architectures. The 
process model they use is depicted in Figure 22.  In particular, these are the first authors 
to explicitly state that the allocated architecture of an SoS is unique, stating, “Multiple 
possible allocated architectures can be defined from a functional and physical 
architecture. It is the primary goal of system of systems architecting to define feasible 
SoS architectures; to evaluate the ability of the architectures to satisfy mission 
requirements and the resources required to procure and operate the SoS” (Kenley et al. 
2014, 3). The authors model the allocated architecture through a dynamics model, with 
functionalities acting as agents; in particular, they use the discrete agent framework 
developed by Mour et al. (2013). This automates the creation of possible allocated 
architectures allowing researchers to explore large design spaces. They further explore 
these architectures regarding their performance as judged through process flows modeled 
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in Petri Nets. These are dynamically linked to UML (and, by extension SysML) products. 
This automated synthesizing of network architectures combined with process flows 
allows a more full exploration of possible SoS designs. 
 
 
Figure 22.  Reference Process for Synthesizing SoS Architectures. 
Source: Kenley et al. (2014) 
This paper is the most advanced consideration of SoS design with regard to 
MBSE and complete SoS architecting (including functional, physical, and allocated 
architectures). It is well linked with common MBSE products that makes using the 
process simpler when integrated with a larger MBSE systems engineering process. It is 
limited in that while it considers the one way relation of functional and physical 
architecting to allocated architecting, it does not allow for the reverse relationship. This 
impedes the development of a tradespace and the associated exploration of the trades 
among the functional, physical, and allocated architectures and SoS performance. It 
further does not explicitly account for the concept of participation risk or organizational 
architecture. The expansion and inclusion of this model into a greater SoS architecting 
and analysis analytic methodology would improve the state-of-the-art. 
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(4) Rao, Ramakrishnan, and Dagli, 2008 
Rao et al. (2008) demonstrate a methodology to model the architecture of an SoS 
using SysML and then map that architecture to an executable Colored Petri Net (CPN) 
model. Using the Petri Net model, the researchers could assess the architecture according 
to their desired metrics. The demonstration used the Global Earth Observation System of 
Systems (GEOSS). The researchers used a methodology pictured in Figure 23.  Note that 
the general flow is depicted on the bottom half: model the architecture in SysML, turn 
that into an executable model, and then use the executable model to evaluate the 
architecture. Though it is not expressly depicted, the authors note that following 




Figure 23.  SysML and CPN Modeling Methodology. Source: Rao, 
Ramakrishnan, Dagli (2008) 
This work provides a very concrete, useful manner in which to both model the 
architecture of a system and assess that architecture. It is limited in that the manner in 
which SysML allocates functions to components is static, which is at odds with a general 
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SoS dynamic allocated architecture. It is further limited in that Petri Nets can only model 
simple emergence. Finally, it is limited in that it does not expressly develop a tradespace 
or method for TSE; any iteration that occurs is, to an extent, a trial and error process 
which can be time consuming and ineffective for searching a large design space. 
c. SoS Exploratory Design 
The two pieces of literature that consider SoS tradespace exploration methods 
(Chattopadhyay 2009; Biltgen et al. 2006) are severely limited. Chattopadhyay (2009) 
presents a method for SoS TSE, but abstracts the challenge of defining SoS architectures 
to the problem of SoS composition and ignores other, significant considerations; 
furthermore, this work makes significant use of very low fidelity methods of defining 
system attributes that do not represent emergent properties. Biltgen et al. (2006) present 
an SoS TSE method, but the definition of an SoS is restricted to directed SoS with 
primarily physical architecture considerations. Neither work encompasses the 
requirement to consider different perspectives on SoS architecture and how that affects 
system performance. 
(1) Chattopadhyay, 2009 
Chattopadhyay (2009) presents, “A Method for Tradespace Exploration of 
Systems of Systems.”9 It is an extension to the “Dynamic Multi-Attribute Tradespace 
Exploration” (Ross 2006; Chattopadhyay 2009). The SoS Tradespace Exploration 
Method (SOSTEM) is seen in Figure 24.  This is annotated as a ten step process:  
1. “Determining the SoS Mission,”  
2. “Generating a List of Component Systems,”  
3. “Identifying Stakeholders and Decision-makers for SoS and Component 
Systems,”  
4. “Classifying Component Systems According to Managerial Control and 
Participation Risk,” 
5.  “Defining SoS Attributes and Utility Information,”  
                                                
9 This work has been presented in various forms (Chattopadhyay et al. 2008; Chattopadhyay et al. 
2009; Ross and Rhodes 2015) with no apparent material change to the research. 
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6. “Defining SoS Context Changes,”  
7. “Modeling SoS Performance and Cost: a) Modeling Legacy Systems, b) 
Modeling New Systems, c) Modeling the SoS,”  
8. “Tradespace Analysis,”  
9. “Epoch-Era Analysis,”  
10. “Selecting Value Robust SoS Designs” (Chattopadhyay 2009, 89).  
This process yields an explorable tradespace that decision-makers may consider in 
designing an SoS. 
 
 
Figure 24.  SoS Tradespace Exploration Method. 
Source: Chattopadhyay (2009) 
Chattopadhyay’s SOSTEM is the most useful of the current research on SoS 
design with regard to developing an explorable tradespace that incorporates the key 
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distinctions of SoS. Unfortunately, it makes many simplifying assumptions and is not 
embedded with common systems architecting products, nor does it lend itself to be 
embedded. With regard to architecting, the SOSTEM simplifies the architecting problem 
to a matter of SoS composition, although it does acknowledge that there is some 
additional work and cost required to make some systems interface properly. While 
simplifying assumptions must be made for all models, this is too simplistic for even high 
level conceptual SoS architecting. It is limited in its ability to explore varying physical, 
functional, or allocated architectures or non-material factors in SoS design. Furthermore, 
it assumes that participation risk on the part of any given system is static, and not a 
function of the SoS architecture, which is certainly not the case as the cost and benefit for 
participation in an SoS is clearly a function of the SoS architecture (e.g., Maier’s 
heuristic regarding architecting to induce desired systems to participate). Finally, the 
method of SoS analysis is deceptively simple and highly limited as discussed in Section 
II.E.2.b. Despite these flaws, it is a useful baseline for advancing analytic tools to support 
SoS design. 
(2) Biltgen, Ender, and Mavris, 2006 
Biltgen, Ender, and Mavris (2006) developed a “hierarchical, surrogate modeling 
environment for SoS analysis” depicted in Figure 25.  Their research problem was to 
develop a method for collaborative design and trade studies for simultaneous SoS and 
system level development. As depicted, the methodology integrates the MOEs and MOPs 
at each level through a top-down analysis. To mitigate problems of computational time 
and proprietary information, the researchers used parametric surrogate models of each 
system. Additionally, they developed neural network surrogates to model the interactions 
among the systems. Ultimately this yielded an explorable “universal tradeoff 




Figure 25.  Hierarchical, Surrogate Modeling Environment for SoS Analysis. 
Source: Biltgen, Ender, Mavris (2006) 
This work is useful as it clearly demonstrates a method of combining surrogate 
modeling for SoS analysis. Furthermore, it makes extensive use of data visualization 
and analysis to “illuminate the tradespace.” It is limited to, what appears to be, directed 
SoS under development, though the authors do not explicitly state this. Furthermore, it 
makes no apparent use of commonly used systems architecting methods or provide 
methods of integrating these architecture models into the modeling and simulation 
methodology. Finally, it appears that the SoS architecture is relatively static in this 
methodology, and the exploration is more focused on how given an implicit functional, 
physical, and allocated SoS architecture the system level architectures and requirements 
are linked to SoS level MOEs and MOPs. This is a useful development, but only 
applicable to very unique SoSE problems, in particular, the development of a directed 
SoS from the bottom up. 
F. CONCLUSION 
SoS design is a challenging problem because designers must contend with pre-
existing, independent (to varying levels) systems. Furthermore, SoS present emergent 
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behavior that is the product of interactions among various systems. A SoS is best 
represented through multiple perspectives—both technical and non-technical. One way to 
do this is to consider the physical, process, and organizational architectures of an SoS. By 
doing this, one is better able to assess an SoS design’s potential operational performance 
through an ABM (or similar model). Unfortunately, by defining an SoS architecture in 
this manner, one significantly increases the size of the design space and explicitly defines 
the tradespace with parameters that cannot be assumed to be independent. This is a 
problem because current monolithic system TSE methods assume one can define design 
parameters in a manner such that they are independent or have limited interactions. On 
the other hand, current SoS design methods either do not account for the full 
requirements of an SoS architecture, or otherwise simplify the problem. Taken together, 
this creates a potential for an extension to the state-of-the-art of SoSE in the area of SoS 
TSE. The remaining chapters present these extensions. 
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III. THE SOS TRADESPACE DEFINITION METHODOLOGY 
THROUGH THE SOS ARCHITECTURE FEASIBILITY 
ASSESSMENT MODEL 
This section introduces the primary contributions of this dissertation, the SoS 
Tradespace Definition Methodology (SoS-TDM) through the SoS Architecture 
Feasibility Assessment Model (SoS-AFAM). Together, these extend the state-of-the-art 
in two ways. Within MBSE, it extends the MBSE MEASA to be capable of addressing 
SoS and similar systems that must incorporate multiple, non-material factors in their 
architectures. Within SoSE, the SoS-TDM and the SoS-AFAM extend the state-of-the-art 
by augmenting current SoS design methodologies to include an exploratory design 
decision making method that considers multiple aspects of an SoS (physical, process, and 
organization) and by defining a general model for assessing SoS feasibility. 
The SoS-TDM is predicated on the claim that, for any design space, the subset of 
that design space that contains the feasible design points is significantly smaller than the 
initial design space. Ultimately, it is impossible to prove this claim in complete 
generality; however, it is applicable in many (if not the majority) situations. Moreover, as 
a system increases in complexity,10 it is generally more difficult to achieve a feasible 
design because there are more interactions among the sub-systems making it difficult for 
a system to meet all requirements. This only serves to further reduce the size of the 
feasible design space. 
                                                
10 The term “complexity” is used here generically. There are various technical definitions and 
measures of complexity; however, they do not serve the purposes here. A general concept of complexity 
may be considered as the number of interactions that occur among the sub-systems of a system. 
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Figure 26.  The SoS Tradespace Definition Methodology 
The SoS-TDM is depicted in Figure 26.  The methodology defines the tradespace 
of an SoS according to the parameters necessary for SoS architecting: physical, process, 
and organizational (Step 1). The feasibility model assesses the points in an SoS design 
space in an efficient manner to define the much smaller sub-set of the design space that is 
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feasible (Step 2). If the feasibility analysis winnows the design space sufficiently, one 
proceeds with design point analysis; otherwise, one iterates the first two steps (Step 3). 
These feasible design points may then be exhaustively analyzed for performance (Step 4). 
Taken together, the set of feasible design points and their associated performance 
attributes may form a tradespace that may be explored and inform subsequent detailed 
analysis.  
A. SOS-TDM CONTEXT AND SCOPE 
1. SoS-TDM in SoSE and MBSE 
Within SoSE, the SoS-TDM occurs during the design phase(s) as depicted in 
Figure 27 and discussed in Section II.D.2. Areas of SoSE such as integration, test and 
evaluation, operations and maintenance are outside the scope of the SoS-TDM. Note that 
the SoS-TDM may be used in any choice of a general SoSE methodology, e.g., the 
iterated vee or wave models. 
 
 
Figure 27.  Where SOS-TDM is Useful in SoSE. Adapted from Dahmann et al. 
(2011) and Department of Defense (DOD) (2008)  
In MBSE, the SoS-TDM facilitates design decision-making. In particular, the 
SoS-TDM is integrated with Beery’s (2016) methodology, the MBSE MEASA. To solve 
the problem of not being able to define transfer functions between design parameters and 
operational parameters (as discussed in Section II.C.1.b) one re-orders the flow of the 
MEASA as depicted in Figure 28.  In doing this, one defines the initial SoS requirements 
and top level functions similarly, but then uses that to inform the parameters necessary to 
SoS Design:  SoS Analysis & SoS Architecture!
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define the physical, process, and organizational architectures (the SoS design space), 
assesses this space for feasibility (what Beery calls synthesis) and then only assesses the 
feasible set of designs for operational performance and builds a tradespace. 
 
 
Figure 28.  SoS-TDM Modification of the MBSE MEASA.  
Adapted from Beery (2016) 
It is useful to consider the SoS-TDM as a system itself, and initially consider it a 
“black box” that takes inputs and produces outputs as seen in Figure 29.  These inputs 




The figure shows the inputs and outputs of the SoS-TDM as a “black box” system in and 
of itself. 
Figure 29.  Inputs and Outputs of the SoS-TDM 
The inputs include “Valid SoS Need and Associated MOEs” and “Potential 
Systems, Processes, and Organizations.” These inputs are necessary for the SoS-TDM to 
build the set of possible SoS architectures that can meet the SoS need. The outputs 
include, “Set of Feasible SoS” and “Feasible SoS Performance Attributes.” Together 
these two outputs define a tradespace, which may be explored by engineers and decision-
makers. 
The first input, “Valid SoS Need and Associated MOEs,” is both a requirement 
and an underlying assumption. Foremost, the SOS-TDM requires a purpose against 
which to assess potential SoS. There must be some associated MOEs by which an 
engineer can 1) assess performance and 2) design the SoS to perform. Furthermore, this 
assumes, like the MEASA, that the engineer, analyst, and various stakeholders have 
developed a clear refined need that answers the stakeholders’ problem(s) (Beery 2016). It 
does not assume that initial benchmarks for MOEs are completely valid, rather that they 
may be adjusted as one develops a better understanding of the tradespace. 
The second input, “Potential Systems, Processes, and Organizations,” is the list of 
possible systems that could be included in the SoS and the potential processes and 
organizations that may be used to govern the interactions among the systems to elicit the 
desired SoS emergent behavior(s).  
The first output, “Set of Feasible SoS,” is the set of SoS design points that are 












architecture that includes the necessary physical, process, and organization perspectives. 
Furthermore, these design points are directly linked to performance attributes as they 
form the inputs for performance models and simulations. 
The second output, “Feasible SoS Performance Attributes,” are the results of the 
models and simulations that are used to assess each feasible design point. The choice of 
model or simulation is dependent upon the desired MOEs and SoS need. These models 
are often ABM for operational considerations (e.g., percent collateral damage), but may 
also be deterministic (e.g., a cost model). The SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM output a set of 
design points as inputs for an operational model. Typically, for an SoS, a reasonable 
operational model is an ABM with the agents representing the various systems. 
Importantly, the rules that govern an ABM – how agents interact, how agents make 
decisions, and so forth—are described by the design parameters of process and 
organization and required for use of the SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM.  
Together, the inputs and outputs define a tradespace for the SoS. This is a 
practical linkage between the synthesis model and the operational model as defined in the 
MBSE MEASA Step 4 (Beery 2016) and as seen in Figure 28.  This may then be used as 
a part of a larger SoSE or MBSE process. The SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM are tool and 
technique agnostic; they provide a methodology and framework for engineering problems 
that must be defined by parameters with significant interaction, i.e., SoS. 
2. SoS-TDM Scope and Assumptions 
The SoS-TDM is applicable to the design of acknowledged or directed SoS 
composed of pre-existing systems that produce desired emergent behavior(s) in a manner 
that may be understood and modeled. Each requirement for employment of the SoS-TDM 
is outlined as follows: 
a. Type of SoS 
The SoS-TDM is intended for use with acknowledged or directed SoS. These 
types of SoS have both a centrally agreed upon purpose and some level of a central 
administration or engineering (DOD 2008). The latter condition is a necessary 
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prerequisite for the use of the SoS-TDM. If an organization or person is using SoS-TDM 
to engineer an SoS, that SoS is, by definition, either acknowledged or directed. The 
former condition is necessary because the purpose of (and need for) the SoS is a major 
input of the SoS-TDM.  
b. Type of Interfaces 
The SoS-TDM assumes that the interfaces among the various constituent systems 
are purely information interfaces (i.e., communications sub-systems connect the various 
constituent systems). This is assumed for two reasons. First, generally speaking, SoS are 
of this form (Maier 1998). Second, information has the ability to be transformed across 
multiple communications systems with varying levels of efficacy. For example, 
information sent over a phone call from System 1 to System 2 may be transcribed and 
sent over email from System 2 to System 3. There may be a loss of information (e.g., the 
classic “Telephone Game”), but it is generally possible to do this. This is not the case, 
however, when one considers physical interactions. A piece of cargo of a certain size may 
be transferred over one physical cargo system (say in a freight train) but not in another 
physical cargo system (say an automobile). The case in which the systems of an SoS have 
physical interactions is therefore excluded from the SoS-TDM. 
c. Pre-Existing Systems 
The SoS-TDM only considers using pre-existing systems. This assumption allows 
the SoS-TDM to assume that these systems are well understood with meaningful, useful 
architectures and performance measures. This mitigates the SoS-TDM from having to 
vary the performance of individual systems within the SoS when assessing the SoS 
performance. The SoS-TDM does allow for a discrete number of re-factorizations of 
these systems. Again, the re-factorization is assumed to be well understood (e.g., adding 
an existing communications sub-system to a system that does not have that sub-system). 
By assuming that the possible constituent systems pre-exist, the data that 
populates the analysis of the SoS is more accurate. This limits the number of assumptions 
one must make in developing the synthesis and operational models. This allows analysts 
to more clearly determine which variables are highly important and which are not. 
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It is reasonable to assume that an existing system does or can have a valid system 
architecture and valid models of its performance. Organizations maintain data on their 
systems and conduct operational test and evaluation routinely. This is a well-studied field 
with extensive practical experience. It is highly reasonable to assume that an existing 
system has well-developed data on its performance and mode of activity. 
d. Predictable Systems 
The final necessary assumption is that the constituent systems perform in some 
predictable manner. That is to say, for a given input to a system, it produces a predictable, 
if stochastic, output. A non-predictable system provides no regular output for a given 
input. This is a challenge, because systems that involve humans are not always 
predictable; however, humans, operating as a part of a system (say a military unit), can be 
expected to perform the standard procedures for that system and given situation. In the 
military, these are typically codified as tactics, techniques, and procedures. The 
analogous concept exists for other, non-military systems. This requirement allows the 
reasonable use of models of the system behavior. 
B. SOS-TDM – DESIGN SPACE DEFINITION 
The first step of the SoS-TDM is to define the design space for the SoS problem. 
This includes three things: the physical architecture design space, the process architecture 
design space, and the organization architecture design space. The SoS design space is the 
Cartesian product of these three sub-design spaces: 𝑫 = 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔×𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄×𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 
The set, 𝑫, contains the eventual set of feasible SoS and, eventually, the set of 
acceptable SoS that will be chosen for detailed architecting and analysis. In the context of 
the greater SoS-TDM, this step is highlighted in red in Figure 30.  
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Figure 30.  SOS-TDM – Define SoS Design Space 
1. Physical Architecture Design Space 
The physical architecture design space, 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔, is the set of design points defined 
by the parameters that define the physical architecture. The physical architecture of a 
design point is the composition of the included constituent systems, system refactoring 
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parameters, and SoS bridges. Associated with each parameter, constituent system, 
refactoring, or bridge, are the various details of the parameter capabilities regarding 
communications and information flow. Together, these form a communications network 
topology. Mathematically the physical architecture design space may be defined as: 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔 = 𝑺𝟏×𝑺𝟐×…×𝑺𝒊×…×𝑺𝒏 
Each 𝑺𝒊 may take a value in < 0, 1, 2, 3,… > where zero indicates that the 𝑖!!  system is not included in the SoS, a one indicates that the system is included, and a 
value higher than one indicates that the system is included and refactored according to the 
specifications equated to that number.  
For example, if one potential system in an SoS is a “U.S. Headquarters,” called 𝑺𝟒 
as a parameter, it may take a value in < 0, 1, 2 >. If 𝑺𝟒 = 0, then it is not included in that 
SoS. If 𝑺𝟒 = 1 then the “U.S. Headquarters” is included in the SoS as is. If 𝑺𝟒 = 2, then 
that indicates the “U.S. Headquarters” is refactored to include an “Afghan Liaison.” 
As a special case, some systems may be included that exist solely as a bridge for 
the SoS. In this case, the parameter is still treated as a separate system, but this system 
exists solely for the purpose of serving as a bridge among the various constituent 
systems. |𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔|, denotes the size of 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔 and is the product of the magnitude of each 
parameter’s domain, call this number 𝑠!   or  𝑏! as it corresponds to each parameter. Using 
the previous example, 𝑺𝟒 ∈< 0, 1, 2 > has a magnitude of three, so 𝑠! = 3. In general, 
each system or bridge may take at least two values, inclusion or exclusion. Therefore, 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔 = 𝑠! ∙ 𝑠! ∙… ∙ 𝑠! ≥ 2! 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔 ≤ 𝑀!!, where 𝑀! is the maximum of all 𝑠! 
Each design point in 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔, coupled with the corresponding system, 
refactorization, and bridge data, may define a unique physical architecture. The analysis 
of each physical architecture is discussed in Section III.C.1. 
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2. Process Architecture Design Space 
The process architecture design space is the set of design points defined by the 
parameters that define a process architecture. The process architecture of an SoS defines 
the sequence of operational activities and operational rules. Mathematically, this may be 
defined as: 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄 = 𝑭𝟏×𝑭𝟐×…×𝑭𝒊×…×𝑭𝒂×𝑬𝟏×𝑬𝟐×…×𝑬𝒋×…×𝑬𝒃 
Each 𝑭𝒊 is a set of mutually exclusive operational activity sequences (i.e., one 
must pick one and only one of the sequences available from that set). Each operational 
activity sequence may be assigned a nominal value (e.g., sequence 1 or 2) to define a 
design point. If there are multiple operational activity sequences that are not mutually 
exclusive (e.g., the SoS performs different sequences of activities to produce different 
desired emergent behaviors), these are represented by distinct Fi. The total number of sets 
of operational activity sequences is a. For example, in an indirect fire scenario, we define 
two, mutually exclusive operational activity sequences: 
1. Observe à Shoot 
2. Observe à Deconflict à Shoot 
Thus, in this example, there is one Fi:  
F1 = < “Observe à Shoot,” “Observe à Deconflict à Shoot”>, 
which may be shortened as  
F1 = <1, 2>. 
Each 𝑬𝒋 indicates if the 𝑗!! employment rule is used. An employment rule (or rule 
of employment) is a rule that prescribes how systems within the SoS must behave. There 
are b sets of rules of employment. For example, in an indirect fire scenario, we define 
two distinct rules of employment, one concerning the number of required observations of 
a target prior to shooting (1 or 2) and another concerning the rules of engagement for 
shooting at targets near civilians (authorized or not). Thus, in this example, b=2 and E1 
and E2 are defined as:  
E1 = <“One required observation,” “Two required observations”> 
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E2 = <“May shoot near civilians,” “May not shoot near civilians”> 
Together, F1, E1, and E2 define a process architecture design space by their 
Cartesian product. 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄  denotes the size of 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄 and is the product of the magnitude of the 
domain of each parameter, 𝑓!   𝑜𝑟  𝑒!. In general, each parameter has at least two potential 
values, therefore 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄 = (𝛱!!!! 𝑓!) ∙ (𝛱!!!! 𝑒!) ≥ 2!!! 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄 ≤ 𝑀!! ∙𝑀!!, where 𝑀! and 𝑀! are the maxima of 𝑓!   and  𝑒! 
Each design point in 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄 coupled with the associated values for the parameters 
defines the process architecture for that SoS. The analysis of a process architecture is 
discussed in Section III.C.2 
3. Organizational Architecture Design Space 
The organizational architecture design space is the set of design points whose 
parameters describe the organizational architecture of the SoS. The organizational 
architecture describes the relationship between each pair of systems within the SoS. This 
may be described mathematically as 𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 = 𝑰𝟏𝟐×𝑰𝟏𝟑×…×𝑰𝒊𝒋×…×𝑰(𝒏!𝟏)𝒏 
Each 𝑰𝒊𝒋 takes a value that corresponds to a predefined relationship between two 
systems. Note that there is no parameter for 𝑰𝒊𝒊; that is, there is no defined relationship for 
a system with itself. For example, if there are two systems, a U.S. Headquarters, 𝑺𝟒, and a 
Special Operations Forces Team, 𝑺𝟓, and there are four defined relationships: no 
relationship, a collaborative relationship, and a command-subordinate relationship, we 
may define 𝑰𝟒𝟓 ∈<! 𝑁𝑜  𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝!,! 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝!,! 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟!, ′𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒! >   
and 𝑰𝟓𝟒 ∈<! 𝑁𝑜  𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝!,! 𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝!,! 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟!, ′𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑒! >   
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The size of 𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈, 𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 , is the product of the magnitude of the domain of each 𝑰𝒊𝒋, call this 𝑖!" Note that, at a minimum, there are always two organizational 
relationships: no relationship or some other relationship. Thus, the magnitude of 𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 is: 𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 = 𝑖!" ∙ 𝑖!" ∙… ∙ 𝑖!" ∙… ∙ 𝑖! !!! ≥ 2! !!!  𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 ≤ 𝑀! !!! , where M is the max of all 𝑖!"  
In reality, defining the organizational design space in this combinatorial manner is 
untenable. The design space becomes enormously large for SoS with more than four 
potential systems. For example, with four possible relationships and nine possible 
systems, using a combinatorial approach leads to an organizational design space with 4!∙! ≈ 2.2×10!" distinct design points. To resolve this issue, one may define a number 
of distinct organizational architectures heuristically. Each of these may be defined using 
some set of well-defined relationships and a matrix whose i-j entries correspond to the 
relationship between the ith and jth systems. In this manner, we may define DOrg explicitly 
as <Organization 1, Organization 2, …. Organization o>, where o is the number of 
defined organizations. Accordingly: 𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 = 𝑜 ≥ 2 
Each point in 𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 coupled with the defined relationships defines an 
organizational architecture for the SoS. This closely mirrors what is represented by the 
OV-4: Organizational Relationships view in DODAF (DOD CIO 2010). Examples of 
pre-defined relationships include operational control (OPCON), tactical control 
(TACON), Direct Support (DS), General Support (GS), administrative control (ACON), 
coordinating authority, and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) (Joint Chiefs of Staff 
[JCS] 2011). For non-DOD SoS, one must carefully define these relationships according 
to information requirements and the affects a relationship has on system decision-making. 
The analysis of the organizational architecture is discussed in Section III.C.3. In 
defining an organizational design point in 𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 an engineer is advised to consider this 
wealth of literature and any pre-existing organizational relationship definitions or 
requirements. This facilitates subsequent integration activities. 
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4. SoS Design Space 
The design space for an SoS is defined as the Cartesian product of the physical, 
process, and organization architecture design spaces as defined in the previous three 
sections. This design space has a magnitude: 𝑫 = 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔 ∙ 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄 ∙ 𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 ≥ 2!!!!! ∙ 𝑜 
For values of n, a, and b such that their sum is greater than or equal to 16, the 
magnitude of the design space is non-trivial (greater than 100,000), and increases rapidly 
on the order of 2n. Direct assessment of each design point in the total design space is 
either impractical or impossible. The SoS-TDM contends with this issue through 
feasibility analysis of potential design points.  
C. SOS-TDM – DESIGN SPACE FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS AND 
SCREENING: THE SOS-AFAM 
The second step of the SoS-TDM is the design space feasibility analysis and 
screening as depicted in Figure 31.  The goal of this step is to define a set of feasible SoS 
“sufficiently small” so that each design point can be evaluated. This yields the feasible 
design space, 𝑫𝑭: 𝑫𝑭 =< 𝒅 ∈ 𝑫|𝑓!"#$%&'" 𝒅 = 1 > 
The function that assesses an SoS design point for feasibility is called:  𝑓!"#$%&'":𝑫 → [0, 1] 
where a design point is feasible if it returns a value of one and infeasible if it returns a 
value of zero. The challenge is to define a 𝑓!"#$%&'" that is accurate, computationally 
efficient, and practical. 
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Figure 31.  SoS-TDM – Design Space Feasibility Analysis and Screening 
The SoS-TDM – Design Space Analysis is accomplished through the SoS-
AFAM. This defines the SoS feasibility function through multiple steps that analyze 
subsets of the design space—the physical, process, and organizational—individually and 
then together as depicted in Figure 32.  The steps of the SoS-AFAM are listed and 
correspond with the numbers in the figure: 
1. Physical Design Space Feasibility Analysis: 𝑓!!!":𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔 → [0, 1] 
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2. Process Design Space Feasibility Analysis: 𝑓!"#$:𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔×𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄 → [0, 1] 
3. Organization Design Space Feasibility Analysis: 𝑓!"#:𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔×𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 →[0, 1] 
4. Total Design Space Feasibility Analysis: 𝑓!"#$%&'":𝑫 → [0, 1] 
 
 
Figure 32.  The SoS-AFAM 
Each function is employed through a standard flow seen in Figure 32. Each function 
is implemented through a computer algorithm that checks each SoS design point against a 
minimum set of requirements that are defined as necessary, but not necessarily sufficient, for 
any SoS architecture (e.g., the network topology of the included systems must be connected). 
The output of each function is then assessed against the next function until the entire design 
space has been assessed. The initial screen is a high-level, low-fidelity analysis. One can then 
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iterate through increasing levels of fidelity for SoS feasibility until one defines a feasible 
subset of the design space that is “sufficiently small.” 
One significant advantage of this methodology is that it partitions the design space 
into sub-spaces that are progressively screened for feasibility, thus reducing the requirement 
to check every point in the design space. For example, if there is a physical design point, 𝒅𝒑𝒉𝒚𝒔 ∈ 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔, there are many design points in the overall in design space that include this 
physical design as a part of them. Specifically, there are 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄 ∙ |𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈| design points in 𝑫 
that have the same physical parameters as 𝒅𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔. Through one calculation, if we assess 𝒅𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔 as infeasible, then every point in the overall SoS design space with those parameters is 
also infeasible and may be eliminated without further analysis. 
1. Physical Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
 
Figure 33.  SoS-AFAM Step 1: Physical Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
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Figure 33 depicts the first step of the SoS-AFAM, the physical design space 
feasibility analysis. In this step, potential SoS designs are assessed for physical 
feasibility. This test only assesses the design points in 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔, not the entire design space. 
This test may take varying levels of fidelity, but ultimately rests upon the idea that an 
SoS is only feasible (from a physical perspective) if every system is connected to every other 
system, either directly or indirectly. That is, if the physical composition of the SoS coupled 
with its communication interfaces forms a connected network, the SoS is feasible. 
A connected network is one in which every node (in this case system) can form a 
path to every other node (system). A path is a set of nodes and their edges (in this case 
communications interfaces) that form a continuous string from one node to another 
(Newman 2010). Figure 34 shows examples of connected networks, paths, and non-
connected networks. It is intuitively clear that, for an SoS to function and include all of 
its constituent systems, it must form a connected network. In the lower left-hand quadrant 
of the figure, node A is not connected to the network. Were A, B, C, and D an SoS, 
System A would have no means of communicating with the other systems. It would make 
no difference if A were there or not to systems B, C, and D. 
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a. Initial Physical Feasibility Test 
The initial physical feasibility test requires two inputs: the included systems (and 
their re-factorizations) and a table of the available means of communication to each 
system (or re-factorization). The data comes from the definition of each design point and 
is in the form  < 𝑆!, 𝑆!,… , 𝑆! > 
where each parameter takes a value from a set of pre-defined possible values, including 0 
for exclusion of the system, 1 for inclusion of the system as is, and 2 or greater for a re-
factorization of the system. The table of possible systems versus communications means 
comes from the system data. This is pre-defined, as the systems already exist. In 
DODAF, this data would come from a system’s DIV-1, 2, or 3, SV-1, 3, or 6 (DOD CIO 
2010). For non-DOD systems, this data may come from a similar format, or may require 
an engineer to create it. 
A simple example of a system versus communication table is seen in Table 3.  
This table outlines a theoretical set of possible systems (the names and details of this are 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter IV) and their communications sub-systems. This 
example assumes that if two systems have a mutual communications system, that they 
may communicate. An X in the i-j cell indicates that the ith system may communicate 
with the jth system. The X* indicates that a communication system is available if a re-
factorization is employed. 
Table 3.   System versus Communication Type Table 



















X  X X*  X X X  
OSRTV    X     X 
U.S. FM  X  X X X    
BFT  X  X X X    




Using the system and communications table, one may form an adjacency matrix11 
that describes the network topology of a given set of systems and then assess it for 
connectedness. This may be done using the following algorithm: 
 
Algorithm 1. Physical Feasibility Initial Algorithm   
COMMENT: Define the list of potential physical SoS 
compositions 
FOR each value of S_1 
FOR each value of S_2 
(Define a FOR loop for each S_i) 
FOR each value of S_n 
Define a vector [S_1, S_2, … S_n] 
IF Number of non-zero 
elements in the vector 
is greater than or equal 
to two 
Add vector to list of 







COMMENT: End Define the list of potential physical SoS 
compositions 
 
COMMENT: Assess potential physical SoS compositions for 
connectedness 
FOR each potential physical SoS composition 
DEFINE a square matrix of zeros of with the size of 
the number of included systems (adjacency matrix) 
FOR each included system (i) 
FOR each included system (j) 
IF i and j are distinct AND the ith and jth 
system share a common communications 
system 
                                                
11 An adjacency matrix is a matrix whose entries correspond to the relationship of the respective row 
and column (Newman 2010). 
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CALL FUNCTION “ISCONNECTED”12 and assess if the 
adjacency matrix is connected. 
IF the adjacency matrix is connected 
ADD physical SoS composition to physically 
feasible list 
ENDIF 
ENDFOR each potential physical SoS composition    
 
This algorithm outputs the set of physical SoS compositions that meet the 
minimum requirement to form a connected network, shared common communications. 
Potential SoS compositions must meet this basic level of connectivity to meet any higher 
fidelity assessments of SoS connectivity. Call the resultant physical SoS design space:  𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔!𝑭 =  < 𝒅 ∈ 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔|𝒅  𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑑  𝑎𝑠  𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  𝑏𝑦  𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑃ℎ𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙  𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡 > 
b. Expanded Physical Feasibility Tests 
If desired or necessary to further prune the design space, one may define 
progressively stricter physical connectivity tests upon a composition of systems. These 
tests may take a variety of forms and should be used as appropriate. These include range, 
system availability, minimum bandwidth (across the network), maximum latency, and 
maximum error rate. 
The first expanded test is a simple refinement on the initial test. It assesses the 
distance between two systems and modifies the communications matrix if the distance 
between two systems exceeds the maximum range of a communications sub-system. This 
requires the knowledge of each system’s location, or a reasonable approximation of its 
average location and the maximum range of each communications sub-system. One 
                                                
12 Network connectedness algorithms are well documented (Ahuja et al. 1993; Newman 2010) and 
readily available in a variety of network science packages for many programming and scripting languages. 
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calculates the distance between two systems in the most appropriate manner13 and 
compares this distance two the maximum range of each sub-system shared between those 
two subsystems. One then assesses for connectivity in accordance with the same 
algorithm, as detailed in Section III.C.1.a. 
Another connectivity test may measure the general availability of both the 
systems and communications sub-systems. Each system may have an operational 
availability, A0 defined for it. One can then use this to simulate the connectivity of the 
SoS network when systems or communications sub-systems are unavailable. This is done 
by assessing a system’s inclusion or not based upon its A0 and then assessing the system 
connectivity in the same manner as Section III.C.1.a. This may be repeated an 
appropriate number of times (i.e., 30 or more) to give a percentage likelihood of 
connectivity. A more refined method of doing this would be to use the mean time 
between failure (MTBF) and mean time to recovery (MTTR) for each system and sub-
system and conduct a simulation over a relevant time period that induces failures and 
recovery times on various systems according to the MTBF and MTTR and then assessing 
the percent time of connectivity. Decision-makers may then establish a minimum 
threshold as desired.  
The next three measures assess different aspects of network connectivity. They 
are: minimum allowable bandwidth between any two systems in the network, maximal 
allowable latency between any two systems, and maximum allowable error rate. These 
tests may be done using the common, precise measures in terms of bits per second, 
seconds between transmissions, or percent corrupted bits respectively. Alternatively one 
                                                
13 This method may vary depending upon the distance between the systems and the type of 
communications sub-system. If the distance is relatively small, standard Euclidean distance measures in 
two or three dimensions are appropriate. If the distance is large (say with satellites), one may need to 
employ a different metric. Furthermore, if the communication sub-system is supported by relays (e.g., a cell 
or satellite telephone), the question may be the distance between each system and its nearest relay. In other 
cases, such as two systems having internet access, the distance may be irrelevant depending on exact 
communications requirements (e.g., latency, bandwidth). 
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may make a lower fidelity approximation if necessary.14 To do this, one must define 
these measures on each system and communications sub-system.  
One may measure the minimum bandwidth between any two systems in an SoS 
by considering the bandwidth of each communications sub-system. In general, the 
minimum bandwidth transmission between any two systems in an SoS is the minimum of 
the maximum bandwidth available to any system in the SoS. A decision-maker may 
determine a system infeasible if its minimum bandwidth does not exceed a certain 
threshold. 
One may assess the minimum latency between any two systems in an SoS by 
defining a network flows problem where a network is defined for the SoS where each 
there is a node for each system and its communication type (e.g., if the “UAV“ has 
“OSRTV” and “MIRC” communications sub-systems, there is a “UAV-OSRTV” node 
and a “UAV-MIRC” node. One then defines a link between each node that shares a 
common communications sub-system (e.g., there is a link between “UAV-OSRTV” and 
“U.S. HQ – OSRTV” as both the “UAV” and “U.S. Headquarters” share the common 
“OSRTV” communications sub-system), and weight that link with the latency of the 
communications sub-system. Furthermore, for any system that has multiple 
communications sub-systems, one defines the latency between those two nodes as the 
time it takes to reconfigure the information from one type of communications sub-system 
to another (e.g., there would be a link between “UAV-OSRTV” and “UAV-MIRC” 
weighted with the length of time it would take a system to reconfigure the OSRTV 
information into MIRC information). If a system cannot reconfigure information from 
one type into another, that link has a weight of zero. This results in a weighted adjacency 
matrix of size 𝐶! + 𝐶! +⋯𝐶! +⋯𝐶! ≤ 𝑚 ∙ 𝑛, where Ci is the number of 
communications sub-systems the ith system has, m is the total number of communications 
sub-systems available and n is the number of systems available. To find the shortest path 
                                                
14 Those measures are highly useful when dealing with digital transmissions, e.g., e-mail. The 
concepts may be the same, but the actual measures less useful when considering non-digital 
communications, e.g., FM radio. One may consider the time it takes to send a standard formatted message 
in cases like this, e.g., a the Army standard for a Call For Fire should be made in 30 seconds or less. 
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between any two systems one considers each pair of systems and uses a shortest path 
algorithm to determine the shortest path between the two nodes in terms of latency.15 
There are multiple variations on Dijkstra’s algorithm to assess shortest path for an 
adjacency matrix with non-negative weights (Ahuja et al., 1993) that have been codified 
in a variety of network science packages. Thus, with the formulation of the adjacency 
matrix as described, one can solve this problem for each pair, and define the maximal 
minimum latency between any two systems in the SoS. 
The final test is the maximal allowable error rate. This problem is very similar to 
the previous problem. One must define the error rate for each communications sub-
system and for each system’s internal transmission between its own sub-systems. One 
then assesses the minimum error rate between two systems as the “shortest path” between 
the two systems along this error rate adjacency matrix. One can then assign a maximal 
allowable error rate for feasibility and eliminate systems that do not achieve this. 
Note that these tests should only be used after the initial iteration of feasibility 
tests and winnowing of infeasible solutions. Depending upon the size and density of the 
network formed by an SoS, some of these tests could potentially take significant time. As 
with all models and methods, an engineer must take care to define the problem well for 
the given situation. 
                                                
15 Note that this does not require checking the shortest path between every member of the adjacency 
matrix as defined, as each system may have multiple instantiations in this adjacency matrix. 
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2. Process Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
 
Figure 35.  SoS-AFAM Step 2: Process Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
The second step of the SoS-AFAM is the process design space feasibility 
analysis, as depicted in Figure 35.  This is done by assessing design points in the space 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔!𝑭×𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄, that is, each SoS design point defined by a physically feasible 
composition of an SoS crossed with each potential process architecture. The primary 
feasibility question to answer is: can a given set of systems conduct the required process? 
This makes an implicit assumption: an identified process results in the desired SoS 
behavior. This assumption is validated in the choice of processes that define the design 
space. 
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There are two types of process elements or factors: functional flows and rules of 
employment. In DODAF, these may be described by an OV-5a: Operational Activity 
Decomposition Tree, OV-5b: Operational Activity Model, OV-6a: Operational Rules 
Model, OV-6b: State Transition Description, or OV-6c: Event-Trace Description (DOD 
CIO 2010). Systems may use various functional flow block diagrams, IDEF0 diagrams, 
kill-chains, flow-charts, or other lists that describe and define rules of employment. 
Regardless of the precise method of describing the process architecture, a process 
architecture describes the necessary functions, their sequencing, and the rules of 
employment for a process. 
a. Initial Process Feasibility Test 
The initial process feasibility test simply concerns the ability of a composition of 
systems that form an SoS to perform the necessary functions indicated in a process 
architecture. To do this, one must identify the functions available to a composition of 
systems and the required functionality for a given process. In DODAF, the capabilities of 
a given system are cross-referenced with operational activities in a CV-6: Capability to 
Operational Activities Mapping (DOD CIO 2010). In non-DOD systems, this data may 
have to be recreated from another view. With this data, one may identify the operational 
activities each system is capable of and define, for each system, a vector that corresponds 
to this data (e.g., if there are three operational activities, define a binary vector of length 
three in which a 1 in the nth position indicates that the system is capable of performing the 
nth operational activity). This may be done similarly for each process. The algorithm 
simply compares the available operational activities provided by a composition of 
systems to the required operational activities of a given process. 
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Algorithm 2. Initial Process Feasibility Algorithm   
DEFINE the Set of Design Points 
FOR Each Design Point 
 DEFINE an empty SoS operational activity vector 
 FOR EACH INCLUDED SYSTEM 
SUM the included system’s operational 
activity vector to the SoS operational 
activity vector 
 ENDFOR 
 DEFINE an empty SoS operational activity sequence 
vector 
 FOR EACH INCLUDED Operational Activity Sequence 
SUM the included operational activity sequence to 
the SoS operational activity sequence vector 
  ENDFOR 
IF each entry of the operational activity vector 
(SoS available capability) is greater than 
or equal to the operational activity 
sequence vector 
SoS Design Point is feasible, include this 
design point in the feasible array 
 ENDIF 
ENDFOR            
 
A simple example may clarify this algorithm. Consider a set of systems that can 
conduct operational activities in accordance with Table 4.  This table is an extrapolation 
of the data for the set of potential systems that could come from a DODAF CV-6, or, in 
the case of non-DOD systems, other similar architecture views. Additionally, consider the 
set of potential operational activity sequences described in Table 5.  This table is 
abstractly represented in Table 6.  Together, these three pieces of information can be used 
to assess which SoS composition may complete which process. 

















Platoon	  2	   UAV	  
Observe	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   X	   X	   X	   X	   X	  
Deconflict	   	  	   	  	   X	   X	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Shoot	   X	   X	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Table 5.   Example Processes 
Process 1 (P1) Observe à Deconflict à Shoot 
Process 2 (P2) Observe (x2) à Deconflict à Shoot 
Process 3 (P3) Observe à Shoot 
Process 4 (P4) Observe (x2) à Shoot 
Table 6.   Minimum Functions By Process 
Process Observe Deconflict Shoot 
P1 1 1 1 
P2 2 1 1 
P3 1 0 1 
P4 2 0 1 
 
In this case, the algorithm may consider two physically viable compositions, call 
them SoS-1 and SoS-2. SoS-1 includes the “Afghan Rifle Platoon – 1,” “U.S. Rifle 
Platoon,” and “SOF Team.” SoS-2 includes the “U.S. Headquarters,” “U.S. Artillery,” and 
“U.S. Rifle Platoon.” Both form connected networks by Table 3.  and are therefore 
included in 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔!𝑭.  SoS-1 has the capacity to conduct the “Observe” operational activity 
by each of its three systems by Table 4.  This can be represented as a vector, 3, 0, 0 . 
Compared to each process, however, this SoS composition is not feasible as it cannot 
“Shoot” (required for all processes) nor can it “Deconflict.” Thus, all of these design points 
are infeasible. On the other hand, SoS-2 has the capacity to “Observe,” “Deconflict,” and 
“Shoot” once each time, represented as 1, 1, 1 . This meets or exceeds the requirements to 
conduct P1 and P3, but not P2 or P4 per Table 6.  Thus, the design points (SoS-2) x P1 and 
(SoS-2) x P3 are feasible and included in 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄!𝑭 and the others are not. 
This analysis provides a high-level, low-fidelity, but quick analysis of potential SoS 
designs’ process feasibility. The next sections examine, in greater depth, feasibility issues 
related to acceptance of rules of employment, and process interactions and de-conflictions. 
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b. Expanded Process Feasibility Test 
If desired or necessary, one may develop more detailed process feasibility tests. 
These begin with the set 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄!𝑭 as defined in Section III.C.2.a. One can then assess for 
rules of employment, resource and communication flow, and process de-confliction.  
If a process has a defined rule of employment, one may interview system program 
managers regarding their desire or ability to follow that rule. For example, in an indirect 
fire situation, a process rule may be that the SoS chooses targets in such a way that it 
maximizes the potential number of enemy killed without regard for civilian casualties. 
While this may be acceptable for some systems, other systems may not choose to operate 
with that rule in place. To do this, one must articulate the set of possible rules, which are 
process design points and interview the relevant system managers. This can be expressed 
in a table such as Table 7.   
Table 7.   System Acceptance of Process Rules 
 U.S. Headquarters Afghan 
Headquarters 




Acceptable Acceptable … 
One required 
observer 
Acceptable Acceptable … 
Maximize enemy 
killed 
Not Acceptable Acceptable … 
Do not engage 
locations with 
civilian presence 
Acceptable Acceptable … 
To assess if a design point is feasible, one merely identifies the rules of 
employment for that design point and cross references that against the included systems 
for the design point and highlights any non-acceptable rules of employment making the 
design point infeasible. This is simple enough that it does not warrant specific pseudo-
code. 
The second expanded process feasibility test involves considering process 
conflicts. To do this, one assesses the process flow for simultaneous operational activities 
that must be conducted and ensuring that these simultaneous activities do not conflict. 
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For example, consider that when one fires an artillery round in an indirect fire scenario, 
one must “clear the airspace,” i.e., ensure that no aircraft are operating in or near the 
same area as the projectile flight path.16 Accordingly, we can consider that there is a 
conflict between simultaneous observation on the part of an aircraft and shooting on the 
part of an artillery system. This is seen in Table 8.   
Table 8.   Example System Process Interference 
 
 
In general, one may identify the set of process interferences by defining a matrix 
in which the rows and columns are defined by the system and each of its possible 
functions (e.g., “Afghan Artillery – Shoot” is one row / column, if Afghan Artillery had 
the ability to also observe, “Afghan Artillery – Observe” would be another row / 
column). Note that in this set up, a system may conflict with itself if it cannot 
simultaneously perform two of its own functions. After defining this process interference 
matrix one further defines each set of simultaneous operational activities that must occur. 
This is done by assessing the operational activity sequences and defining the set of 
functions that must be conducted in each. One then develops an algorithm to assess each 
design point for as follows: 
                                                
16 This is somewhat simplified. Military fire support officers and air liaison officers devote significant 
attention to ensuring artillery rounds do not impact aircraft. There are a variety of tactics, techniques, 
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Algorithm 3. Process Deconfliction Algorithm    
Call Process Conflict Matrix 
Call Process Simultaneous Activity Sets 
FOR Each Design Point 
 Identify the Current Process 
 FOR Each set of simultaneous activities in the
 current process 
FOR Each possible system (Identify what 
functionality is available for this SoS) 
If that system is not included in the 
SoS composition 
Delete the rows and columns 
associated with that system from 
the Process conflict matrix 
   END If 
FOR Each pair of simultaneous activities in 
the current set, call them x and y 
Set Conflict = 1 
WHILE Conflict == 1 
Search the modified conflict matrix for 
the first non-checked system-activity 
pair that conducts x activity 
IF that row contains at least one 
element in the range of systems that 
conduct y’s activity that is not a 
conflict 
 Set Conflict = 0 
END IF 
IF all possible systems have been 
checked, break 
END WHILE 
IF Conflict == 1 
 Identify this system as infeasible 
 Break 
END IF 
  END FOR 
 END FOR 
END FOR 
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Through these expanded process feasibility tests, one may identify potential 
conflicts or limitations of an otherwise feasible process architecture and further winnow 
the process architecture design space. 
3. Organization Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
 
Figure 36.  SoS-AFAM Step 3: Organization Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
The third step of the SoS-AFAM is the Organization Design Space Feasibility 
Analysis as depicted in Figure 36.  This test assesses design points in the design space 
defined by 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔!𝑭×𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈. The feasibility tests in this case answer the questions:  
• Are the defined relationships acceptable to the included systems? 
• Does the organization form a connected network? 
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• Is the organization supported by the physical architecture? 
Recall that each organization, 𝑶𝒊 ∈ 𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 is defined as the set of relationships 
between each pair of potential constituent systems along with the definition of each 
relationship. For n potential systems, this may be expressed as a 𝑛×𝑛 matrix whose i-j 
entry is the relationship between the ith and jth systems. This is similar, although not 
precisely the same, as the DODAF OV-4 (DOD CIO 2010).  
An example of such an organization may be seen in Figure 37.  In this example, 
there are three possible relationships: “Commander-Subordinate” (represented by an 
arrow), “Collaborative” (represented by a line), or “No Relationship.” This is presented 
both as graphic model and a matrix. This example includes every possible system that 
defines the physical design space. 
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Furthermore, through engagement with each constituent systems’ management, 
one can define which relationships are acceptable and which are not to that constituent 
system. This may be an absolute—as in a general will never consent to be commanded by 
a private, or conditional, as in the Special Operations team may consent to be 
commanded by the Afghan HQ for certain missions. The set of acceptable relationships 
may be defined as a matrix in a similar manner to the organization definition. With this, 
one can assess, for each design point in 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔!𝑭×𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈, which are acceptable to all 
included systems. This may be done as follows: 
Algorithm 4. Initial Organization Feasibility Algorithm  
DEFINE the set of physically feasible SoS vectors 
DEFINE each organization matrix 
DEFINE the nxn Acceptable Organization Matrix 
FOR Each Physically Feasible SoS vector 
 FOR Each Organization 
  FOR i = 1 to n 
   FOR j = 1 to n 
IF the ith and jth system are 
included 
IF the ij entry of the 
current Organization is not 
included in the ij entry of 
the Acceptable Organization 
Matrix 
DEFINE this design point 
as not feasible 
BREAK from the i and j 
loops 
     END IF 
    END IF 
END FOR j = 1:n 
  END FOR i = 1:n 
IF the organization was not found not 
feasible 
Define the design point as 
feasible 
  END IF 
 END FOR Each organization 
END FOR Each Physically Feasible SoS Vector     
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The second question for organizational feasibility is, does the organization form a 
connected network? This is a feasibility requirement for reasons similar to the physical 
connectivity requirement—in order to work in concert to provide an emergent capability, 
the constituent systems in an SoS must be connected. Consider, for example, the general 
organization depicted in Figure 37.  If that organization is applied to the set of systems 
that includes all of the depicted ones except for the U.S. and Afghan Headquarters, one 
will, in effect, see the organization depicted in Figure 38.  Clearly, there are two distinct 
divisions to this organization making it an infeasible SoS. 
 
 
Figure 38.  Example Organization with Key Systems Excluded 
To assess for organizational connectivity, we consider two systems connected if 
they have an organizational relationship. This is done through the following algorithm: 
 
Algorithm 5. Organizational Connectivity Algorithm   
DEFINE the set of design points that are physically 
feasible, and organizationally feasible from an 
organization acceptance perspective.  
FOR Each design point 
 FOR i = n:1 
IF the system is not included 
 Delete the ith row and column or the 
organization matrix 
END IF 
 END FOR i = n:1 
 
 FOR each entry in the organization matrix 
IF the entry defines an organizational 
relationship 
   DEFINE that entry as a 1 














   DEFINE that entry as a 0 
  END IF 
 END FOR each entry in the organization matrix 
 
CALL FUNCTION “ISCONNECTED” and assess if the 
organization matrix is connected. 
IF the adjacency matrix is connected 
ADD physical SoS composition to physically 
feasible list 
END FOR Each design point        
  
A third test of organizational feasibility is with regard to the number and type of 
relationships that are acceptable for any given node. For example, if an organization has a 
command—subordinate relationship, one may wish to desire the maximum number of 
subordinates any system commands (e.g., in the Army, a common heuristic is no more 
than three to five subordinates) or limit the number of commanders a given system has 
(e.g., in the Army, the principle of unity of command would set this limit at one).17 For 
example, if the organizational design is as depicted in Figure 37, then one can see that the 
“U.S. Headquarters” has four subordinates. This may be acceptable, but, if one wishes to 
limit that to three subordinates, this organizational design is not acceptable unless one of 
the subordinate systems is excluded from the SoS. The general algorithm for assessing 
this is as follows: 
 
Algorithm 6. Organizational Relationship Limits    
Define the maximum number of relationships for each 
relationship type as R_type 
FOR Each system design 
 Define the organizational relationship matrix 
 FOR each relationship type 
  FOR Each System 
Sum the number of times the current 
relationship type occurs in the current 
system’s row, call this r 
                                                
17 Note that one may account for these principles when defining the organizational design space; 
however, that is not necessarily always true or desirable. One may define an organizational design in which 
one system is the commander of many systems, but only consider it feasible when there is a limited set of 
systems included in the SoS, thus limiting the number of subordinates. 
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   If r > R_type 
    Define this system as infeasible 
    Break 
   End If 
  End FOR 
 End FOR 
END FOR            
 
After assessing for organizational acceptability and connectivity, one may assess 
to see if the organization is supported by the physical connectivity. That is, for every 
organizational relationship, there is some communication that must occur between the 
two systems, this communication must be supported by the physical interface between 
those two systems. For example, in Figure 37 the U.S. and Afghan Headquarters have a 
collaborative relationship; however, Table 3.  indicates that these two systems only have 
the ability to communicate if the “Afghan Liaison” refactorization is included. Thus, the 
organization is only feasible if the “Afghan Liaison” is included. 
The algorithm for assessing physical support of an organization involves defining 
the organization for a given set of systems and, for each non-zero entry (i.e., any entry 
that has a defined organizational relationship) in the organizational relationship matrix, 
assess whether 1) there is a means of physical communication and 2) whether this 
physical communication supports the necessary communication as defined by that 
relationship. This requires the connectivity matrix as defined in the physical feasibility 
assessment section. 
 
Algorithm 7a. Physical Support of SoS Organization   
FOR Each Design Point (of those thus far assessed as 
physically feasible) 
Call the Physical Connectivity Matrix from the Physical 
Feasibility Assessment 
 For i = n:1 
IF the ith system is not included in the 
design point 
Delete the ith row and column out of 
that design point’s organization matrix 
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Delete the ith row and column from the 
physical connectivity matrix 
  END IF 
 END FOR i = n:1 
  
 FOR Each element of the organization matrix 
IF an element has a defined organizational 
relationship && does not have a physical 
connection in the corresponding Physical 
Connectivity Matrix 
 Define the design point as not feasible 
Break 
 END FOR 
  
 IF the organization has not been defined not 
feasible 
  Define the design point as feasible 
 END IF 
END FOR Each design point        
 
Much of the Algorithm 7a depends upon the definitions of an organizational 
relationship and physical connectivity. The highest level, low fidelity physical 
connectivity matrix only considers if there exists a potential physical connection of any 
sort. Increasing levels of fidelity vary this (as discussed in Section III.C.1) according to 
technical details. The type of relationship indicates both the type and amount of 
communication that must occur between two systems. At a detailed level, the physical 
connectivity must be sufficient such that it is capable of transmitting the required 
organizational information in a timely manner. If necessary, such detailed requirements 
may be articulated in the organization architecture relationship definition.  
This increased level of detail may be expressed with a slight modification of 
Algorithm 7a by varying the statement that assess for physical support of an 
organizational relationship as follows: 
Algorithm 7b. Physical Support of SoS Organization 
(Modified) 
 FOR Each element of the organization matrix 
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DEFINE organization required information 
type as O_org and bandwidth as B_org 
DEFINE the available physical connectivity 
between the relevant systems as O_phys and 
B_phys 
 
IF an element has a defined organizational 
relationship 
IF O_org is not equal to O_phys (or, 
O_org is not a member of O_phys if 
O_phys is a vector) 




IF B_org > B_phys (if the required 
bandwidth exceeds the available 
bandwidth) 




 END FOR          
 
Ultimately, the organizational feasibility assessment defines a set of points that 
contain physical and organizational design parameters and are feasible physically, 
organizationally, and in their interaction (i.e., the physical supports the organization); call 
the resultant space 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔!𝑭×𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈!𝑭. These design points must be assessed in 
conjunction with the process design points for total design point definition and 
assessment. 
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4. Total Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
 
Figure 39.  SoS-AFAM Step 4: Total Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
The fourth and final step of the SoS-AFAM is the Total Design Space Feasibility 
Analysis. At this point, one has two distinct sub-design spaces, 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔!𝑭×𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄!𝑭 and 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔!𝑭×𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈!𝑭. One may combine these to define the total feasible design space by 
considering every pair of feasible points from each of the sub design space that share a 
common set of physical parameters.  
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A minimal requirement is that the design point is feasible from all three 
perspectives. For example, if a design point is can take one of two physical architectures 
– say C1 and C2, two organizational architectures, say O1 and O2, and two process 
architectures, P1 and P2, there are eight possible designs. Assuming C1 and C2 are both 
feasible, one may consider if the designs for each organization and process combined 
with a physical architecture are feasible. Example results are seen in Tables 9 and 10. As 
one can see, the only feasible design point from all three perspectives if C1-O1-P1 as that 
is the only one that is feasible from both the organizational and process perspectives.  
Table 9.   Example Results of Process and Organization Architecture 
Feasibility Assessment 
C1-O1 Feasible  C1-P1 Feasible 
C1-O2 Not  C1-P2 Feasible 
C2-O1 Not  C2-P1 Not 
C2-O2 Feasible  C2-P2 Not 











More generally, this analysis may be completed with the following algorithm: 
 
Algorithm 8. Total SoS Design Space Analysis    
Call set of physical feasible designs 
Call the set of process feasible designs 
Call the set of organization feasible designs 
FOR Each physical feasible design 
 FOR Each Organization 
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  For Each Process 
If the Point defined by the current 
Organization and Physical parameters is 
in the set of Organization Feasible 
Designs and the Point defined by the 
current Process and Physical parameters 
is in the set of Process Feasible 
Designs 
Define the point defined by the 
current physical, process, and 
organization parameters as 
feasible 
   ELSE 
Define the point defined by the 
current physical, process, and 
organization parameters as not 
feasible 
   END IF 
  END FOR 
 END FOR 
END FOR            
 
The next question to assess is if the organization supports the process. In general, 
if an SoS design point has been found feasible thus far, it is physically and 
organizationally connected and has sufficient functionality to achieve the desired process. 
Accordingly, as one progresses from one step to the next in an operational activity flow, 
information may be passed between the systems by virtue of the physical and 
organizational connectivity. There are two ways to further refine this question. The first 
is by determining a maximum distance (or time) one wishes to allow between any two 
operational activities. The second considers the specific information (type and amount) 
required between two operational activities and if one can form a path (of any length) that 
allows for this information per the organizational definitions. 
For example, consider an SoS composed of: a “U.S. Headquarters,” “Afghan 
Liaison,” “Afghan Headquarters,” “U.S. Artillery,” and “Afghan Rifle Platoon – 1;” the 
organization depicted in Figure 37 conducting Process 3 with functionality as described 
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by Table 4. This SoS would be as depicted in Figure 40. 18 As the SoS is conducting 
Process 3, there is only one pair of functionalities to assess, “Observe” and “Shoot.” We 
assess the distance between these two points by building a path between them. In this 
case, the only path is “Afghan Rifle Platoon – 1,” “Afghan Headquarters,” “U.S. 
Headquarters,” then “U.S. Artillery” and is of length three. If, for some reason, a 
decision-maker wished to only allow for paths of length one,19 then this would not be a 
feasible system as there is no shorter path than the one described. 
 
 
Figure 40.  Example SoS For Organizational – Process Analysis 
A refinement on this is to consider the time to transmit from the sender system to 
the receiver system. This is done by considering the size of the required message, the 
bandwidth at each link, and the time to re-transmit the message through a system. This 
requires one to identify the bandwidth of each link, the processing time of each system, 
and then use standard network flow algorithms (e.g., Ahuja et al., 1993). If the size of a 
required message exceeds the capacity of any link, the distance will be infinite, meaning 
                                                
18 Note that this is a compilation of multiple, previously introduced, views used here for convenience. 
19 A path of length one means direct, organizational communication between the two systems. This 
prevents the “telephone game” in which one passes information between multiple other systems before it 


















no path could be formed. A similar, but qualitative question is, if the organizational 
relationships only authorize specific information,20 one can then do a similar analysis of 
the ability to send the required message along each node of a path between the sender and 
receiver. In general, all of these methods follow the same basic algorithm that may be 
modified according to the exact requirements. This is seen as follows: 
 
Algorithm 9. Organization Support of Process Analysis  
FOR Each design point 
 Define the current physical composition as C 
 Define the current process as P 
 Define the current organization as O 
 Define the current adjacency matrix based upon P, 
O, and C 
Define the max path length (or time, as defined 
by the decision-maker) 
 FOR each pair of operational activities in P, 
call them P_start and P_end 
IF P_start and P_end have a direct 
relationship in P 
FOR each included system that conducts 
P_start, call this S_start 
FOR each included system that 
conducts P_end, call this S_end 
Call the function21 
Shortest_Path(S_start, S_end) 
IF the result is less than 
the max path length 
 This point is feasible 
 Break 
    END FOR 
   END FOR 
ELSE 
                                                
20 In this regard, and at a high level of fidelity, one may define specific types of communication (e.g., 
a Call for Fire in a specific format), and define relationships that may use or require that format. 
21 These functions are commonly available in many network science applications. The author used 
MATLAB networks routines published by a variety of authors and compiled by MIT at 
http://strategic.mit.edu/downloads.php?page=matlab_networks  
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(No need to check, progress to the next 
pair) 
END IF 
 END FOR 
 IF All pairs of P_start and P_end have a path 
that is less than the max length 
 Define the system as feasible 
ELSE 
 Define the system as infeasible 
END IF 
END FOR            
 
As with the other analyses, it makes the most sense to progress from the highest 
level, lowest fidelity tests to lower level, high fidelity tests in sequence. This is because 
the high level tests are generally quicker and have the potential to remove a significant 
number of infeasible design points that do not warrant greater fidelity testing. 
After any level of fidelity testing has been completed, the end result is a set of 
design points that describe feasible SoS from the perspectives of physical, process, 
organization, and their interactions. 
5. SoS-AFAM Conclusion 
The end result of the SoS-TDM Design Space Definition and Design Space 
Analysis, the SoS-AFAM, is a significantly reduced subset of the initial SoS design space 
defined by the fact that each design point in it is feasible, from a physical, process, and 
organization perspective. Call this space: 𝑫𝑭 =< 𝒅 ∈ 𝑫|𝒅  𝑖𝑠  𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒 > 
Each design point is a set of parameters for an SoS that, together with the 
constituent system data, inform a unique SoS architecture that may be built and includes 
SoS physical, process, and organizational perspectives. Moreover, these design points 
serve as inputs to subsequent system analysis models (e.g., operational models or cost 
models) conducted in the fourth step of the SoS-TDM. 
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D. SOS-TDM – FEASIBLE DESIGN SPACE ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 41.  SOS-TDM – Feasible Design Space Analysis 
The third step of the SoS-TDM is Feasible Design Space Analysis, highlighted in 
red and seen in Figure 41.  The input to this step is 𝑫𝑭. It is a trivial matter to assess its 
size. It is a discrete set of parameter vectors that are held in a matrix or similar data store 
in one’s computer code; an engineer merely looks up the appropriate size metric. 
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Defining “sufficiently small” is only slightly more complicated. This depends upon the 
time available and the time to compute an appropriate number of runs of an operational 
simulation (or multiple distinct simulations) for a design point. Sufficiently small is, 
therefore a number s, such that 
𝑠 ≤ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑃𝑒𝑟  𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛  𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 
If 𝑫𝑭 ≤ 𝑠, then it is sufficiently small and may be assessed exhaustively in the 
next step of the SoS-TDM. If 𝑫𝑭 > 𝑠, one must iterate the SoS-TDM Design Space 
Analysis step at a higher level of fidelity and with stricter requirements for feasibility. 
This will produce a new 𝑫𝑭 ⊂ 𝑫𝑭. One then assesses 𝑫𝑭 in the same manner as 
described in Section III.C. Iterate these steps as necessary until a sufficiently small 
feasible design space is defined. 
E. SOS-TDM – DESIGN POINT ASSESSMENT AND TRADESPACE 
ANALYSIS 
The final step of the SoS-TDM is to exhaustively assess the set of feasible design 
points for performance (according to pre-defined, desired MOEs) and use this for 
tradespace exploration. For context within the general SoS-TDM, this step is highlighted 
in red in Figure 42.  This step of the SoS-TDM has two primary components, design 
point assessment and tradespace development and exploration. The end result is a 
tradespace that may be explored and used to define the set of acceptable design points, 𝑫𝑨. These are the design points that are both feasible and satisfy decision-makers’ 
requirements. Within 𝑫𝑨 there is a subset that are Pareto optimal that may be selected for 
subsequent detailed architecting and analysis. 
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Figure 42.  SOS-TDM – Design Point Assessment and Tradespace Analysis 
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The first step is to assess the design points for performance. This may be done 
using any number of appropriate modeling and simulation techniques, although, for SoS, 
the most common are ABM. Each design point is input into the chosen model or 
simulation and executed. If the simulation is non-deterministic, it is repeated an 
appropriate number of times to achieve statistically accurate results (30 repetitions is 
standard). Significantly, the design points in 𝑫𝑭 that are the inputs to the simulations 
have varying physical, process, and organization parameters that affect the results of a 
simulation and provide more realistic results. Methods of modeling and simulation of 
SoS are well developed for individual design points; see Section II.E.2 for a more 
detailed discussion of SoS analysis. Once the simulations are complete, one may develop 
a tradespace. 
The second step is the actual presentation of a tradespace. The specific 
presentation is contingent upon the desires of a decision-maker; however, it should 
demonstrate the relationship between a set of design parameters for a system and the 
resulting output. Decision-makers can then vary the desired requirements that define the 
set of acceptable points, either in terms of system attributes (e.g., system performance, 
such as cost) or system parameters (i.e., the inclusion or exclusion of a system) as 
discussed in Chapter II. This defines 𝑫𝑨. 
Once a decision-maker defines 𝑫𝑨 an engineer may then assess the set of Pareto 
optimal points within 𝑫𝑨, and conduct detailed SoS architecting and analysis for final 
SoS design decision-making. At this point, the SoS-TDM is complete and one continues 
with the chosen SoSE and MBSE engineering processes. 
F. SOS-AFAM ANALYSIS 
The SoS-AFAM defines an SoS design space with parameters that describe the 
physical, process, and organizational structure of a potential SoS. Inherently, this 
increases the size of the design space. The significant question is, how quickly can we 
analyze this space and use it to develop a tradespace? There are two considerations by 
which to assess the SoS-AFAM, the number of design points that must be assessed and 
how quickly each design point may be assessed. 
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1. Number of Design Points to Assess 
Recall the design space is defined as: 𝑫 = 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔×𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄×𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈. This has a 
magnitude 𝑫 = 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔 ∙ 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄 ∙ |𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈|. Recall that the magnitude of each of these 
subspaces is defined by the inputs: 
• 2! ≤ 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔 ≤ 𝑀!! where n is the number of distinct systems, and Ms is 
the maximum number of re-factorizations a system may take plus the 
options of no system included or the system as is 
• 2!!! ≤ 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄 ≤ 𝑀!! ∙𝑀!!  , where a is the number of non-mutually 
exclusive operational activity flows, b is the number of non-mutually 
exclusive rules of employment, and Mf and Mr are the maximum of any 
given set of mutually exclusive operational activity flows or rules of 
employment, respectively 
• 𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈 = 𝑂 for some pre-defined set of heuristically chosen organizations. 
Recall, the alternative of considering every combination of possible 
relationships for r defined relationships and n systems was 𝑟! !!!  
Accordingly, just considering the lower bounds of the first two and only one 
organization, the number of possible SoS designs, |𝑫|, exceeds: 
• 100,000 no later than when n+a+b = 17  
• 1,000,000 no later than when n+a+b = 20 
• 10,000,000 no later than when n+a+b = 24 
• 100,000,000 no later than when n+a+b = 27 
• 1,000,000,000 no later than when n+a+b = 30 
Therefore, it is not tenable to consider every single design point, particularly for a 
complete operational simulation. The SoS-AFAM addresses this problem by partitioning 
the design space into three sub-spaces: the physical, process, and organizational, and then 
aggregating the results. This significantly reduces the number of design points that must 
be checked. 
For convenience, let 𝐶 = 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔 ,𝑃 = 𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄 ,𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝑂 = |𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈|. Also, assume 
each is greater than or equal to two as the purpose of the SoS-TDM is to assess varying 
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parameters of each type. Initially, the number of design points one must consider is, 
therefore, COP.  
The first step of the SoS-AFAM is to assess the physical design space. One must 
assess C design points. This results in some percentage of design points being feasible, 
say x percent. 
The second step of the SoS-AFAM is to assess the process design space. The size 
of this design space is 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔!𝑭 ∙ 𝑃 = 𝑥𝐶𝑃 by the previous analysis. This results in some 
percentage, y, of design points that are feasible, or yxCP design points. 
The third step of the SoS-AFAM is to assess the organizational design space. The 
size of this design space is 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔!𝑭 ∙ 𝑂 = 𝑥𝐶𝑂 by the previous analysis. This results in 
some percentage, z, of design points that are feasible, or zxCO design points. 
The fourth step of the SoS-AFAM is to assess the total design space. One must 
only assess those points that have the potential to be feasible. The set of points to check 
are either of the form (process feasible design point)x(all possible organizations) or 
(organization feasible design point)x(all possible organizations) as in order to be totally 
feasible, each design point must be both organizationally and process feasible (these 
points include physical feasibility already). Thus, the number of design points that we 
must check is the min((zxCO)P, (yxCP)O). In general, call this number, wxCOP, where 
w=min(y, z). 
Thus, to assess the entire design space for feasibility, we must only assess 
C+xCO+xCP+wxCOP. Let 𝛱 denote the percentage of design points in the design space 
one must assess. This is: 
𝛱   = 𝐶 + 𝑥𝐶𝑂 + 𝑥𝐶𝑃 + 𝑤𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑃𝐶𝑂𝑃 = 1𝑂𝑃 + 𝑥𝑃 + 𝑥𝑂 + 𝑤𝑥 
Recall that P and O are both greater than or equal to two, thus: 
𝛱 ≤ 14+ 𝑥2 + 𝑥2 + 𝑤𝑥 =   0.25+ 𝑥 + 𝑤𝑥 
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While this may seem initially somewhat large, note that as the size of the design space 
increases as a function of additional processes and organizations, the percentage of 
design points one must assess decreases significantly. For example, if O=P=10, 𝛱 = !!"" + !!" + !!" + 𝑤𝑥 = 0.01+ !! + 𝑤𝑥. Thus, as the design space increases as a 
function of the number of organizations and processes, the percentage of the design space 
we must assess is primarily dominated by the percentage of physically feasible SoS 
design points. 
2. Algorithm Analysis 
a. Physical Design Points 
Algorithm 1 assesses the physical design space for connectivity. Each input into 
this test is a set of at most n systems that form an adjacency matrix. To define this matrix 
requires a set number of steps for each pair of possible systems, thus this first step is 
O(n2). Reingold (2008) showed that connectivity can be assessed as O(log(n)) for a 
network with n nodes. Together, each design point may then be assessed in O(n2 + 
log(n)). The detailed physical tests differ from the initial test with regard to the definition 
of connectivity, but, algorithmically, they are effectively the same. 
One must assess 2! ≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝑀!! points in this manner. For limited numbers of 
possible refactorizations, this number is approximately 2n, thus the entire physical design 
space may be assessed in 𝑂 2! 𝑛! + log 𝑛 . 
b. Process Design Points 
Algorithm 2 considers the number of operational activities available to the set of 
systems. If there are f operational activities one must simply add these numbers for each 
of the n systems, therefore this is O(nf). This must be checked for each of the xCP 
process design points. xC is a fixed number; P is bounded by 2a and Mfa for a is the 
number of non-mutually exclusive operational activity flows (e.g., if one is choosing one 
operational activity flow among a set of several, then a would be one. If one chooses one 
operational activity flow from one set and another from another set, a would be two). As 
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we typically only choose one potential operational activity flow for the entire ABM, this 
number is most typically, Mf. Thus, this is assessed in approximately O(xCMfnf). 
The second process check assesses which collections of systems accept the 
chosen set of rules. There was no need for a formal algorithm due to the simplicity; 
however, if there are at most bMe = r rules of employment and n systems, at most, we 
must check each system against each rule of employment, thus this algorithm is assessed 
in O(nr). Again, there are xCP design points that must be assessed each time, thus, to 
assess each design point, the analysis is approximately O(xCPnr). 
Algorithm 3 assesses process conflicts for a set of systems and a given operational 
activity flow. If there are c conflict points (meaning we have identified c pairs of 
operational activities that must be conducted simultaneously), we must assess, at most, 
each pair of systems in the SoS against these conflict points. This may be done in O(cn2). 
We do this for each of the xCP design points, thus the entire assessment may be done in 
approximately O(xCPcn2). 
c. Organization Design Points 
Algorithm 4 assesses each organization design point for relationship acceptability. 
At most, this requires assessing each possible pair of systems in the SoS against the 
relationship acceptability matrix. This may be done in O(n2). We check this against the 
xCO organizational design points. Thus, the entire organization design space may be 
checked in O(xCOn2). 
Algorithm 5 assesses organizational design points for connectivity. As the 
organizational matrix is already defined, we must only modify it to delete the rows and 
columns associated with non-included systems. This involves a set number of steps for 
each of the n systems, and thus may be done in O(n). We then assess the resultant 
adjacency matrix for connectivity, which may be done in O(log(n)) (Reingold 2008). 
Thus, each point may be assessed in O(n+log(n)). We must assess xCO points, thus the 
entire analysis may be done in O(xCO(n+log(n))).  
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Algorithm 6 assesses the number of each type of relationship each system has and 
compares that number against a pre-defined threshold. This therefore requires assessing 
each of n systems against R relationship types (e.g., collaborative, command). This may 
be done in O(nR). We assess this for each of the xCO design points. The total analysis is 
therefore, O(xCOnR). 
The final organizational feasibility test, Algorithm 7a and 7b, assesses the 
physical support of each organizational relationship. Algorithm 7a assesses only against 
the requirement to have a communication system of any type supporting an 
organizational relationship; Algorithm 7b has a stricter requirement—that specific 
communications capabilities support organizational relationship requirements in a pre-
defined manner. In either event, the assessment requires a fixed number of steps to assess 
each of the n2 potential system-system relationships. Each design point may be assessed 
in O(n2). Again, there are xCO design points; the total analysis is, therefore, O(xCOn2). 
d. Total Design Space 
Algorithm 8 defines each design point that is feasible from a physical, process, 
and organizational perspective. Its inputs are the set of feasible process designs (of the 
form (physical parameters)x(process parameters)) and set of feasible organization designs 
(of the form (physical parameters)x(process parameters)). One must check either the 
organization design against each possible process or vice versa resulting in design points 
of the form (physical parameters)x(organization parameters)x(process parameters). One 
checks each of these points to ensure the (physical parameters)x(process parameters) and 
(physical parameters)x(organization parameters) are both feasible. This involves a fixed 
number of steps for each of the design points and thus may be done in O(wxCOP), where 
w is as defined as in Section III.F.1. 
Finally, if desired, one may assess the design space as described in Algorithm 9 to 
see if the organization supports the processes. This involves at most, assessing, the 
shortest path between any two systems conducting any two pairs of operational activities 
in the SoS. There are n systems and f operational activities, thus the set of pairs may be 
assessed in O(n2f2). For each of these, one must assess the shortest path (along the 
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organizational adjacency matrix) that may be assessed using the Dijkstra algorithm, or a 
variation of it. In general, one may solve a shortest path algorithm in (Ahuja et al. 1993, 
123): 𝑂 min 𝑚 + 𝑛 ∙ log 𝑛 ,𝑚 ∙ log log 𝐿 ,𝑚 + 𝑛 log 𝐿 22 
where n is the number of nodes in the network, m is the number of links, and L is the 
maximum arc length (or weight) in the network. The reason for the varying run-time 
measures is due to different implementations of Dijkstra’s algorithm (Ahuja et al. 1993). 
Thus, for each design point, the organizational support of the process may be assessed in: 𝑂 n!f ! ∙ min 𝑚 + 𝑛 ∙ log 𝑛 ,𝑚 ∙ log log 𝐿 ,𝑚 + 𝑛 log 𝐿  
This must be assessed for each point that is physically, organizationally, and process 
feasible, which is the result of Algorithm 8. This is some percentage of the wxCOP 
design points; call it t. The entire design space may be assessed therefore in: 𝑂 𝑡𝑤𝑥𝐶𝑂𝑃𝑛!𝑓! ∙ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 𝑚 + 𝑛 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑛 ,𝑚 ∙ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿 ,𝑚 + 𝑛 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿  
3. False Positives 
The SoS-AFAM is vulnerable to false-positives. That is, a design point may be 
assessed as feasible, when in reality it is not. This is not a statistical error, rather an 
inherent limitation of the SoS-AFAM. Passing each of the SoS-AFAM’s tests is 
necessary, although possibly not sufficient, for a design point to be feasible. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to comprehensively define a sufficient set of feasibility 
criteria for all systems. The SoS-AFAM is, however, resilient to false-negatives. That is, 
if one accepts the various tests as necessary for feasibility, the SoS-AFAM will not 
identify a system as infeasible when it is, in reality, feasible.  
For tradespace development, it is preferable to have false-positives over false-
negatives as one wishes to explore the largest set of possible system designs. False-
negatives, excluded from a tradespace, have no potential to be chosen a useful design. 
                                                
22 Note: Ahuja et al. (1993, 123) use a C versus the L written here. The author modified this to avoid 
confusion with the C indicating the number of physical SoS compositions that may be formed. 
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False-positives, however, if chosen, will be identified as infeasible during more detailed 
architecting and analysis. 
4. Non- Physical, Process, or Organization Interactions 
It is not generally possible to categorically say that every type of interaction 
within an SoS may be categorized as physical, process, or organization. If an SoS has a 
significant interaction that falls outside of one of these categories, it would be missed. 
This affects both the feasibility analysis, i.e., one could generate a false positive, and the 
subsequent performance analysis, i.e., one would not correctly represent the SoS by 
missing a potential interaction, which would affect the results of a simulation. The former 
case is addressed in the earlier false-positive section. The latter case is generally 
problematic for SoSE. Identifying every possible interaction a priori is difficult, if not 
impossible. For this reason, practitioners have methods such as the “wave model” 
(Dahmann et al. 2011) to iterate the SoS engineering process. 
5. SoS-AFAM Analysis Conclusion 
The SoS-AFAM analyzes the design space of an SoS problem using a series of 
algorithms that assess the feasibility of a given SoS design. Significantly, by partitioning 
the SoS design space into four distinct spaces, the percent of design points that one must 
assess for feasibility is: 
𝛱   = 1𝑂𝑃 + 𝑥𝑃 + 𝑥𝑂 + 𝑤𝑥 
where O is the number organizational points, P is the number of process points, x is the 
percentage of physical compositions that are feasible, and w is the minimum of the 
percentage of organizational or process designs that are feasible. There is no general 
method to prove what x or w are; however, it is clear that the SoS-AFAM significantly 
reduces the size of the design space if one can significantly reduce at least one of the 
three sub-spaces. Furthermore, the analysis of each design point may be assessed for its 
computational complexity as described in Section III.F.2 and tabulated in Table 11.    
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Table 11.   SoS-AFAM Algorithm Analysis 
Test Analysis of a Design Point Maximum Number of Design 
Points to Assess 
Physical Connectedness 
(Algorithm 1) 
O(n2+log(n)) 2! ≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝑀!!  
Sufficient Functionality 
(Algorithm 2) 
O(nf) 𝑥𝐶𝑃, 2!!! ≤ 𝑃 ≤ 𝑀!!𝑀!! 











Maximum Relationship Capacity 
(Algorithm 6) 
O(nR) xCO 
Organization Supported by 
Physical Communication 
(Algorithms 7a and 7b) 
O(n2) xCO 




Maximum Organizational Path 
Length Between Any Two 
Operational Activities 
(Algorithm 9)  
𝑂 n!f ! ∙ min 𝑚 + 𝑛 ∙ log 𝑛 ,𝑚∙ log log 𝐿 ,𝑚 + 𝑛 log 𝐿  
wxCOP 
a = number of sets of mutually exclusive operational activity flows 
b = number of sets of mutually exclusive rules of employment 
f = number of operational activities 
c = number of operational activity conflicts 
C = number of physical system designs 
L = maximum arc length in a network 
m = number of edges (links or arcs) in a network 
Me=most number of mutually exclusive rules of employment 
Mf=most number of mutually exclusive operational activity flows 
Ms=most number of system refactorizations 
n = Number of systems 
O = number of organizational system designs  
P = number of process physical system designs 
R = number of relationship types 
w = minimum of percent organizationally feasible or process feasible systems 





The SoS-TDM is a methodology to define a comprehensive SoS design space, 
assess it for feasibility, and use this assessment to define a “sufficiently small” subset of 
the design space for exhaustive performance analysis. This allows engineers to define an 
SoS tradespace and explore this tradespace with decision-makers. Through TSE, 
engineers and decision-makers may define a small subset of the feasible design space that 
is acceptable. Within that acceptable design space, engineers may identify and analyze 
the Pareto optimal design points and conduct subsequent detailed SoS architecting and 
analysis. This process is described in Figure 43.  Ultimately, the SoS-TDM process 
facilitates the selection of a high level SoS architecture (that may be described in a 
number of manners, one notable SoS architecture framework being DODAF). By 
exploring a large design space that includes process and organizational considerations in 
addition to physical considerations, engineers are able to 1) better assess design points for 
feasibility across a wide range of considerations, 2) better represent the system 
performance attributes (e.g., operational performance, cost), and 3) better inform 
decision-makers of the SoS tradespace.  
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Figure 43.  SOS-TDM Process 
SoS architecting and analysis is challenged, from a tradespace development 
perspective, by large design spaces that are, in general, characterized by significant 
dependencies among the parameters that indicate the complex interactions among the 
systems. This makes it a challenge to approximate how various configurations will 
perform using various statistical tools. Moreover, one must still assess each potential 
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design for feasibility. An efficient feasibility test allows one to broadly assess the design 
space for feasibility and winnow infeasible points. Subsequently, one may exhaustively 
assess the subset of the design space that has the potential to be realized. This is done in 
the SoS-TDM in the step “SoS-TDM – Design Space Analysis” in which the feasibility 
of a design point is assessed according to its physical, process, and organizational 
parameters through the SoS-AFAM. 
The SoS-AFAM provides a series of general tests that may be used to assess a 
generic SoS design for feasibility. The majority of these tests only assess one aspect of 
the SoS, and therefore, this significantly reduces the number of design points one must 
assess. Furthermore, each test may reduce the number of design points one must assess in 
the subsequent test (e.g., if a design point is not both organizationally and process 
feasible (Algorithm 8), it does not need to be assessed for maximum organizational path 
length between two operational activities (Algorithm 9)). In total, this allows one to 
quickly assess the entire design space for feasibility as articulated in Section III.F and 
Table 11.    
This chapter presents two contributions to the state-of-the-art of MBSE and SoSE. 
Within MBSE, the general methodology, as seen in Figure 43, is an expansion on general 
MBSE design space and tradespace methodologies. Specifically, it expands these 
methods by including process and organization parameters to the design space. Within 
SoSE, it provides a non-heuristic, non-normative methodology to define a large SoS 
design space that includes physical, process, and organization architecture parameters and 
use that design space for tradespace analysis. The specific methodology for assessing for 
feasibility, the SoS-AFAM, is, itself, a contribution, that provides a means for iteratively 




IV. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SOS-TDM—AN 
EXAMPLE OF INDIRECT FIRE 
This chapter demonstrates an implementation of the SoS-TDM in the 
development of a combined, joint23 indirect fire (IDF) SoS. The purpose is to 
demonstrate the SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM through a concrete example. 
The problem is how to design an IDF SoS that maximizes enemy destruction, 
minimizes collateral damage, and minimizes cost. The available systems are from the 
U.S. Army, U.S. Special Operations, U.S. Air Force, and Afghan Army. The example 
itself is notional, meaning that no specific stakeholder has requested this analysis, but it is 
representative of many situations faced by the DOD, particularly in the context of joint, 
interagency, and combined operations. This represents an acknowledged SoS as the 
systems recognize the need to conduct the IDF mission, but the various services and 
commands maintain a level of control over their systems. 
Through the use of the SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM, we are able to define the IDF 
SoS tradespace for exploratory analysis. The design space is formed of nine possible 
systems with one possible refactorization, eight possible processes, and 11 possible 
organizations. This results in 90,112 design points. Through the use of the SoS-AFAM, 
7,980, or about 9%, are found to be feasible. We then assess those 7,980 points for their 
performance measures, and use these results to define the SoS tradespace. Each design 
point can be used to define an SoS architecture that includes physical, process, and 
organization perspectives. Through this, engineers and analysts may define the set of 
acceptable design points for refined architecting and analysis.  
                                                
23 The DoD uses the terms “joint,” “interagency,” and “combined” for specific purposes. Joint 
indicates two or more military services (e.g., Navy and Army). Interagency indicates two or more agencies 
of the U.S. Government (e.g., DoD and Department of State). Combined indicates two or more allies (e.g., 
the U.S. and U.K.). (Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2010. “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms. (JP 1-02)” Washington, DC: Department of Defense. 
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A. IDF SOS-TDM PROBLEM DEFINITION AND SCOPE 
To employ the SoS-TDM, one must have the requisite inputs and meet the 
necessary assumptions defined in Section III.A. We assume that the IDF SoS is an 
acknowledged SoS that has only information interfaces and the performance of the 
systems is well understood as outlined in Section III.A. The inputs, “Valid SoS Need and 
Associated MOEs” and “Potential Systems, Processes, and Organizations” are defined in 
the next two sections. 
1. Valid SoS Need and Associated MOEs 
a. SoS Need and Problem Definition 
We can assume that the need for an IDF SoS is valid. IDF is defined as “Fire 
delivered at a target which cannot be seen by the aimer” (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization [NATO] 2015, 2-I-3). To do this, one must have an observer view the target 
and send that information to a shooter.24 Between the observer and shooter, one may 
analyze the information to validate the target and other safety considerations. An IDF 
SoS is one that integrates the capabilities of observers and shooters via communication 
and information processing to provide aimed indirect fire on enemy targets. 
b. Performance Measures 
For this problem, there are two MOEs, one concerning how well the SoS destroys 
enemy targets and another concerning how well it limits collateral damage, and one 
MOP, its cost. Furthermore, there is the implicit MOP that the SoS is feasible; this is true 
of every system assessed as the SoS-TDM uses this requirement to choose systems for 
assessment. 
The first MOE is the percent of targets destroyed (PTD). In every operational 
simulation, there are a known number of targets that present themselves and a number 
that are engaged and destroyed by the SoS. The PTD is the ratio of these two numbers: 
                                                
24 Fires—fire support and fire delivery—is certainly more complex in its details than the simple 
definition presented here. For deeper discussion, see U.S. Army Field Manual 3-09, “Field Artillery 
Operations and Fire Support” (2014) or the joint equivalent, Joint Publication 3-09, “Joint Fire Support” 
(2014). 
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𝑃𝑇𝐷 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑦  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑦  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑙𝑒  
The PTD has a range of zero to one, with the goal to maximize it. This MOE is 
chosen over other possible variations as it encompasses the entirety of the ability of the 
SoS. For example, percent of targets destroyed out of targets engaged gives a false 
understanding of the SoS’s ability to destroy all targets it sees and gives the SoS an 
incentive to not engage difficult to destroy targets. Another alternative MOE would be 
percent of targets destroyed of targets that are observed; again this gives a false incentive 
to an SoS to not observe targets. Finally, note that there is no distinction or weighting for 
any higher or lower priority targets, all enemy targets are equally important. 
The second MOE is the percent collateral damage (PCD). This MOE measures 
the percent of potential neutral targets that are damaged by the SoS. PCD is measured as: 
𝑃𝐶𝐷 = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑦  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠  𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑑𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑁𝑜𝑛 − 𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑦  𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑠  
The PCD has a range of zero to one, with the goal to minimize it. The PCD is 
chosen over alternative collateral damage MOEs for reasons similar to those described 
for the PTD, so as to not create false incentives to not identify civilian targets or 
casualties.  
The final measure is the cost of the system. This is measured in dollars, with the 
goal to minimize it. It is assessed according to a model that aggregates cost based upon 
the cost of each individual system, the cost of the interfaces required for that system and 
organization, and the cost to train the system to perform the required processes. 
These three measures provide the SoS decision-maker with a tradespace. An ideal 
SoS design point would have a PTD = 1.0, a PCD = 0.0, and a cost of $0.00. Of course, 
this point is unlikely to exist and, among the many potential design points, there will be a 
tradeoff among the various measures. 
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2. Potential Systems, Processes, and Organizations 
a. Systems 
For the IDF-SoS there are nine potential constituent systems from four distinct 
commands; one of these systems may be refactored for an additional communications 
capability. The nine potential systems are:  
• System 1 – Afghan Army Artillery Battery 
• System 2 – U.S. Army Artillery Battery 
• System 3 – Afghan Army Kandak (Battalion) Headquarters 
• System 4 – U.S. Army Battalion Headquarters 
• System 5 – U.S. Army Rifle Platoon 
• System 6 – U.S. Special Operations Forces Team 
• System 7 – Afghan Army Rifle Platoon 1 
• System 8 – Afghan Army Rifle Platoon 2 
• System 9 – U.S. Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
Each of these is described in greater detail in Appendix B. Each performs various 
operational activities, has communications sub-systems, and performance data as outlined 
in Figure 44.  For this example, this data was stored in a MATLAB structure. 
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Figure 44.  SoS IDF Example Constituent System Data 
The three operational activities and their associated performance measures are: 
(1) Shoot 
• Definition: To propel a projectile from one location to another.  
• Measure 1: Probability of a Hit (Phit) is the probability that a system will 
hit the location at which it aimed. There is a 1- Phit probability that the 
fired rounds land at a location other than the one the shooter aimed at.  
• Measure 2: Probability of a Kill (Pkill) is the probability that a shot fired 
will kill a target at the location where the round impacts. This is assessed 
independently for each target at that location.  
(2) Deconflict 
• Definition: To receive and aggregate information, make a decision about 
that information to maximize a goal, and then send a message based on 
this information. 
• Measure 1: Memory is a measure of how much information a system can 




























































y Shoot X X
Deconflict X X
Observe X X X X X
Afghan#FM X X X* X X X
OSRTV X X
US#FM X X X X
BFT X X X X
MIRC X X X X
Phit 0.5 0.9 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Pkill 0.85 0.85 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Memory 1 2 2 5 2 2 1 1 0
Pdetect N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.25 0.25 0.15 0.15 0.15
Plocate N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.8 0.8 0.33 0.33 0.95
Pclassify N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.7 0.8 0.85 0.85 0.5































• Definition: To identify a target.  
• Measure 1: Probability of detection (Pdetect) is the probability that a system 
will detect a target in its field of view. 
• Measure 2: Probability of location (Plocate) is the probability that a system 
will correctly identify the location of a target it detected.  
• Measure 3: Probability of classification (Pclassify) is the probability that a 
system will correctly classify a target (as either civilian or enemy). 
• Measure 4: Max Call For Fire (Max CFF) is the maximum number of 
observations a system may make at any given time. 
The five communication sub-systems are: “Afghan FM Radio,” “One Station 
Remote Video Terminal” (OSVT), “U.S. FM Radio,” “Blue Force Tracker” (BFT), and 
“My Internet Relay Chat” (MIRC). These are described in further detail in Appendix B. 
Each communications sub-system has an aggregate performance measure that is the 
probability that a message sent on that system is received and understood. This is a high 
level aggregation for more detailed measures such as bandwidth, semantic 
interoperability, range, and availability. The probabilities are detailed in Table 12.  Note 
that the available communications refactorization is to add an Afghan liaison to the U.S. 
Headquarters, providing it with Afghan FM capability.  
Table 12.   Probability Communication System Transmits a Message 
Communication System Probability Message Received and Understood 
Afghan FM 80% 
OSRVT 85% 






As previously defined, there are three operational activities that the set of 
potential constituent systems can conduct, “Observe,” “Deconflict,” and “Shoot.” For this 
example, there are two ways these may be arranged as operational activity flows to 
achieve the emergent behavior of aimed IDF, either: “Observe then Shoot” or “Observe 
then Deconflict then Shoot” as seen in Figure 45.  
 
 
Figure 45.  IDF-SoS Operational Activity Flows 
Furthermore, there are two sets of rules of employment that define the process 
parameters. The first concerns the number of independent observations required before 
shooting—either one or two (e.g., if it is two, both the “UAV” and “Afghan Rifle 
Platoon” must observe the same target prior to a shooter engaging that target). The 
second rule concerns how decisions are made regarding which targets to engage, the rules 
of engagement. The first rule is that a shot cannot be made if civilians are known to be at 
a location, thus shots are fired at the location with the most enemy but no civilians. The 
second rule is that shots are chosen to maximize the difference between the number of 
enemy and civilian targets at a location (e.g., if there are five enemy at a location and two 
civilians at the same location, the difference is three; if there are two enemy and no 








Taken together, these form eight distinct process architectures: 
• P1a: Observe (two independent) à Deconflict à Shoot; Do not engage 
locations with civilians. 
• P1b: Observe (two independent) à Deconflict à Shoot; Maximize enemy 
– civilian targets at a location 
• P2a: Observe à Deconflict à Shoot; Do not engage locations with 
civilians. 
• P2b: Observe à Deconflict à Shoot; Maximize enemy–civilian targets at 
a location 
• P3a: Observe (two independent) à Shoot; Do not engage locations with 
civilians. 
• P3b: Observe (two independent) à Shoot; Maximize enemy–civilian 
targets at a location. 
• P4a: Observe à Shoot; Do not engage locations with civilians. 
• P4b: Observe à Shoot; Maximize enemy–civilian targets at a location 
c. Organizations 
Finally, the organizational inputs to the SoS-TDM for the IDF-SoS are defined 
through three organizational relationships: “No Relationship,” “Collaborative 
Relationship,” and a “Command-Subordinate Relationship.”  
The first is no relationship. The name of this relationship defines it; two systems 
with no relationship, even if they can communicate, do not communicate. This sort of 
relationship is beneficial in cases where centralized control is desired; furthermore, it 
minimizes the amount of interactions that must be accounted (and paid for) during the 
training and employment of the SoS. 
The second relationship is collaborative. Two systems with a collaborative 
relationship may share information and request activity from each other (e.g., an observer 
may request fires from a shooter, or a system may request another system pass 
information along); however, neither system exerts control over the other. Any positive 
response to a request is purely at the discretion of the requested system, which may 
prioritize requests as it wishes.  
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The final relationship is a command-subordinate relationship. In this relationship, 
the subordinate prioritizes requests from the commander and prioritizes sending 
information to the commander. This relationship must be used judiciously, as if one 
system has multiple commanders, the benefit of being a commander is diminished. 
Furthermore, this relationship may or may not be amenable to all systems. 
There is a set of organizational relationships that are acceptable to each system. 
This is defined in a matrix in which each system is defined along the rows and columns 
of the matrix as seen in Table 13.  The i-j cell of the matrix defines the relationship as i is 
the ___ of j (e.g., i is the subordinate of j). If a relationship is found in the i-j cell, then 
that relationship is acceptable to the ith system. The abbreviations are “Cmd” for 
command, “Sub” for subordinate, “Col” for collaborative, and “N” for no relationship. 
Table 13.   Table of Acceptable Organizational Relationships 
 
 
Finally, there are 11 ways in which these relationships define distinct 
organizations. Each is depicted visually in which a system is a blue block, a collaborative 
relationship is depicted as a black line, and a command-subordinate relationship is 
depicted as a black arrow in which the arrow points from the commander to the 
subordinate. A non-relationship is simply not indicated. There are red lines and arrows 



































































































































Afghan'Artillery < Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N
U.S.'Artillery Cmd,'Col,'N < Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N
Afghan'HQ Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N < Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N
U.S.'HQ Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N < Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N < Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N < Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N < Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 Cmd,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Col,'N < Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N
U.S.'UAV N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N Cmd,'Sub,'Col,'N N N <
Acceptable'Relationships:'Cmd'='Command;'Sub'='Subordinate;'Col'='Collaborative;'N'='No'Relationship
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refactorization to the U.S. Headquarters. Note that these images are small; larger versions 
are included in Appendix B. 
The first set of organizations is based upon likely existing hierarchies—by 
country and by command; they are further modified by allowing collaboration at the 
subordinate level (i.e., two subordinates of the same commander may interact or not). 
These hierarchy variations form the first six possible organizations. 
Organizations 1a and 1b are formed from collaboration between a hierarchy of 
U.S. and Afghan forces. The distinguishing characteristic between the two is that in the 
first, no collaboration is allowed among subordinates and, in the second, it is. These are 
seen in Figure 46.  
 
 
Figure 46.  Organizations 1a and 1b 
 
The second set of organizations is a modification of the Organizations 1a and 1b 
in which the U.S. Headquarters commands the Afghan Headquarters, and, by extension, 
all Afghan forces. 
 
 









































































Afghan'Artillery < N Sub N N N N N N
U.S.'Artillery N < N Sub N N N N N
Afghan'HQ Cmd N < Col N N Cmd Cmd N
U.S.'HQ N Cmd Col < Cmd Cmd N N Cmd
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon N N N Sub < N N N N
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team N N N Sub N < N N N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 N N Sub N N N < N N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 N N Sub N N N N < N






























































































Afghan'Artillery < N Sub N N N Col Col N
U.S.'Artillery N < N Sub Col Col N N Col
Afghan'HQ Cmd N < Col N N Cmd Cmd N
U.S.'HQ N Cmd Col < Cmd Cmd N N Cmd
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon N Col N Sub < Col N N Col
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team N Col N Sub Col < N N Col
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 Col N Sub N N N < Col N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 Col N Sub N N N Col < N





















































































Afghan'Artillery < N Sub N N N Col Col N
U.S.'Artillery N < N Sub Col Col N N Col
Afghan'HQ Cmd N < Sub N N Cmd Cmd N
U.S.'HQ N Cmd Cmd < Cmd Cmd N N Cmd
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon N Col N Sub < Col N N Col
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team N Col N Sub Col < N N Col
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 Col N Sub N N N < Col N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 Col N Sub N N N Col < N




















































































Afghan'Artillery < N Sub N N N N N N
U.S.'Artillery N < N Sub N N N N N
Afghan'HQ Cmd N < Sub N N Cmd Cmd N
U.S.'HQ N Cmd Cmd < Cmd Cmd N N Cmd
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon N N N Sub < N N N N
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team N N N Sub N < N N N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 N N Sub N N N < N N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 N N Sub N N N N < N
U.S.'UAV N N N Sub N N N N <
Organization'2a:'Stricht'Hierarchy'By'Country,'U.S.'in'Command
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The third set is the reverse of Organizations 2a and 2b with the Afghan 
Headquarters commanding the U.S. Headquarters.  
 
 
Figure 48.  Organizations 3a and 3b 
 
The fourth set of organizations is those that are arranged by command. At the top 
level, the various commands—the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Special Operations, 
and Afghan Army—are all collaborative. 
 
 
Figure 49.  Organizations 4a and 4b 
 
Organization 5 is different from the previous hierarchical organizations; it is a 
purely collaborative organization (up to communication ability). Any two systems that 




















































































Afghan'Artillery < N Sub N N N N N N
U.S.'Artillery N < N Sub N N N N N
Afghan'HQ Cmd N < Cmd N N Cmd Cmd N
U.S.'HQ N Cmd Sub < Cmd Cmd N N Cmd
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon N N N Sub < N N N N
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team N N N Sub N < N N N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 N N Sub N N N < N N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 N N Sub N N N N < N





















































































Afghan'Artillery < N Sub N N N Col Col N
U.S.'Artillery N < N Sub Col Col N N Col
Afghan'HQ Cmd N < Cmd N N Cmd Cmd N
U.S.'HQ N Cmd Sub < Cmd Cmd N N Cmd
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon N Col N Sub < Col N N Col
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team N Col N Sub Col < N N Col
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 Col N Sub N N N < Col N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 Col N Sub N N N Col < N





















































































Afghan'Artillery < N Sub N N N N N N
U.S.'Artillery N < N Sub N N N N N
Afghan'HQ Cmd N < N N Col Cmd Cmd N
U.S.'HQ N Cmd N < Cmd Col N N Col
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon N N N Sub < N N N N
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team N N Col Col N < N N N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 N N Sub N N N < N N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 N N Sub N N N N < N






















































































Afghan'Artillery < N Sub N N N Col Col N
U.S.'Artillery N < N Sub Col N N N N
Afghan'HQ Cmd N < N N Col Cmd Cmd N
U.S.'HQ N Cmd N < Cmd Col N N Col
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon N Col N Sub < N N N N
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team N N Col Col N < N N N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 Col N Sub N N N < Col N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 Col N Sub N N N Col < N




Figure 50.  Organization 5 
 
The final set of organizations is functionally based. The organizational 
relationships are defined based upon the functions each system performs. In the first, the 
headquarters (which perform the deconflict function) are central and can interface with 
any shooter system or observer system. The shooters may all collaborate and the 
observers may all collaborate (up to communication). The second is similar, except it 
only considers observers and shooters. 
 
 
Figure 51.  Organizations 6a and 6b 
Collectively, these inputs: the physical—the systems and their communications 
sub-systems, the processes—the operational activity flows and rules of employment, and 
the organization—the relationships and their potential structure define the second major 
input to the SoS-TDM. Combined with the first input, the valid SoS need and 



















































































Afghan'Artillery < N N N N Col Col Col N
U.S.'Artillery N < N Col Col Col N N Col
Afghan'HQ Col N < N N Col Col Col N
U.S.'HQ N Col N < Col Col N N Col
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon N Col N Col < Col N N N
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team Col Col Col Col Col < Col Col N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 Col N Col N N Col < Col N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 Col N Col N N Col Col < N





















































































Afghan'Artillery < N Sub N'/'Sub N N N N N
U.S.'Artillery N < N Sub N N N N N
Afghan'HQ Cmd N < N N Cmd Cmd Cmd N
U.S.'HQ N'/'Cmd Cmd N < Cmd Cmd N'/'Cmd N'/'Cmd Cmd
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon N N N Sub < Col N N N
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team N N Sub Sub Col < Col Col N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 N N Sub N'/'Sub N Col < Col N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 N N Sub N'/'Sub N Col Col < N





















































































Afghan'Artillery < N N N N Sub Sub Sub N
U.S.'Artillery N < N N Sub Sub N N Sub
Afghan'HQ N N < N N N N N N
U.S.'HQ N N N < N N N N Cmd
U.S.'Rifle'Platoon N Cmd N N < Col N N N
U.S.'Special'Operations'Team Cmd Cmd N N Col < Col Col N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'1 Cmd N N N N Col < Col N
Afghan'Rifle'Platoon'<'2 Cmd N N N N Col Col < N
U.S.'UAV N Cmd N N N N N N <
Organization'6b:'Function'w/'Observers'Directing:'No'HQ'Function'or'Organization'w/'Collaboration'at'2nd'Level
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B. IDF SOS-TDM STEP 1: IDF DESIGN SPACE DEFINITION 
 
Figure 52.  SOS-TDM – Define SoS Design Space 
The first step of the SoS-TDM is to define the design space as depicted in Figure 
52.  Recall that the design space is defined as the set of points defined by the Cartesian 
product of the physical, process, and organization design spaces: 𝑫 = 𝑫𝑷𝒉𝒚𝒔×𝑫𝑷𝒓𝒐𝒄×
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𝑫𝑶𝒓𝒈; each of these sub-spaces is defined by the Cartesian product of the domain for 
each parameter. For this problem, this leads to a 1x14 vector in which each entry is a 
variable defining some aspect of this space as seen below and described in Table 14.   𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!",𝐹!,𝐸!,𝐸!,𝑂    
Table 14.   Design Space Parameter Definition and Domains 




S1 System 1 – Afghan Artillery [0, 1] 2 
S2 System 2 – U.S. Artillery [0, 1] 2 
S3 System 3 – Afghan Headquarters [0, 1] 2 
S4 System 4 – U.S. Headquarters [0, 1] 2 
S5 System 5 – U.S. Rifle Platoon [0, 1] 2 
S6 System 6 – U.S. Special Ops. 
Team 
[0, 1] 2 
S7 System 7 – Afghan Rifle PLT – 
1  
[0, 1] 2 
S8 System 8 – Afghan Rifle PLT – 
2  
[0, 1] 2 
S9 System 9 – U.S. UAV [0, 1] 2 
S10 Afghan Liaison [0, 1] 2 
F1 Operational Activity Flow [Operational 
Activity Flow 1, 
Operational 
Activity Flow 2] 
2 
E1 Number of Required Observers [1, 2] 2 
E2 Rules of Engagement [No Civilians (1), 
Max Difference 
Enemy – Civilian (-
1)] 
2 
O Organization [Org 1a, Org 1b, 
Org 2a, Org 2b, Org 
3a, Org 3b, Org 4a, 
Org 4b, Org 5, Org 





These variables and definitions correspond exactly to the inputs as described in 
the previous section; this merely formalizes the inputs into the notation described in 
Chapter III. From this, we can easily see that the magnitude of the design space, the 
product of the magnitude of each parameter’s domain, is:  2×2×2×2×2×2×2×2×2×2×2×2×2×11 = 90,112 
Finally, note that there is significant interplay in defining the inputs for the SoS-TDM 
and this first step. In the input section, we defined each system, process, and organization 
specifically to align with the requirements for the SoS-TDM Step 1 as defined in Chapter 
III. For clarity, those inputs were defined in the previous section and formalized in this 
section; however, in reality, this distinction is blurred and necessarily iterative. 
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C. IDF SOS-TDM STEP 2: IDF DESIGN SPACE FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS 
AND SCREENING: THE SOS-AFAM 
 
Figure 53.  SoS-TDM – Design Space Feasibility Analysis and Screening 
The second step of the SoS-TDM for the IDF-SoS is to assess the IDF design 
space as seen in Figure 53.  This is done through the four steps of the SoS-AFAM and 
described in the next four sections. 
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1. IDF SoS-AFAM Step 1: IDF Physical Design Space Feasibility 
Analysis 
 
Figure 54.  SoS-AFAM Step 1: Physical Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
The first step of the SoS-AFAM is to assess the physical portion of the design 
space for feasibility as depicted in Figure 54.  For the IDF-SoS, this involves assessing 
which compositions of systems form a connected network. 
The initial physical SoS feasibility defined two systems in a given physical design 
point as connected if they shared a common communications sub-system as defined in 
Figure 44.  To do this, we implemented Algorithm 1 as defined in Section III.C.1. Note 
that this algorithm checks every design point of the form: 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!, 𝑆!"  where each variable is binary. This results in 
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2!" = 1,024  physical design points. It assesses each combination of these variables 
against a 9x9 matrix whose entries are one if the corresponding systems share any 
communications means and a zero otherwise. This matrix is seen in Table 15.  Finally, 
note that the algorithm was also modified to exclude any potential compositions of SoS 
that only contained one or zero systems. 
Table 15.   Initial System-System Connectivity Matrix 
 
  
The result of this analysis is that there are 372 physically connected combinations 
of systems of the 1,024 potential ones. The time to run this analysis was negligible, only 
a second or two, but it provided a 64% reduction in the design space. Note that this does 
not, in and of itself, mean that any of those 372 physical compositions forms an entirely 
feasible SoS. For example, the SoS composed of the “Afghan Rifle Platoon” and “SOF 
Team” meets the requirement of forming a connected network; however, it clearly is not 
a viable SoS as it has no ability to shoot. Another example, the SoS formed by the “U.S. 
Rifle Platoon” and “U.S. Artillery” may be a viable SoS, but it depends upon the required 
process; if the operational activity flow is “Observe” then “Shoot,” then it is may be a 
viable SoS; if the activity flow is “Observe,” then “Deconflict,” then “Shoot,” then it is 
not a viable SoS. These questions are addressed in the process, organization, and total 














































Afghan'Artillery 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0
U.S.'Artillery 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1
Afghan'H.Q. 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
U.S.'H.Q. 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
U.S.'Rifle'PLT 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
SOF'Team 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
Afghan'Rifle'PLT':'1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
Afghan'Rifle'PLT':'2 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
UAV 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
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 For this analysis, the 64% reduction in the physical design space was, in 
combination with the subsequent process, organization, and total analyses, sufficient to 
winnow the feasible design space for exhaustive operational and cost analysis. For 
demonstration, however, we assessed each of the 372 initially feasible design points against 
the probability that they formed a connected network when the communications sub-
systems had a probability of not correctly passing a message according to Table 12.  This 
involved a slight modification of Algorithm 1. To do this, we assessed each of the 372 
design points 100 times. Each time, the connectivity matrix, Table 15, was modified so that 
connectivity between two systems was dependent upon the probability that each 
communications device worked. For example, the sole connection between the “Afghan 
H.Q.” and the “Afghan Artillery” is through the “Afghan FM.” This has an 80% chance of 
correctly connecting and sending a message. Therefore, 20% of the time the “Afghan 
H.Q.” and “Afghan Artillery” systems were not connected. From there, we executed 
Algorithm 1 as defined. This took approximately one minute to execute and the result of 
this is that some of the 372 initially feasible SoS did not always form a connected network 
as seen in Figure 55.  
 
  
Figure 55.  SoS Composition Likelihood of Connectivity 
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2. IDF SoS-AFAM Step 2: IDF Process Design Space Feasibility 
Analysis 
 
Figure 56.  SoS-AFAM Step 2: Process Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
The second step of the SoS-AFAM is to assess the process design space for 
feasibility as depicted in Figure 56.  The input is the set of feasible physical design points 
crossed with the set of all possible processes; the size of this is 372×2×2×2=2,976 as 
there are 372 possible feasible compositions of systems, two operational activity flows, 
and two sets of rules, each with two options. To assess each design point for process 
viability, we must first define each of the eight distinct processes and the number of each 
type of function they require. This is depicted in Table 16.  Each is numbered for 
convenience. Note that one of the rules of employment, the number of independent 
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observations, affects the number of required functionalities whereas the other rule does 
not affect the functionality requirement. 






E1: Number of 
Independent 
Observations 













1a Observe à 
Deconflict à 
Shoot 
1 No Civilian 1 1 1 





1 1 1 
2a Observe à 
Deconflict à 
Shoot 
2 No Civilian 2 1 1 





2 1 1 
3a Observe à 
Shoot 
1 No Civilian 1 0 1 




1 0 1 
4a Observe à 
Shoot 
2 No Civilian 2 0  




2 0 1 
 
The functionality of each system is depicted in Figure 44.  Taking the 
functionality provided by each system combined with the minimum requisite 
functionality for each process, one may assess if a set of systems is process feasible by 
using Algorithm 2 defined in Section III.C.2. The number of feasible systems for each 
process is depicted in Table 17.  Note that the rule of employment does not impact 
functionality test, although it could impact subsequent testing if required. 
Table 17.   Number of Feasible SoS by Process 
Process 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 
# Feasible 
SoS 
207 207 235 235 246 246 281 281 
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The end result is that 1,938 physical-process design points are feasible from a 
process perspective. This is a 35% reduction from the initial set of 2,976 potential design 
points. The run time of this analysis was negligible, only a second or two.  
Although it was not necessary in this example, one could further prune this design 
space in two ways. The first would be by assessing acceptance of the rules of employment in 
a given process against the systems included in the SoS. This would be done by defining a 
matrix of system acceptance or non-acceptance of each rule as depicted in Table 7.  The 
second more detailed assessment is to identify process conflicts and identify SoS that contain 
these conflicts as described in Algorithm 3 and depicted in Table 8.   
3. IDF SoS-AFAM Step 3: IDF Organization Space Feasibility Analysis 
 
Figure 57.  SoS-AFAM Step 3: Organization Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
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The third step of the SoS-AFAM is to assess the organization design space for 
feasibility as depicted in Figure 57.  The design points tested in this section are the cross 
between the 372 physically feasible design points and the 11 possible organizations, for a 
total of 4,092 design points. This feasibility assessment is done through a series of three tests. 
The first test is to assess if a given organization is acceptable to a set of systems. 
This is done by comparing the organization matrix for the set of systems relative to the 
set of acceptable relationships as defined by Algorithm 4 in Section III.C.3. The 
organization matrix for a set of systems is simply the organization matrix for that 
organization design modified so that it only represents the systems included in that design 
point. This is simply checked against the system-system organizational relationship 
matrix. If a design point contains a single non-acceptable organizational relationship it is 
deemed infeasible. For example, the SoS with all nine systems and Organization 3a or 3b 
is infeasible as it has the “Afghan Headquarters” in command of the “U.S. Headquarters” 
and this relationship is not acceptable to the “U.S. Headquarters” by the set of acceptable 
relationships in Table 13.    
The second test assesses the set of design points that were determined to be 
feasible from an organizational acceptance perspective against the connectivity 
requirement. In this requirement, we assess each organizational matrix for connectedness. 
This is done through Algorithm 5 in Section III.C.3. The input for each design point to be 
assessed is an adjacency matrix in which two systems have a common link if they have 
an organizational relationship.  
Finally, the last test takes the previous results, and assesses if each relationship in 
the design point is supported by a physical communications sub-system as defined by 
Algorithm 7A in Section III.C.3. That is, if the “U.S. Headquarters” and “U.S. Artillery” 
are included in the system and the “U.S. Headquarters” commands the “U.S. Artillery,” 
this is feasible as these two systems share a common communications sub-system, “U.S. 
FM.” On the other hand, if the “U.S. Headquarters” commands the “Afghan Artillery,” 
and the “Afghan Liaison” is not present, this is not feasible as the two systems do not 
share a common communications sub-system. 
The end result of these three tests was that 1,677 of the 4,092 possible design 
points were found organizationally feasible as depicted in Table 18.  This is a 59% 
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reduction in the set of physical-organization design points. The run time for these 
analyses was similarly quick as the physical and process ones, only a second or two. Note 
that the exceptionally low results in 6b are due to the fact that some systems are 
inherently excluded in 6b (the deconflicters, the “U.S. Headquarters” and “Afghan 
Headquarters”). Furthermore, there are significant symmetries in the first three 
organizations that lead to similar results. 
Table 18.   Results of Organization Architecture Analysis 
Organization 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 4a 4b 5 6a 6b 
# Feasible 150 105 150 105 150 105 222 227 259 150 54 
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4. IDF SoS-AFAM Step 4: Total IDF Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
 
Figure 58.  SoS-AFAM Step 4: Total Design Space Feasibility Analysis 
The final check for the IDF-SoS is to assess the design space in its totality. Recall 
that initially there were 90,112 design points defined by the physical, process, and 
organizational parameters. We have identified 1,938 process and physically feasible 
points and 1,677 organizationally and physically feasible points, each defined by a 
composition of systems and a process or organization (e.g., the “U.S. Artillery,” “U.S. 
Headquarters” and “U.S. Rifle Platoon” with the “Observe,” “Deconflict,” “Shoot,” one 
observer, and no civilian present physical-process design point). To be totally feasible, a 
design point, defined by its physical composition, process, and organization, must be 
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feasible against each one of these perspectives. Furthermore, the organization must 
support the process requirements. 
The first check is to identify the points that are physically, organizationally, and 
process feasible as defined in Algorithm 8 in Section III.C.4. In general, we already have 
a defined set of physical-organization design points that are feasible and a set of physical-
process design points that are feasible. We only must check either the feasible physical-
organization design points crossed with all potential processes or the reverse. For 
example, in Figure 18 we see that the physical organization design point of the “U.S. 
Artillery,” “U.S. Headquarters,” “U.S. Rifle Platoon” and Organization 1a is feasible. 
Therefore, there are eight potentially feasible physical-organization-process design 
points: the initial point with each of the eight processes; however, not all of them are 
totally feasible. We know from the process analysis that some of the processes with this 
physical design are not feasible. 
Table 19.   Feasible Physical-Organization Design Point Crossed with All 
Eight Processes 
Physical – 
Organization Process Feasible Note 
(U.S. Artillery, 
U.S. Headquarters, 
U.S. Rifle Platoon) 
x 
(Organization 1a) 
1a Yes Has sufficient functionality 
1b Yes Has sufficient functionality 
2a No Needs an additional “Shooter” 
2b No Needs an additional “Shooter” 
3a Yes Has sufficient functionality 
3b Yes Has sufficient functionality 
4a No Needs an additional “Shooter” 
4b No Needs an additional “Shooter” 
 
The end result of this analysis is that 7,980 design points are feasible from a 
physical, organization, and process perspective. The computational time of this analysis 
was only a second. This resulted in a 76% reduction from checking every possible 
organization and process against the 372 physically feasible designs (32,736 design 
points). This reduces the size of the feasible design space to a “sufficiently small” 
number as defined in the next section. If desired, however, one can conduct more detailed 
total design space analysis. 
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The more detailed total design space analysis takes the 7,980 design points and 
assesses how well the organization supports the process as described in Algorithm 9 of 
Section III.C.4. If one wishes to limit the number of “organizational steps,” one must take 
between any two points in a given process, we follow the algorithm as described. For 
example, consider the feasible systems described in Table 19.  One sees that either 
operational activity flow is acceptable, so long as only one observer is required. There 
are, however, varying numbers of “organizational steps” as depicted in Figure 59.  If a 
decision-maker wished to only allow one organizational step between any two 
operational activities in an operational activity flow, this would restrict any operational 
activity flow that required an observer to interact directly with a shooter, namely the first 
one, “Observe” then “Shoot.” Thus, of the four initially feasible design points, only two 
would be feasible. 
 
 
Figure 59.  Example Number of Organizational Steps for a Design Point 
From the 7,980 feasible design points, if one restricts the number of 












Algorithm 9, we reduce the feasible design space to 4,806 design points, a 40% 
reduction. This analysis only took a few seconds to run. 
D. IDF SOS-TDM STEP 3: IDF FEASIBLE DESIGN SPACE ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 60.  SOS-TDM – Feasible Design Space Analysis 
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The third step of the SoS-TDM, as seen in Figure 60, is to assess the feasible 
design space, DF, to see if it is “sufficiently small” for exhaustive assessment. If the space 
is not sufficiently small, one iterates the SoS-AFAM at a higher level of fidelity. For this 
example, each iteration was combined and discussed in the previous section. The sole 
question for the IDF-SoS for this section is defining “sufficiently small.”  
The operational model that assessed PTD and PCD took approximately one 
minute to run 30 repetitions of a single design point. The cost model took less than a 
second to assess each design point. For this example, we considered a week of 
computational time to be the maximum allowable run-time for the operational 
assessments. Therefore, using the formalization of Section III.D, a design space of less 
than 10,080 design points is “sufficiently small” as 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒  𝑃𝑒𝑟  𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛  𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 = 1  𝑊𝑒𝑒𝑘 = 7×24×60 = 10,080  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠1  𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒  𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛  
The initial design space, with 90,112 design points would require approximately 
1,500 hours (two months) of run time to exhaustively assess the entire design space. The 
feasible design space, with 7,980 design points, is feasible as it can be assessed in less 
than a week. 
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E. IDF SOS-TDM STEP 4: IDF DESIGN POINT ASSESSMENT AND 
TRADESPACE ANALYSIS 
 
Figure 61.  SOS-TDM – Design Point Assessment and Tradespace Analysis 
The fourth step of the SoS-TDM is to assess the design points in DF and use that 
to develop a tradespace for subsequent analysis. For the IDF SoS, this involved testing 
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the 7,980 design points judged feasible in two models, an operational ABM and a cost 
model. This provided the three measures for this scenario, the PTD, PCD, and cost for 
each design point. The fields of SoS modeling, tradespace exploration, and multi-criteria 
analysis are well explored (as discussed in Chapter II); however, for completeness, we 
provide a brief demonstration. 
1. IDF-SoS Agent-Based Model 
The IDF-SoS ABM assesses a design point’s PTD and PCD. It takes a design 
point as input in the form of a vector: [S1, S2, … S9, LNO, Pm, ROE, Oo] where the 
variable Sn or LNO is binary, indicating whether or not the nth system is included, Pm is 
which of four processes is employed, ROE indicates which set of ROE are used, and Oo 
indicates which of 11 possible organizations are used. It outputs the number of civilian 
and enemy targets presented and the numbers of each hit; these are used to calculate the 
PTD and PCD for design point as measured to the nearest percent. 
The scenario is a military operation in which targets (enemy and civilian) present 
themselves in the area of operations (AO) for a pre-determined amount of time. 
Observers detect, locate, and classify each target according to their Pdetect, Plocate, and 
Pclassify respectively. They then use this information and any information (e.g., a request 
for information from a commander) to choose on which targets to report. Target reports 
(calls for fire) are then sent to another system in the SoS; the choice of system depends 
upon the process and organization. Deconflicters, in processes that employ them, 
aggregate the information they have received to choose targets in accordance with the 
rules of employment. Deconflicters then send a message to shooters according to the 
organization. Shooters engage a target location according to the calls for fire they receive 
or direction from deconflicters; they prioritize the shots fired according to the 
organization and rules of employment. Throughout this, systems may relay messages that 
they have received but are not intended for them. Finally, damage is assessed for shots 
fired and enemy and civilian hits are tallied. For a more detailed treatment of the 
algorithm, see Appendix B. 
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The scenario took approximately 1–2 seconds to run each iteration on a personal 
computer. To test each design point 30 times for a statistically reasonable result took 
approximately a minute. To test the entire design space took approximately six days of 
computational time. This was reasonable in the context of the design problem.  
2. IDF-SoS Cost Model 
The cost model for the IDF-SoS accounted for the cost of each system, the cost 
for each relationship (to account for training), and the cost for the functions required 
(again, to account for training). The algorithm to run simply summed the cost of each 
included system, relationship, and process for a design point (see Appendix B) and output 
the results. The results are deterministic and only require a single run. The run time was 
less than a minute for the set of feasible systems. 
3. IDF-SoS Tradespace 
After running all models, one has defined the tradespace. Recall the mathematical 
definition of a tradespace from Section II.B.2.g, a design space, its associated attributes 
and bounding requirements, the six-tuple: 𝑫,𝜹𝒊,𝐷!!"#,𝐷!!"# , 𝛿!∗!"#, 𝛿!∗!"# . In this 
example, the design space, D is defined by the set of vectors of the form: 
<S1, S2, … S9, LNO, Pm, ROE, Oo> 
The system attributes, 𝛿!!, 𝛿!!, 𝛿!!, and  𝛿!! are feasibility, mean PTD, mean PCD, and 
cost respectively and defined through the previously described models.25 The initial 
bounds are defined as the range of each input parameter and any possible PTD, PCD, or 
cost. The one requirement that we have already imposed is that 𝛿∗!!"# = 1, i.e., we require 
a design point to be feasible.  
All of the tradespace information is contained in a large spreadsheet with 7,980 
rows, corresponding to each design point, and 17 columns, corresponding to the 
parameters for each design point and the system attributes (performance measures). This, 
                                                
25 Note: In the mathematical definition, each system attribute, 𝛿! is defined by some function. In this 
case, this function is defined for each input through the model. It is not a “function” in the classic sense 
such as y = f(x) = x2. It is, however, a function in the sense that it assigns an input to an output. 
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of course, is not very useful to a decision-maker. Instead, it is presented in a graphical 
user interface (GUI) as depicted in Figure 62.  
 
 
Figure 62.  IDF-SoS Tradespace Graphical User Interface (GUI) 
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The tradespace GUI allows a user to visualize the relationship between the three26 
performance measures as seen in the top right corner of the figure and expanded in Figure 
63.  Each design point is plotted, to the nearest 5% or $25,000, against its PTD, PCD, and 
cost. If multiple design points map to the same performance measures, that is indicated in 
this GUI by varying the color and size of the point as outlined in the figure. One can also 
choose to view this in two dimensions by selecting the desired option, e.g., collateral 
damage versus enemy killed as seen in the bottom half of the figure. 
 
 
Figure 63.  Expanded Projection of Tradespace in Three and Two Dimensions 
                                                
26 Direct visualization is possible for two or three performance measures. For four or more, one must 
select a subset of the performance measures as demonstrated in Beery (2016).  
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One can vary the bounds of the parameters and attributes, i.e., the {𝐷!!"#,𝐷!!"# , 𝛿!∗!"#, 𝛿!∗!"#} to affect the tradespace. This is indicated, for the design 
parameters, in the three boxes labeled Physical Architecture, Organizational Architecture, 
and Process Architecture and, for the system attributes, in the box labeled performance 
measures as seen in Figure 62.  As one varies these, the set of acceptable SoS, DA varies, 
and the displayed design points changes to only display those that are acceptable.  
More explicitly, for the parameters, the terms “Allowed,” “Required,” and “Not 
Allowed” vary the bounds of the parameter space, i.e., the Dj. “Allowed” means that an 
SoS with or without a given system, organization, or process may be included in the set 
of acceptable SoS (DA). “Not Allowed” means that an SoS with that system, organization, 
or process may not be included in the set of acceptable SoS (DA). “Required” means only 
those SoS with the given system, organization, or process are included in the set of 
acceptable SoS (DA). For example, for the physical architecture, the relationship between 
the GUI and the mathematical formalization of the design space is demonstrated in 
Figure 64.  There is a direct mapping between the GUI button and a change in the set of 
design parameters that define DA. 
 176 
 
Figure 64.  Tradespace GUI Design Parameter Bounding to Mathematical 
Formalization 
For the system attribute bounds, as defined by the performance measures, the 
process is the same. The box labeled “Performance Measures” sets an upper or lower 
bound on what is acceptable for each performance measure. Formally, this varies the {𝛿!∗!"#, 𝛿!∗!"#} associated with each attribute as demonstrated in Figure 65.  
 
Required( Allowed( Not(Allowed(
S1# D1#=#[1]# D1#=#[0,#1]# D1#=#[0]#
S2# D2#=#[1]# D2#=#[0,#1]# D2#=#[0]#
S3# D3#=#[1]# D3#=#[0,#1]# D3#=#[0]#
S4# D4#=#[1]# D4#=#[0,#1]# D4#=#[0]#
S5# D5#=#[1]# D5#=#[0,#1]# D5#=#[0]#
S6# D6#=#[1]# D6#=#[0,#1]# D6#=#[0]#
S7# D7#=#[1]# D7#=#[0,#1]# D7#=#[0]#
S8# D8#=#[1]# D8#=#[0,#1]# D8#=#[0]#
S9# D9#=#[1]# D9#=#[0,#1]# D9#=#[0]#
LNO# D10#=#[1]# D10#=#[0,#1]# D10#=#[0]#
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Figure 65.  Tradespace GUI System Attribute (Performance Measure) to 
Mathematical Formalization 
With this framework in place, a user, an engineer or decision-maker, may vary the 
bounds of what is acceptable both in terms of design parameters and performance 
measures and “explore” the tradespace, i.e., choose a variety of bounding sets that define 
sets of design points that are feasible. The actual exploration of a tradespace has been 
reviewed in the literature (e.g., Ross and Hastings 2005; PSU-ARL 2015; Beery 2016) 
and outside the scope of this research; a more detailed treatment of tradespace 
exploration for this example is seen in Appendix B. 
F. CONCLUSION 
In this example, we use the SoS-TDM to develop the tradespace of an IDF-SoS. 
Through the use of the SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM we winnowed the design space from 
90,112 points to 7,980 (9%) feasible design points. This allowed us to exhaustively assess 
the set of feasible design points for operational performance through the use of an ABM 
in less than a week of computational time using a personal computer. This would have 
been infeasible for the entire design space, as it would have taken 1,500 hours (two 





infeasible design points would have been wasted effort as those points could not be 
realized, even if they produced acceptable performance measures. 
To winnow the initial design space of 90,112 points took less than less than ten 
minutes of computational time. By partitioning the design space, we only had to assess:  
1. C = 1,024 physical design points that resulted in 372 physically feasible 
points. Thus 𝑥 = !"#!,!"# = 0.36. 
2. xCP = 372×8 = 2,976 process design points that resulted in 1,938 process 
feasible design points. Thus 𝑦 = !,!"#!,!"# = 0.65. 
3. xCO = 372×11 = 4,092 organizational design points that resulted in 1,677 
organizationally feasible design points. Thus 𝑧 = !,!""!,!"# = 0.41. 
4. wxCOP = 1,677×8 = 13,416 complete design points.  
In total, we made 1,024+2,976+4,092+13,416 = 21,508 feasibility assessments. Thus, 𝛱 = !",!"#!",!!" = 0.24. This analysis resulted in 7,980 feasible SoS design points. 
The end result of using the SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM for the IDF SoS was a 
tradespace that defined an SoS across its physical, organizational, and process parameters 
and against three performance measures. The inclusion of all three SoS architectural 
perspectives allowed better fidelity SoS modeling and simulation as it organization and 
process parameters are key to ABM and SoS analysis. The resultant tradespace GUI is a 
user friendly method of exploratory design decision making that may be used to define a 
small subset of designs for subsequent detailed architecting and analysis. Importantly, 






Contemporary organizations desire to explicitly engineer SoS; however, this has 
proven difficult. A significant aspect of this challenge is that SoS are highly complex—
not only are the constituent systems of an SoS managerially and operationally 
independent, but there are significant interactions among the physical composition, 
processes used, and organizational relationships of the SoS. A SoS architecture must 
describe these different perspectives. Moreover, it is through the interactions of these 
different perspectives that an SoS generates its emergent capabilities. This makes it 
difficult to easily understand and predict the implications of choosing any set of design 
parameters. 
Within engineering design, there are three methods of design-decision making: 
heuristic, normative, and exploratory. For SoS, there are heuristic and normative design 
decision-making methodologies; however, there are limited exploratory SoS design 
decision-making methodologies, and the ones that do exist make significant simplifying 
assumptions abstracting away the necessary architectural perspectives of an SoS.  
Within the field of MBSE, there has been much effort on developing exploratory 
design decision-making methods, primarily in the area of tradespace exploration. These 
methods require one to define the relationship between a design point and its attributes 
(e.g., cost, performance). This is challenging for an SoS due to the complex nature of the 
interactions. SoS design points are best assessed individually; however, this limits the 
number of design points that may be assessed in total due to time and computational 
constraints. 
Taken together, these two challenges—the requirement to design and represent 
SoS with the considerations of physical, process, and organization and the lack of any 
current ability to develop the tradespace for an SoS represented in this manner—create a 
potential for an extension to the state-of-the-art of systems engineering.  
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To address this challenge, the dissertation developed the SoS Tradespace 
Definition Methodology and the SoS Architectural Feasibility Assessment Model; both 
are depicted in Figure 66.  The SoS-TDM is a four step methodology in which an 
engineer 1) defines an SoS design space according to the physical, process, and 
organization perspectives, 2) assesses these design points for feasibility and winnows the 
infeasible points, 3) iterates this process until the remaining feasible set is “sufficiently 
small” for exhaustive analysis, and 4) exhaustively analyzes the set of feasible SoS 
design points to create a complete tradespace. The SoS-AFAM is how one conducts Step 
2 of the SoS-TDM. It involves testing different subsets of the SoS design space for 
feasibility from a variety of perspectives and then using the results of these tests to define 
a sub-set of the design space that is feasible. 
 
 
Figure 66.  The SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The first chapter identified three research questions to answer to extend the 
current state-of-the-art. 
1. How may the required SoS architectural perspectives of physical, process, 
and organizational be used to define an SoS design space? 
 181 
This question is answered Step 1 of the SoS-TDM. Generally speaking, there exist 
defined architectural representations (e.g. DODAF views) for each of these perspectives. 
The distinction for the SoS-TDM is that it defines parameters that can define a design 
space such that these parameters may be used to build the required architectural 
perspectives. 
2. How may one assess the feasibility of an SoS architecture? 
The SoS-AFAM presents a model to define the feasibility of an SoS design point. 
This involves a series of logical tests that assess different aspects of the design space. 
These tests include requirements for the physical (communications) topology and 
organizational topology to form connected networks, for the included systems to provide 
sufficient functionality to complete the desired processes, system acceptance of the 
necessary organizational relationships and rules of employment, and other more in depth 
considerations that refine these basic questions. These tests must be answered positively 
for any SoS to be realized as, if they are not, there exists a system in the SoS that either 
does not agree to the requirements placed upon it or is not connected to the other systems 
in the SoS.  
3. May the above be used to define an SoS tradespace in an efficient manner 
so that it can be incorporated into existing MBSE TSE methodologies? 
The SoS-TDM is a method to define and winnow, via the SoS-AFAM, an SoS 
tradespace in a reasonable time. It does this by introducing feasibility tests to selectively 
choose a significantly smaller subset of the SoS design space for analysis. While it is 
impossible to prove that the feasible subset of the design space will always be sufficiently 
small, it is often the case as the complexity of an SoS makes the likelihood of all 
feasibility requirements being met fairly low. 
In general, one may assess an SoS design space for feasibility fairly quickly with 
the SoS-AFAM. This is done by partitioning the design space and assessing these 
partitions prior to assessing the total design space. The percent of the design space one 
must assess is:  
𝛱   = 1𝑂𝑃 + 𝑥𝑃 + 𝑥𝑂 + 𝑤𝑥 
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where O is the number organizational points, P is the number of process points, x is the 
percentage of physical compositions that are feasible and w is the minimum of the 
percentage of organizational or process designs that are feasible. Each feasibility tests has 
varying algorithmic complexity as described in Table 11.  In the example of the IDF-SoS, 
the computational time to assess feasibility for all 90,112 points was less than ten 
minutes.  
Finally, the SoS-TDM extends current state-of-the-art MBSE methodologies, 
notably the MEASA as depicted in Figure 67.  As the SoS-TDM starts and ends at the 
same point as the MBSE MEASA, one may integrate it into greater MBSE 
methodologies as described by Beery (2016). 
 
 
Figure 67.  SoS-TDM Modification of the MBSE MEASA.  
 Adapted from Beery (2016) 
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are at least seven areas of potential future research to extend and improve 
this methodology and model. These include detailed architecting and analysis, process 
and organization definition, collaborative SoS, transfer functions, strategic SoS design 
decision-making, variable environments, and unanticipated emergent behaviors. 
The first area of further research is in applying the SoS-AFAM to greater levels of 
detailed architecting and analysis. As presented, the feasibility of a system is generally 
binary—an SoS design is feasible or it is not, it is connected or not, the physical supports 
the organization or it does not. In some cases, there are gradations of feasibility as 
feasibility itself is defined by a decision-maker’s requirements (e.g., a system that may be 
realized in one year may or may not be feasible depending upon the decision-maker’s 
timeline). Furthermore, the analysis made the simplifying assumption that the 
information used was fungible and could be passed across any network with only some 
translation time to switch between different networks; this may not generally be true. 
Moreover, there may be multiple, different types of information (or possibly other 
resources) that must transition between systems. In some cases, certain types of 
information or other resources may only require a transition between a small subset of an 
SoS and not the whole SoS. For example, one may have a supply chain SoS that must be 
completely connected by information sharing, but only requires a sub-set of it that must 
form a connected physical network of actual material exchange. 
The second area of continued research is with regard to how one defines 
processes and organizations. As presented, an engineer uses heuristics to define multiple 
distinct processes and organizations. This solves a combinatorial problem as there are 
essentially infinite ways in which one could arrange even a small number of functions to 
define an operational activity flow, rules one could come up with, or organizations one 
could define with even a small number of operational activities or organizational 
relationships. A more analytic tool to define and assess potential processes and 
organizations may further extend Step 1 of the SoS-TDM—how we define the SoS 
design space. For example, one may define a set of available operational activities and 
relationships and assess which sets present a desired emergent behavior and then assess 
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what set of systems could support those designs. This may be of particular use in a 
concept related to SoS—Families of Systems or swarms (groups of modular, but distinct 
systems that interact to provide a desired capability). 
A third area of research involves extending the scope of the SoS-TDM and SoS-
AFAM to collaborative SoS. As developed, the SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM only apply to 
acknowledged and directed systems. This makes the tacit assumption that, if an SoS is 
found to be feasible (and, in particular organizationally acceptable), one can develop that 
SoS. For collaborative SoS, however, one must place greater emphasis on the incentive 
structure as a function of the architecture. As a part of considering which systems to 
incentivize the most, one may consider which systems are most important to providing a 
capability or performance measure. Game theory suggests different ways in which one 
can consider which member of a team (i.e., constituent system in a system) should be 
rewarded based upon how the team performs (i.e., its performance measures) with or 
without that member (e.g., the Shapley Value).27 
A fourth area of future research is in regard to transfer functions as defined in 
Section II.C.1.b. Recall that a transfer function is a function that takes a set of design 
parameters as input and outputs an operational parameter for use in an operational 
simulation. They are useful for the practical purpose that operational and system 
synthesis models often require different inputs. A simple, if obvious example of an SoS 
transfer function would be to define the latency and accuracy of a message passed 
between two systems over its organization and physical architectures. This could be used 
in a non-ABM simulation to assess SoS operational performance.  
A fifth area is that the SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM, as developed, only consider a 
single design phase in an SoS’s life-cycle. In reality, the development of an SoS is an 
iterative process that occurs repeatedly as constituent systems change over their own life-
cycles. As presented, the SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM only consider the impacts of an SoS 
design for this point in time. This is a tactical perspective. A more strategic perspective 
would consider the impact of an SoS design over a longer life-cycle, particularly as it 
                                                
27 The Shapley Value is, in essence, a measure of how much a given player contributes relative to the 
other players in a cooperative game (Owen 2013).  
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relates to the life-cycle of its constituent systems and their potential replacements. 
Ideally, one would want a methodology that introduced a method of measuring an SoS’s 
performance over multiple iterations of its life-cycle and its ability to continue to provide 
utility to its stakeholders. 
A sixth area is that, as mentioned in Chapter II, this dissertation assumed a static 
environment. Systems must operate in many environments. A changing environment 
varies system attributes (e.g., a system may perform well in one environment and not 
well in another). This, in turn, varies the tradespace, both in how one must define it and 
how one explores it. Moreover, a varying environment may affect SoS feasibility. For 
example, two systems may share a FM radio communications sub-system. The range of 
the FM radio varies depending upon the terrain. Thus, an SoS that depends upon this 
connection may or may not be feasible depending upon the terrain. Similarly, 
relationships between two systems may vary in acceptability depending upon the political 
environment.  
Finally, the SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM are focused on the trades among pre-
defined performance measures, in other words, among expected emergent properties. A 
challenge of SoS engineering is that there are often unexpected emergent properties 
(Keating 2009). Understanding the nature of these emergent properties—what 
combination of systems and interactions lead to them—is highly useful. Conceptually, if 
an unexpected emergent property is one that may be modeled (i.e., it is simple or weak 
per Maier’s (2015) definition), it can potentially be observed in a simulation of that SoS. 
If one has a method to identify unexpected emergent properties that occur in the 
modeling and simulation of the set of all feasible SoS identified by the SoS-AFAM, one 
could use that information to identify which combinations of systems and their 
interactions cause that unexpected emergent property. Accordingly, developing a method 
for identifying unexpected emergent properties in a simulation would be highly useful 
future research. 
 186 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 
 187 
APPENDIX A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ARCHITECTURE 
FRAMEWORK 
The Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DODAF) is the DOD’s 
required architecture framework for its systems. It is referenced throughout this 
dissertation. The most recent version is DODAF 2.02 (DOD CIO 2010).  
Importantly, the DODAF is focused upon defining the necessary data that 
describes the system and may subsequently be turned into models that demonstrate a 
particular view (DOD CIO 2010). This data is called the DODAF Metal Model (DM2) 
(DOD CIO 2010). This is necessary for actually building an architecture in accordance 
with DODAF; however, of greater conceptual interest are the various views that use this 
data.  
DODAF does not prescribe the actual depiction of any particular viewpoint 
(DODAF CIO 2010); however the Object Management Group (OMG) has developed a 
set of standards for the Unified Modeling Language (UML) for DODAF called the 
Unified Profile for DODAF / MODAF (UPDM) (Object Management Group [OMG] 
2016). The company No Magic provides a quick reference guide that provides examples 
of employment of the UPDM available on their website, 
http://www.nomagic.com/support/quick-reference-guides.html.  
A. ALL VIEWPOINT (AV) 
The All Viewpoint (AV) provides an overview of the architecture and defines 
constraints, requirements, objectives, and key terms for the architecting (as opposed to 
the system being architected). It is composed of the AV-1: Overview and Summary 
Information and AV-2: Integrated Dictionary (DOD CIO 2010). 
B. CAPABILITY VIEWPOINT (CV) 
The Capability Viewpoint (CV) describes the capability of the system under 
development and its relationship to other systems (DOD CIO 2010). It is composed of 
seven models: CV-1: Vision, CV-2: Capability Taxonomy, CV-3: Capability Phasing, 
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CV-4 Capability Dependencies, CV-5: Capability to Organizational Development 
Mapping, CV-6: Capability to Operational Activities Mapping, CV-7: Capability to 
Services Mapping. Each is described in Figure 68.  
 
 
Figure 68.  DODAF Capability Viewpoints. Source: DOD CIO (2010) 
C. DATA AND INFORMATION VIEWPOINT (DIV) 
The Data and Information Viewpoint (DIV) describes information requirements 
and rules from Conceptual (DIV-1), Logical (DIV-2), and Physical (DIV-3) perspectives. 
Each is described in Figure 69.  
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Figure 69.  DODAF Data and Information Viewpoints. Source: DOD CIO 
(2010) 
D. OPERATIONAL VIEWPOINT 
The DODAF describes nine (broken into six types, with several sub-types) 
Operational Viewpoints that “describe the tasks and activities, operational elements, and 
resource flow exchanges required to conduct operations” (DOD CIO 2010). These 
facilitate understanding of how the system is employed and operates, its goals, and how it 
interacts with its environment. These viewpoints are described in Figure 70.  
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Figure 70.  DODAF Operational Viewpoints. Source DOD CIO (2010) 
E. PROJECT VIEWPOINT (PV) 
The DODAF Project Viewpoint (PV) describes the information necessary for the 
various program management activities required to bring a system into being (DOD CIO 
2010). These are described in Figure 71.  
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Figure 71.  DODAF Project View Points. Source DOD CIO (2010) 
F. SERVICES VIEWPOINT (SVCV) 
The DODAF Service Viewpoint (SvcV) describes the services and their 
interconnections provided to or from the system being modeled (DOD CIO 2010). These 
are described in Figure 72.  
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Figure 72.  DODAF Services Viewpoints. Source: DOD CIO (2010) 
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G. STANDARDS VIEWPOINT (STDV) 
The DODAF Standards Viewpoint (StdV) describes the various internal 
interactions and interdependencies of the system (DOD CIO 2010). They are described in 
Figure 73.  
 
Figure 73.  DODAF Standards Viewpoints. Source: DOD CIO (2010). 
H. SYSTEMS VIEWPOINT (SV) 
The DODAF Systems Viewpoint (SV) describes the “systems and 
interconnections providing for, or supporting, DOD functions” (DOD CIO 2010). This is 
a particularly useful view for the SoS-TDM and SoS-AFAM when developing an SoS 
composed of DOD systems. The thirteen views are described in Figure 74.  
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Figure 74.  DODAF Systems Viewpoints. Source: DOD CIO (2010) 
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APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FROM THE IDF-SOS 
The actual modeling and simulation of SoS is a well-defined and well-understood 
field of study outside the scope of this research. Furthermore, the actual exploration of an 
SoS tradespace is conducted in a manner similar to any other multi-dimensional 
tradespace exploration and is also outside the scope of this research. This appendix 
provides additional details regarding the IDF SoS model and simulation that were 
necessary for the demonstration, but extraneous from the main purpose of the research. 
A. CONSTITUENT SYSTEM INFORMATION 
1. Shooters 
The first set of systems are those that provide the function “shoot.” To shoot is to 
propel a projectile from one location to another. The shooting function is measured by 
two MOEs, “Probability of a Hit” and “Probability of a Kill.” Probability of a Hit (Phit) is 
the probability that a system will hit the location at which it aimed. Note that once a 
round is fired, it will land somewhere. There is a 1- Phit probability that the fired rounds 
land at a location other than the one the shooter aimed at. Probability of a Kill (Pkill) is the 
probability that a shot fired will kill a target at the location where the round impacts. This 
is assessed independently for each target at that location. Note that these measures are 
high-level generalizations of other performance measures that may be considered in 
higher fidelity models such as: rounds fired per target, rounds per minute, time of flight, 
or explosive radius. Finally, the shooting systems also have a “memory” which assesses 
how long a system can remember the information (regarding targets) passed to it.  
a. System 1 – Afghan Army Artillery Battery 
The first available system is an Afghan Army Artillery Battery. This a unit of four 
to six artillery pieces, such as the 122mm D-30 howitzer, an artillery piece originally 
made in the former Soviet Union. The Afghan Army has historically lacked advanced 
training, communications, and equipment; thus, this system is less accurate than a 
comparable American one. 
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b. System 2 – U.S. Army Artillery Battery 
A U.S. Army artillery battery is composed of six howitzers. For this example, the 
howitzers are M198 or M777 (the updated version of the M198) 155mm howitzers. U.S. 
Army artillery units have modern equipment, communications, and significant training 
that results in highly accurate fires. 
2. Deconflicters 
The second important function is aggregating and deconflicting the information 
presented in the SoS to maximize the potential for enemy killed and minimize the 
potential for civilian casualties. These systems, the deconflicters, do this through 
collecting information, developing it into a world view, and then using this world view to 
make decisions. The primary metric by which the deconflicters may be measured is 
through their “memory,” that is, how much information can they store and process.  
a. System 3 – Afghan Army Kandak (Battalion) Headquarters 
An Afghan Army Kandak (the equivalent of a U.S. battalion) is typically 
commanded by a lieutenant colonel and has a staff that facilitates information processing 
and decision-making, but limited communications capabilities. Afghan units, such as the 
aforementioned artillery battery and to be described rifle platoons, habitually report to the 
Kandak headquarters. 
b. System 4 – U.S. Army Battalion Headquarters 
A U.S. Army battalion headquarters, also commanded by a lieutenant colonel, has 
a robust staff and communications equipment that are capable of receiving and 
processing significant amounts of information and directing the activities of subordinate 
and collaborating units. 
3. Observers 
a. System 5 – U.S. Army Rifle Platoon 
A U.S. Army Rifle Platoon is an infantry unit of approximately 40 soldiers. 
Importantly, for this example, the platoon has a fire support team of a forward observer 
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and his radio-telephone operator (RTO) who specialize in identifying targets and calling 
for indirect fire. They typically have significant training in this area, and equipment for 
observing, locating, and identifying targets. In this situation, similar to recent modern 
experiences, it is difficult, however, for U.S. observers to distinguish between civilian 
targets and enemy targets masquerading as civilians. 
b. System 6 – U.S. Special Operations Forces Team 
A U.S. SOF Team is a 12-soldier team trained in various specialties. In particular, 
there are soldiers trained and equipped for indirect fire observation to the same or 
superior levels as the forward observer team in a Rifle Platoon. Moreover, SOF Teams 
are trained and equipped to work with and communicate with foreign military forces, thus 
enabling them to communicate with the Afghan forces in this example.  
Although a Special Operations team is de jure a member of the U.S. Army, Air 
Force, Navy, or Marines, special operations have evolved to such an extent that the 
command and its subordinate systems are, de facto, independent of their separate 
services.  
c. System 7 and System 8 – Afghan Army Rifle Platoons 1 and 2 
For this example, there are two identical systems, Systems 7 and 8. Both are 
Afghan Army Rifle Platoons. These are similar to U.S. Army Rifle Platoons, but they 
lack the level of training and equipment, resulting in less accurate calls for fire; however, 
being local forces, they are more likely to correctly distinguish between civilian and 
enemy targets. 
d. System 9 – U.S. Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
The final potential system is a U.S. Air Force Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). 
It provides full motion video observation. It can only observe a small section of the area 
of operations at any time, and thus has a relatively low likelihood of identifying a target; 
however, if it does identify the target, it very capable at providing an accurate location. 
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4. Communication Systems 
The potential communication systems for this SoS are the communication sub-
systems each system has. Furthermore, there is the potential to refactor one system, the 
“U.S. Headquarters,” so that it can communicate on the “Afghan FM” (by adding an 
“Afghan Liaison”). The five communications systems are: 
• Afghan FM Radio: This is a standard two-way FM radio. The language 
spoken on this channel is Dari (an Afghan language). The radio itself is 
unencrypted. 
• One Station Remote Video Terminal (OSRVT): This is a U.S. military 
system that allows a UAV to provide video feed to the user and for the 
user to communicate with the UAV.  
• U.S. FM Radio: This is a standard two-way FM radio. The language 
spoken is English and conforms to all normal military radio standards. The 
radio transmissions are encrypted. 
• Blue Force Tracker (BFT): This is a U.S. military system in which users 
can see each other’s location on a map (based upon their GPS signal) and 
send text messages. 
• My Internet Relay Chat (MIRC): Is an encrypted computer chat program 
used by the U.S. military. It functions like any other sort of Internet instant 
messenger chat. 
B. ORGANIZATION DEPICTIONS 
Each full size organization description is depicted in this section. 
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C. INDIRECT FIRE OPERATIONAL SIMULATION 
1. Methods and Notes 
For this example, the author used MATLAB to define the IDF-SoS operational 
and cost models. This was both for convenience and control. MATLAB is readily 
available and has extensive network science packages. Furthermore, by using MATLAB 
for both the operational and cost models, the author was able to make explicit the utility 
of the SoS-TDM. In future situations, an engineer may use any general-purpose 
programming language (e.g., JAVA, Python), particularly ones that have pre-built 
network science routines. For the SoS operational modeling and analysis, any of a 
number of models are appropriate depending up the desired performance measures (e.g., 
ABM for operational performance such as AnyLogic or MANA, or cost models such as 
COSYSMO or CoCoMo II). Finally, note that the scenario was for academic purposes 
only. The capabilities of all systems are notional, based upon reasonable judgment and 
open source information.  
2. Indirect Fire Definition 
Indirect fires are “Fire delivered at a target which cannot be seen by the aimer” 
(NATO 2015, 2-I-3). Note that the term fire is used in the common military terminology, 
e.g. “fires – The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a 
target” (ADRP 1–02 2015, 1–39). In this example, the prescribed effect on a target is 
destruction. This is defined as: “Destroy – A tactical mission task that physically renders an 
enemy force combat-ineffective until it is reconstituted. Alternatively, to destroy a combat 
system is to damage it so badly that it cannot perform any function or be restored to usable 
condition without being entirely rebuilt” (ADRP 1–02 2015, 1–28).  
Typically, indirect fire is indirect (i.e., the shooter cannot see the target) for one of 
two reasons: 1) the distance from the shooter to the target is so great that the shooter cannot 
see the target or 2) there is an obstacle between the target and the shooter. In either event, 
the laws of gravity govern the ballistics of the projectile as seen in Figure 87.  
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Figure 87.  Direct versus Indirect Fire 
By the strict definition of IDF, no observer is necessary; however, in order to have 
aimed fire, an observer must see the target and relay information to the shooter. For this 
example, it is assumed that only aimed IDF is allowable. This leads to some basic 
requirements for an IDF SoS. 
The first IDF SoS requirement is that there must be a system or collection of 
systems that provide an “effect on a target.” In this case, the effect is destruction—
imparting damage to such an extent that the target is no longer functional. This means the 
SoS must have a system that sends a projectile. Typically, IDF systems in the military are 
artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles of various sorts.  
The second IDF SoS requirement is that there is a system or collection of systems 
that observe and provide information about the target. This is distinct from any shooter 











The third IDF SoS requirement is that information about the target is 
communicated, and possibly processed, between the aforementioned systems. The basic 
information of target location, description, and other factors must be relayed from the 
observer to the shooter. Furthermore, in order for a shooter to make an informed choice, 
it may need to know target priorities and the locations of other systems in the area (target 
deconfliction).  
An IDF SoS is one that integrates the capabilities of observers and shooters via 
communication and information processing to provide aimed indirect fire on enemy 
targets.  
D. IDF-SOS OPERATIONAL MODEL 
For this model, the scenario, or “Area of Operations” is defined as a series of 
vertical “lanes” that divide a map. Each one of these lanes is a target area, in which all 
shooters have the ability to engage and all observers have the potential to see. In the 
program, this is defined as a vector in which each entry corresponds to a lane as depicted 
in Figure 88.  
 
 
Figure 88.  Area of Operations and Its Abstraction 
L1# L2# L3# L20#…#








Time in the scenario is represented by a time step, notionally one minute long. 
During each time step, every entity views its environment, makes decisions, and then acts 
simultaneously. Targets appear during each time step according to a Poisson distribution 
with a mean of one. Each target is assigned a location by a random uniform distribution 
across the map; each target is equally probably a civilian or enemy target; each target is 
given a pre-determined “presentation time” – how long it exists in the scenario, this is 
determined by a Poisson distribution, with a mean of 7 (i.e., 7 minutes). 
As location is immaterial in this scenario (i.e., it is abstracted away, when we 
assume that all observers can observe any location equally well, and all shooters can 
engage any location equally well), the systems in the SoS are not assigned a location. 
A general outline of how the algorithm that defined the IDF-SoS ABM ran 
follows. This is not intended to be a formal demonstration of the simulation; rather, it is a 
broad overview. 
• Target Creation and Destruction: Targets are created randomly 
according to a Poisson distribution; targets are removed if they have met 
their “presentation time.” 
• External Observations: Observer systems make observations relative to 
what targets are presented and their 𝑃!"#"$# seen in Figure 44.  If an 
observer detects a target, it locates it according to its 𝑃!"#$%& and classifies 
it as civilian or enemy according to its 𝑃!"#$$%&'. Note that deconflicters or 
shooter systems do not make external observations, they receive all 
environmental input from communications received from the SoS. 
• Internal Observations: Each system “reads its messages” received, for 
that time step, from other systems in the SoS. It classifies messages in one 
of two ways—as messages to pass along or as messages intended for 
itself. 
• Message Passing: Each system passes messages it received, but not 
intended for it, to the intended recipient, or, if the system and the recipient 
are not organizationally connected, to another system to which it is 
organizationally connected and is on the shortest path to the recipient.  
For example, if the current system is the SOF Team and the recipient is 
the U.S. Artillery; if the organization is one in which the SOF Team and 
U.S. Artillery are connected (e.g., Organization 1b), the SOF team sends 
that message directly to the U.S. Artillery. If, however, they are not 
organizationally connected (e.g., Organization 1a), the SOF team chooses 
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a recipient on the shortest path to the end system, in this case, that would 
be the U.S. Headquarters (that is, the message would go from the SOF 
team to the U.S. Headquarters to the U.S. Artillery).  
The sender attempts to maintain the same communications system for the 
forwarded message as it was received on (e.g., in the example with the 
SOF Team, if the message was sent on U.S. FM, the SOF Team forwards 
it on U.S. FM). If, however, the sender and next recipient do not share that 
communications platform, the sender must “translate” the message. This 
takes an additional time step and the message will be received in two time 
steps.  
Furthermore, each message is assessed as delivered or not according to the 
probability that the message is received and understood for that 
communications system as seen in Table 12.   
• Message Reading: Each included system then “reads” its messages. 
Messages are of one of two forms, either a Call for Fire (CFF) or a 
Request for Information (RFI). Observers can receive RFI and 
deconflicters can receive CFF. How each system responds to the message 
depends upon the system itself, the organization, and the process. In 
general, the process is as follows: 
• Shooters: The shooters read their messages and determine if they have 
one from a commander. If so, they prioritize those messages.  
If they do have an RFI, which requests what information is known 
about a single location (e.g., how many civilian or enemy targets 
there are), they assess their worldview, which is a composite of 
their observations as far back as their “memory” allows.  
If the systems do not have RFI to respond to, they develop calls for 
fire based upon their worldview. They choose possible targets 
dependent upon the ROE (either maximize the difference between 
enemy and civilian at a location or maximize locations without 
civilians, but with enemy) and then choose a recipient.  
If the process requires a deconflicter, they send to the deconflicter 
that is also their commander (if one exists) or otherwise randomly 
choose between the two. The actual message is sent in a manner 
similar to how it is described in the “message passing section.” 
• Deconflicters: Deconflicters develop their worldview based upon the 
various CFF they receive from observers. They do this in an additive 
manner. For example, if the “U.S. Rifle Platoon” and “UAV” both see an 
enemy target at location one and send that to the “U.S. Headquarters.” The 
“U.S. Headquarters” assesses this to be two (independent) observations of 
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an enemy. Each headquarters’ worldview is based upon how long their 
memory is.  
The deconflicters then develop a new CFF based upon the ROE 
and send it to a shooter, with a priority on a subordinate. Note that 
in processes that do not require a deconflicter, even if one is 
included, it may not “have much to do” as systems will not send 
them CFF directly; it will only pass messages. 
• Shooters: Shooters receive CFF either directly from observers in the 
relevant processes or from deconflicters.  
If the process includes deconflicters, shooters focus solely on 
shooting and simply prioritize shooting targets from their 
commanders, up to the max number of shots allowed.  
Otherwise, shooters must decide upon which CFF from observers 
to act on. They prioritize those from their commanders and then 
make a choice in a similar manner as described for observers, 
although it is more limited as shooters have less “memory.” 
• Shots Fired, Damage Assessed: Once all systems have made their 
decisions, if the shooters made any shots, the effects of those shots are 
assessed.  
Each shot lands at its location according to the shooter’s 𝑃!!"; if a shot 
misses, it lands in the location immediately left or right of the target area 
with equal probability.  
Each target at the impact location is then assessed for damage according to 
the 𝑃!"##. If a target is “killed” it is considered destroyed and removed 
from the simulation. 
• Iteration: These steps are iterated for the length of the scenario. At the 
end of the scenario, the results are tallied, the number of enemy targets 
that appeared, how many were hit, and the same for the civilian targets. 
These results provide the MOEs PTD and PCD and are the outputs for that 
design point. 
E. IDF-SOS COST MODEL 
The IDF SoS cost model is a deterministic formula. The cost of an SoS is a 
function of the sum of the cost of each system in Table 20.  Each organizational 
relationship included in an SoS cost a varying amount as indicated in Table 20.  Finally, 
the cost of a chosen process was a function of the number of operational activities 
required. 
 217 
Table 20.   SoS Cost Table 
System, Relationship, or Process Cost 
Afghan Artillery $20,000 
U.S. Artillery $100,000 
Afghan Headquarters $50,000 
U.S. Headquarters $200,000 
U.S. Rifle Platoon $50,000 
Special Operations Team $120,000 
Afghan Rifle Platoon – 1 $10,000 
Afghan Rifle Platoon – 2  $10,000 
UAV $200,000 
Afghan LNO $50,000 
Collaborative Relationship 15,000 
Subordinate Relationship $30,000 
Command Relationship $30,000 
Operational Activity (Any Type) $10,000 
 
F. TRADESPACE EXPLORATION EXAMPLE 
The tradespace of the IDF SoS is its design space, set of system attributes (PTD, 
PCD, and cost), and the bounds placed upon the allowable design parameters or system 
attributes as discussed in Section IV.E. Decision makers may vary the allowable bounds 
to assess what potential systems may satisfy their requirements. Note that this analysis 
did not include utility functions as these are a second source of subjectivity; however, it is 
fairly simple to modify the tradespace GUI to allow a user to define each utility function 
and their corresponding weights.  
As an example, for the IDF SoS, there are a few features of the tradespace are 
useful to note. First, there is a general correlation between increasing PTD and PCD as 
seen in Figure 89.  This goes against the desire to maximize PTD and minimize PCD. 




Figure 89.  Percent Enemy Killed versus Percent Civilian Casualties, All Design 
Points 
On the other hand, there is no apparent correlation with cost and PTD or PCD as 
seen in Figure 90.  
 
 
Figure 90.  IDF-SoS, Cost versus PTD and Cost versus PCD 
Accordingly, the decision-maker may begin to explore the tradespace per his 
internal values and requirements. For example, if a decision-maker prioritized 
minimizing collateral damage, he could only consider those design that exhibited no 
collateral damage and then compare PTD versus Cost as seen in Figure 91.  Note that the 
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best of these design points, from a PTD perspective, is approximately PTD = 25% and 
cost approximately $600K. 
  
 
Figure 91.  Design Points that Minimize Collateral Damage 
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If the decision-maker considers that 25% PTD is insufficient, and is willing to 
assume more risk with collateral damage, he may easily expand the set of potential 
designs to those that allow up to 10% PCD. This significantly increases the number of 
potential designs, increases the potential PTD to approximately 55%, and at a lower cost 
of approximately $150,000. This is seen in Figure 92.  
 
 
Figure 92.  IDF-SoS Tradespace if 10% PCD is Allowable 
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Finally, if the decision-maker has concerns about including Afghan forces (perhaps 
for political reasons) and is tied to the idea of a hierarchical organization with the U.S. Army 
in control (again, perhaps for political reasons), but still wants less than 10% PCD, some of 
the previous results are not available. He may be able to achieve similar collateral damage 
results, but with reduced PTD (35% from 55%) and a higher cost ($500,000 versus 
$150,000). At a comparable collateral damage and cost (though still more expensive, at 
$250,000) he may achieve only 20% PTD. This is seen in Figure 93.  
 
 
Figure 93.  Afghan Forces and Hierarchy Required, 10% PCD 
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Finally, if the decision-maker still requires his political considerations (including 
Afghan forces and mandating U.S. Army control), but wishes to improve the PTD at the 
cost of relaxing PCD, one can see variations in the tradespace. By relaxing the PCD to 
11% from 10%, one achieves a potential 45% PTD (up 10% from 35%), although at a 
higher cost of $850,000 (up from $500,000) as seen in Figure 94.  To achieve the 55% 
PTD achieved without the political considerations at 10% PCD, but with political 
considerations included, one must raise the maximum PCD to 16%. At this point, there is 
a point that achieves a PCD of 55% for $700,000 as seen in Figure 95.  
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Figure 94.  Tradespace 11% PCD with Potential Political Considerations 
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Figure 95.  16% PCD with Potential Political Considerations 
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The point of this section is, ultimately, not to decide upon a specific IDF SoS 
design, rather, it is to demonstrate how a tradespace tool may be used in the development 
of an SoS design, or design criteria. It can help a decision-maker understand his true 
values, the tradeoffs necessary for the design problem, and potentially, allow operational 
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